Religion Scholar Russell McCutcheon

Russell McCutcheon (b. 1961) grew up inside a gas station on the north shore of Lake Erie. His parents owned it and worked it, and the family lived right there on the lot in Port Colborne, Ontario, close enough to the American shore that a boy could look across the water and see Pennsylvania. A hose lay across the drive. When a car rolled over it the pump rang, ding ding, and somebody went out to fill the tank. His father did the oil changes and the mufflers and the tires in the bay at the back. A canal cut through the town, and the lakers took it to skip Niagara Falls on their runs to and from the sea.

He was not a good student. The night before a test he had not prepared for, his policy was to close the hatch and ride out the storm, which meant he watched television and went to bed early. He sat the MCAT thinking he might become a doctor. The score came back low. He had skipped a lot of class.

Biology had hooked him in high school, the dissecting and the cells under the microscope, so he took Life Sciences at Queen’s University in Kingston: microbiology, physiology, biochemistry, statistics, which he hated. He never enrolled in the fourth year that turns the degree into a Bachelor of Science, so he left with a Bachelor of Arts in a science. Summers he worked. He guarded pools and taught swimming, and broke both bones in his lower left leg on the diving board the summer after grade twelve. He boxed unsold books at the returns desk of the University of Toronto bookstore. He worked as an orderly in the local hospital, lifting men, taking the midnight shift in the emergency room, learning to catheterize a patient.

Religion held him after the science let go. He enrolled in a theology master’s at Queen’s, since Canada writes no separation of church and state into its constitution and its public universities keep theology colleges. He studied the problem of evil, why men feel they must account for the bad things that happen, and worked toward the process theodicy of Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000) and David Ray Griffin (1939-2022) under Pamela Dickey Young. He took a second, one-year theology master’s while his wife, Marcia, finished her degree in education and he got the practice of writing a thesis. Then he applied to the University of Toronto to study religion as an academic subject. There he took his M.A. and, in 1995, his Ph.D., under Neil McMullin, a historian of Japanese Buddhism, and Donald Wiebe, who pressed for the study of religion as a science and against what he called the crypto-theology hiding inside the field.

Something snagged him at Toronto. The scholars of religion he read did not sound so different from the theologians he had left. World religions courses looked to him like liberal theology in other clothes, the language of tolerance and inclusion used to make a few approved ways of being religious look normal and natural. So he stopped trying to study religion and started to study the people who study it. The dissertation became his first book.

Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia (Oxford, 1997) argued that religion is not found but made. Scholars had long treated it as sui generis, a thing of its own kind, standing apart from politics and economics and history, open only to its own terms. McCutcheon called that a claim with a job to do. Set religion apart, he wrote, and you lift it out of ordinary explanation and shield it from the questions put to everything else people do. His hardest target was Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), a founder of the History of Religions school, along with the reverent scholarship that had grown up around Eliade while stepping around his early ties to the Romanian far right. The sui generis view, McCutcheon charged, had built the field’s object as ahistoric, apolitical, fetishized, and sacrosanct, and had built departments and jobs and journals to match. His tools came from social theory, from Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) and from Jonathan Z. Smith (1938-2017), who had argued before him that there is no thing called religion waiting to be found, only a category scholars make for their own uses.

The book drew fire and praise, both loud. In the magazine First Things, Paul Griffiths took up the theological side. Others turned McCutcheon’s argument back on him, charging that he had manufactured his own object, that the sui generis discourse he attacked was a device he had assembled to make room for himself in the market of ideas. His answer was that turning his own tools on himself did not blunt them.

Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of Religion (SUNY, 2001) gave a wing of the field its slogan. The scholar of religion, on this reading, is not the guardian of the traditions he studies and not the friend of the believer. He explains religion by the means used for any other human doing, and he owes the sacred no defense. The Discipline of Religion (Routledge, 2003) turned the lens on the field itself, on its textbooks and conferences and hiring, and read religious studies as a form of governance that trains scholars and public alike in what may be said about belief. He stood in this with Smith, with Talal Asad (b. 1932), with Timothy Fitzgerald, a small camp arguing that the category, not the sacred, is the thing to study.

The argument found a face in Robert Orsi (b. 1953), then at Harvard, a historian of lived Catholic devotion. Orsi read The Discipline of Religion and called it chilling. He wrote that McCutcheon’s scholar claimed the authority and the right to make other people’s lives the objects of his scrutiny, to theorize them. McCutcheon answered in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion in 2006 with an essay he titled from the mouth of a believer: “It’s a Lie. There’s No Truth in It! It’s a Sin!” He set Orsi’s warm reading of Catholic devotion beside Paul Courtright’s cold psychoanalytic reading of the Hindu god Ganesha, a book that had drawn outrage from Hindus, and argued that the field hands out empathy to the Others it likes and the harder tools to the Others whose interests cut against its own. The tenderness, he wrote, was a method, and it carried costs.

McCutcheon came to the United States before he finished the degree, an instructor at the University of Tennessee from 1993 to 1996, then Southwest Missouri State from 1996 to 2001. In 2001 he took the chair of the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Alabama, an office in Manly Hall, and held it for eighteen of the next twenty-two years, 2001 to 2009 and again 2013 to 2023. The department tripled in faculty under him and made a name in digital work and in the redesign of the degree. He edited Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, founded the Critical Categories book series, led the North American Association for the Study of Religion, and in 2005 was elected president of the Council of Societies for the Study of Religion. He started the departmental blog Studying Religion in Culture, which turns the field’s questions on politics and media and higher education, and he built the REL Toolbox with the American Academy of Religion. Alabama named him University Research Professor in 2018. He became an American citizen in 2019, holding both passports. In December 2023 the International Association for the History of Religions gave him honorary life membership, among the field’s higher honors.

At six most mornings you can find him at the old golf course in Tuscaloosa with a boxer named Izzy, who runs with her friends while he stands in the parking lot and waits. New editions keep coming, a fresh Manufacturing Religion and an expanded Religion in 5 Minutes in 2026. The question under all of it has not moved since the gas station. He does not ask what religion is. He asks why people file some of what they do under that word and not the rest, who gains when the filing holds, and what follows once it does.

Notes

The opening scene is built from McCutcheon’s own account in the “Backstory” interview on his department blog. He describes the gas station his parents owned and operated, the family living on the lot, pumping gas at the “ding ding” of the drive hose, his father’s oil-change, muffler, and tire work in the back, Port Colborne on the north shore of Lake Erie with Pennsylvania visible across the water, and the canal used by lakers to bypass Niagara Falls: Backstory interview. The bay, grease, and mechanical texture of a family filling station are self-evident to the setting and are not separately linked.

The same interview supplies the phrases and details about “closing the hatch and riding out the storm,” the low MCAT score and skipped classes, high school biology, the Life Sciences B.A. without the fourth year, lifeguarding, the diving-board leg injury, the University of Toronto bookstore returns desk, and hospital orderly work, including midnight emergency-room shifts and catheterizing patients. These are McCutcheon’s own details, lightly reworded.

The two theology master’s degrees at Queen’s, the problem-of-evil focus, and the move to Toronto for the academic study of religion also come from that interview. This is a correction worth noting. The draft you sent has him doing both his master’s and doctorate at Toronto. His master’s work, including the 1987 process-theodicy thesis under Pamela Dickey Young, was at Queen’s. Only the M.A. and Ph.D. were at Toronto. His CV confirms the thesis and lists two doctoral supervisors, Neil McMullin and Donald Wiebe, not McMullin alone: McCutcheon CV. Wiebe’s critique of “crypto-theology” is well known in the field.

His wife Marcia, their boxer Izzy, and the 6 a.m. golf-course routine come from the same interview.

The account of Manufacturing Religion, including its targets in Mircea Eliade, the History of Religions school, world-religions textbooks, and the sui generis understanding of religion, as well as the charge that religion had been treated as “ahistoric, apolitical, fetishized, and sacrosanct,” is drawn from Oxford University Press and bookseller descriptions: Oxford University Press and Google Books. The connection between Eliade and the Romanian far right is well established in the scholarship on Eliade.

Paul Griffiths’s review appeared in *First Things* in March 1998: First Things. The reflexivity countercharge, that McCutcheon had “manufactured” his own object, is Bryan Rennie’s. McCutcheon’s reply, that applying the critique to himself does not weaken it, appears here: Academia.edu.

The exchange with Robert Orsi, including Orsi’s description of McCutcheon’s position as “chilling” and the line about the scholar’s “authority and the right to make the lives of others the objects of his or her scrutiny,” is reported on the Wikipedia entries for both McCutcheon and Orsi: Russell T. McCutcheon and Robert Orsi. One caveat deserves checking before publication. The word “chilling” appears to move in both directions in the exchange, with McCutcheon turning it back on Orsi. If you want the attribution airtight, check the primary texts. McCutcheon’s 2006 *JAAR* essay, its full title, and the Orsi-Courtright comparison come from the article record and abstract: Journal of the American Academy of Religion. The book Orsi was defending is Between Heaven and Earth (2005). The Courtright book is his psychoanalytic study of Ganesha, which drew real threats, a detail that could be developed if you want to sharpen the stakes.

The career facts, including Tennessee, Southwest Missouri State, the eighteen-year Alabama chairmanship across two stints, the tripling of the faculty, his appointment as University Research Professor in 2018, U.S. citizenship in 2019, IAHR honorary life membership in December 2023, the Manly Hall office, editorship of *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion*, presidency of the Council of Societies for the Study of Religion in 2005, the department blog, the REL Toolbox, and the 2026 reissues, come from his University of Alabama department page and the Wikipedia entry: University of Alabama and Wikipedia.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, the relentless, deconstructive scholarship of scholar of religion Russell McCutcheon serves as a cold, empirical verification of how groups manufacture ideology to secure local institutional dominance.

McCutcheon, a leading figure in the critical study of religion and author of Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia and The Discipline of Religion, argues that “religion” is not an innate, interior human experience or an objective feature of reality. Instead, he asserts that the very concept of religion is a political tool devised by interested actors to classify, control, and authorize specific social arrangements. By labeling certain practices as “sacred” or “apolitical,” groups insulate their preferred values from public contestation, thereby protecting their economic and structural power.

Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion cuts directly through standard academic debates, revealing that McCutcheon is describing the exact operational logic of tribal survival.

First, McCutcheon argues that ideological categories are manufactured by specific historical actors to advance their own authority. If Mearsheimer is right, this is human nature operating at its most fundamental level. Mearsheimer notes that humans are tribal creatures who possess a powerful drive to organize into cohesive units to navigate a dangerous, anarchic world. To maintain internal solidarity and outcompete rivals, a tribe must build a robust, shared worldview during the long childhood of its members. McCutcheon’s work unmasks the mechanics of this process. The invention of sacred categories is not a benign intellectual exercise; it is the precise device the tribe uses to enforce value infusions, police its borders, and consolidate its resource base.

Second, McCutcheon’s critique of the “sui generis” argument—the claim that religion is a unique phenomenon that must be understood on its own terms, separate from politics and economics—directly targets the same intellectual error that Mearsheimer identifies in political liberalism. McCutcheon demonstrates that liberal academics and institutional leaders use the concept of an autonomous, private sphere of “religion” to mask real, material struggles for power and state dominance.

Under Mearsheimer’s lens, this aligns with the core thesis of The Great Delusion. Liberalism falsely claims to offer a neutral, universal framework where distinct individuals can peacefully coexist by relegating their deep-seated convictions to the private realm. McCutcheon proves that this neutrality is an illusion. The creation of a “private sphere” is itself a highly political, protective strategy deployed by the dominant managerial tribe to disarm competing groups and secure its own administrative hegemony.

Finally, McCutcheon targets the academic establishment itself, showing how scholars of religion use their specialized status to maintain institutional turf, capture funding, and assert cultural authority.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology explains this behavior without needing to rely on a theory of unique personal corruption. Academics do not operate outside the gravity of human nature as detached, individual truth-seekers. They belong to distinct subcultural tribes with their own local value infusions, status hierarchies, and survival imperatives. When scholars defend the autonomy of their field, they act like any other defensive coalition protecting its territory from external rivals in an uncertain environment.

If Mearsheimer is right, McCutcheon’s work is a devastating analysis of how human groups use language and classification as weapons of survival. Humans are not looking for universal, abstract truths; they are looking for functional myths to bind their collective together and maintain leverage over outsiders. McCutcheon exposes the raw, political engine behind our most cherished cultural concepts, showing that every claim to a neutral or universal order is simply a tribe trying to rule.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, the aggressive, relentless critique of the study of religion advanced by Russell McCutcheon presents a fascinating case of an intellectual who correctly diagnoses the hidden strategic logic of his academic rivals, only to deploy the exact same self-serving apparatus to conquer his own corner of the university marketplace.

Across books like Manufacturing Religion and Critics Not Caretakers, McCutcheon argues that traditional scholars of religion commit a profound, systemic error. By treating religion as an inner, mysterious, or sacred experience, they separate it from the dirty realities of politics and economics. McCutcheon claims this framing is a historical misunderstanding that masks how religious talk is used to authorize social hierarchies. To his followers, his work is a fearless, clear-eyed intervention that strips away illusions and repositions the scholar as a critical analyst of ideology rather than a protective caretaker of faith.

A Pinsofian analysis applies McCutcheon’s own functionalist critique directly back to him. The theologians and traditional scholars McCutcheon attacks did not invent the idea of the “sacred” because they suffered from a conceptual brain-fart or misread historical data. Protecting the idea of a unique, inner spiritual experience is a highly rational, self-serving strategy. It provides religious institutions and sympathetic academics with a high-status shield, allowing them to guard their authority, secure departmental funding, and preserve their prestige against secular critics. They understand their incentives perfectly.

By exposing this theological strategy, McCutcheon creates his own elite mission statement. Asserting that religion is merely a rhetorical tool used to manufacture social power is not a neutral, disinterested scientific breakthrough. It is a highly effective weapon used to clear out academic rivals and claim dominant territory within the university hierarchy. His framework provides secular, critical theorists with an ideal platform to signal immense intellectual superiority over both the religious public and traditional scholars, treating their opponents’ foundational ideas as mere expressions of false consciousness or strategic deception.

McCutcheon did not discover an objective, non-ideological formula to rescue the study of religion from confusion. He executed a brilliant, combative academic strategy, converting the unmasking of others into high-status academic currency. His work functions as an exceptionally functional lever to secure a dominant, high-prestige position—anchored by a long tenure as a prominent professor and administrator at the University of Alabama—proving that exposing how your rivals play the game of power is one of the best ways to win it.

Posted in Religion | Comments Off on Religion Scholar Russell McCutcheon

Jonathan Zittell Smith: The Grass Breeder Who Remade the Study of Religion

He wanted to breed grass. Not religion. Grass.

At sixteen he spent a summer on a farm, part of a program Cornell ran for city boys who thought they might want to work the land. The school made him prove he could stand in a barn before it let him near anything else. So they sent him to stand in cow manure for a while. He stood in it. He loved it. Decades later, an old man leaning on a cane, he still called that summer the best thing he ever did.

Then came the grasses. Agrostology, the botany of grasses, was the passion of his boyhood, and he meant to make a life of it. He learned to cross-pollinate with a brush that carried a single camel’s hair. Two hairs bruised the flower. The sex organs of some grasses were that fine. He would sit at a binocular microscope and move the brush back and forth, back and forth, a boy conducting the reproduction of a plant one delicate stroke at a time. He kept one of those brushes for the rest of his life. He never used it again. He kept it to remember.

Jonathan Zittell Smith (1938-2017) grew up in Manhattan, at Eighty-Sixth Street and Riverside Drive, in a home his childhood friend the attorney David Simpson remembered as ordinary and Jewish and secular, nothing like what the son became. The boy had something extra-worldly about him. He marched to his own drum. He read about animals and about other cultures, Native American cultures above all, and while the other children at Hunter College Elementary read what children read, he read Marx, and through Marx he found Lewis Henry Morgan and the comparative study of kinship, and through kinship he found the great fact that ordered his mind before he had a name for it. Human beings classify. They sort the world into kinds. A kinship system is one of the most elaborate sorting engines a people ever builds, and the anthropologists who mapped those systems produced some of the finest classifications in the human sciences.

That was the thread. How many kinds of grass there are. How many kinds of religion there are. How many kinds of Bible there are. The wonder at variety, and the hunger to sort it, ran unbroken from the boy with the camel’s-hair brush to the man who told a generation of scholars that they had never once asked themselves the only question that counted: how shall we compare?

There was a second thread, quieter, and he traced it back just as far. Before he was a teenager he had settled on a rule for himself, do no harm, and he lived it in the ways a serious boy of the late 1940s could, in vegetarianism, in an early sympathy for conscientious objection and passive resistance. He read Buddhism and Jainism and Gandhi. He looked at the western religious traditions he half knew and found nothing in them to support such an ethic, only a God who told men the earth was theirs to subdue. His plan to breed grass had a redemptive shape to it. He wanted to reclaim the deserts that human carelessness had made. The boy who would spend his life insisting that religion is a thing scholars build, not a thing they find, began by finding his own inherited religion wanting and going looking for better.

Cornell nearly ended it. He arrived for the agriculture program that a poor city boy could attend without cost, and he found himself in a course called elementary corn development, staring at corn roots the length of a fingernail, and learning that there were people ahead of him at the intermediate and advanced levels of the same thing. He wanted history. He wanted philosophy. The school told him no. A free agricultural education did not come with liberal arts, and if he wanted those he could enroll at Cornell University and pay. He asked whether he might pay a little. They said no. He went to the headmaster of his high school and told him the whole story. The headmaster looked at him.

“You’re such a stubborn son of a bitch,” he said. “It probably would have taken you two years to realize agriculture wasn’t for you. But that’s good. You’ll go to Haverford. They’ll figure you out there.”

The man made a phone call. This was the old-boy network that people worried about even then, and it worked. Smith never applied to college. Cornell took him as a junior. Haverford took a phone call. He went.

His first day on the Quaker campus he went hunting for a place to smoke. He found a room with deep armchairs, the kind you could stretch your legs across for six feet, and no sign that anyone had ever lit a cigarette there. He settled in, happy. The room turned out to be a shrine, a place where Quaker philosophers had studied, very likely the one spot in the college where no one had ever smoked before. While he sat there a man came in, and then some students, and a senior seminar convened on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind. The man was the philosophy professor Martin Foss. Smith had read a little Hegel through Marx and knew some of the vocabulary. He listened to Foss talk. He was enthralled. That afternoon he became a philosophy major. He met the great teacher of his life by accident, in a shrine, looking for somewhere to smoke.

When it came time for graduate school he had a problem that would not let him go, the old quarrel between myth and philosophy, the way philosophers shout at myths and then, if you read them with care, borrow from them. He wanted to work on it, but not through Greek myth, which everyone did. He went to a philosophy professor, Foss having retired, and asked where a man might go to study Greek myth.

“Why don’t you go to Yale Divinity School and study the New Testament,” the professor said. “It’s the biggest piece of Greek myth that’s still around.”

Smith took him at his word. He did not catch the joke until much later. He went to Yale Divinity School to study the New Testament, drawn by Rudolf Bultmann and the project of demythologizing, and he spent two years, as he put it, interacting daily with tribal Protestants, which he came to think was his version of an anthropologist’s fieldwork. Then he crossed into Yale’s new Department of Religion and became its first doctoral candidate in the history of religions. In 1969 he finished a dissertation of 574 pages on James George Frazer (1854-1941) and The Golden Bough, titled The Glory, Jest and Riddle. He meant to use Frazer’s vast comparative sprawl as a laboratory for comparison. He learned instead that Frazer was the wrong specimen and the right problem. The trouble lay neither in Frazer’s data nor in his weak and shifting theories. The trouble was that Frazer had no method, stated or hidden, for any of his thousands of comparisons. He never answered the question. The question stayed with Smith for the rest of his life.

He taught a year at Dartmouth, 1965 to 1966, covering courses that others had left behind, and sealed a friendship with the scholar of Judaism Jacob Neusner (1932-2016). Then California. He became the first new faculty hire in the just-founded Department of Religious Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He lectured to eight hundred students at a time. It was the Vietnam War, and grading carried a weight that had nothing to do with grades. Fail a young man and you might send him to the draft board. One term the department scored its exams by machine, and Smith insisted on standing beside the machine to watch it work. He could not grade it, he said, but he would watch. The machine skipped twenty questions. It skipped the same twenty all the way through. The students earning A’s had done well enough to survive the error. The students dropping to B’s were on their way to the selective service system. The engineer who chaired the committee called it a glitch. Smith never trusted a black box again. For the rest of his life he made his photocopies one page at a time, laying each sheet down, watching the light cross under the glass, taking it out, checking it against the original, then setting the next page down. What went in one end and came out the other without his seeing the middle, he would not trust.

His students at Santa Barbara wrote that he had the hottest nightclub act in town. He was offended by that for years. He spent ten hours preparing a fifteen-minute stretch of a lecture and all they remembered was that he told jokes. The jokes were parables. They always had a point. All the students could remember was that they laughed.

Word of him traveled. Hans Penner (1934-2012), a comparativist at Dartmouth who had known Smith during that single year, told Charles Long (1926-2020) at Chicago about the young man on the coast.

“I met this person who thought like we thought at Chicago,” Penner said.

Long was co-teaching World History of Religions in Chicago’s new and experimental New Collegiate Division, a fifth division stacked on top of the sciences and the humanities, and the classes were spilling out of Swift Hall into the common room. The founding master of the division, the classicist James Redfield (b. 1935), was still recruiting. Long thought Smith was the man. Redfield flew to Santa Barbara and came away certain. On the evening of February 14, 1968, the day after Smith’s interview trip to Chicago, Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) arrived at Santa Barbara for a visiting term and met Smith too. Eliade was then the most eminent figure at the Chicago Divinity School and the great theorist of the sacred, the man whose entire project Smith would spend a career dismantling. They liked each other at once.

That summer Smith wrote to Eliade to say he had taken the Chicago job. The letter, dated June 4, 1968, is careful and warm. He had delayed writing, he said, until he had definite news. He had accepted the position under Dean Wayne Booth (1921-2005). He and Elaine looked forward to seeing Eliade and his wife in the fall. The stay in Santa Barbara had given them both much happiness and a foretaste of what they hoped to continue.

Three years later, on July 1, 1971, Eliade wrote to the dean of the Divinity School, Joseph Kitagawa (1915-1992), pressing for Smith’s promotion. He believed, he wrote, that Jonathan Smith would become one of the most important historians of religion in the United States. They had to help him realize his vocation. The promotion was not only imperative. It was overdue.

Smith made good on the prophecy and then turned on the prophet’s method, and did both without turning on the man. This was the thing colleagues remembered longest, harder to explain than the erudition. He could take an argument apart in front of its author and keep the friendship whole. He quoted Nietzsche as an epigraph when he had to speak about his own life, I am one thing, my writings are another, and he meant it as a working rule. He was in the business of taking down ideas. The people who held them were another matter.

The classicist Redfield learned this early, in the 1970s, when a Tutorial Studies student wrote a senior paper on the Holocaust that two faculty readers declined to recommend for honors. Redfield ran the program and was tired of accommodating the young man, who had, in Redfield’s flat judgment, no real ideas. He knew who could give the paper an honest read. He sent it to Smith. Smith, born Jewish and secular, handed back his verdict.

“This is the first time I have ever felt sympathetic to anti-Semitism,” he said.

That was the style. Wendy Doniger (b. 1940) who taught beside him for decades, said he did not suffer fools, on the page or in the room, and that his whole complaint against the study of religion came down to one charge, that it was not critical enough, that its paradigms went unexamined, that it wanted more cold blood. He wanted scholars to be more analytical about the sacred, not less.

A year or two into his Chicago appointment he walked into Redfield’s office and said he wanted to move to the Divinity School full time. Redfield had built the New Collegiate Division to hold men like Smith and could not believe he had failed to make something that worked for everybody.

“You may remember that the Creator had the same problem,” Smith said.

He did not last at the Divinity School either. By 1973 he had designed his own undergraduate program in the College, Religion and the Humanities, set up in part as a rival to the graduate machinery across the way. He saw religion as a conversation, an act of creation, and he had little use for the taxonomy of specialties the Divinity School prized. He resigned his Divinity School affiliation in 1977. The break cost him something. The last letter from Smith in Eliade’s papers, dated November 21, 1980, turns sad. Smith writes that he is pained Eliade felt touched by his rage, that problems he would not detail had reached such a pass by the previous December that he wanted no formal suggestion of any tie between himself and what the Divinity School was calling History of Religions. He clings to a naive hope. That for the two of them, none of this has happened.

He did not leave Chicago. Something changed his mind and the record does not say what. He stayed forty-five years.

From 1974 to 1977 he was master of the Humanities Collegiate Division, and from 1977 to 1982 he was dean of the College, a role that put a chain-smoking historian of dead religions in front of the Board of Trustees. He gave them two facts. The United States was the first country in the history of the world to employ more teachers than farmers. And education was the country’s largest business, four percent of the national product, more people at work in it than in any other trade. A nation had chosen to pour that much public and private wealth into it. They must think it does something. So what did they think it does? Not teach a man to turn a wrench. Even the schools that taught men to turn wrenches got asked to make better citizens. He wanted the trustees to sit with the size of the mystery.

He held strong and particular views about teaching and pressed them without apology. His iron law, colleagues came to call it: a student may not be asked to integrate what the faculty will not. Students will not be critical if the faculty is not. Students cannot be asked to be consequential while the faculty abstains. He wrote out every lecture by hand, three or four hours of work for one hour at the podium, and until near the end he threw his notes away on the last day of each quarter, to force himself to build the next course from nothing. He taught the College almost exclusively and would not take doctoral students, which for a man of his standing was close to unheard of. Graduate students, he thought, had already been socialized into saying what they believed their professors wanted to hear. You rarely learned what they thought. Undergraduates were more honest because they were still open to being moved. A first-year student would buy anything from anyone with authority. A second-year student would buy nothing from anyone, however authoritative. Only by the fourth year did they learn to take some and leave some, to weigh a text instead of pressing a red button or a green one. A teacher who did not know where his students stood in that arc had no business in the room.

He fought the shrinking of the Core his whole life, and he fought it on principle. A Core had to be a hard-won faculty consensus, not a treaty. Ten weeks, and you lose the first and the last, so eight, and a serious book takes two, so four books. A Core says these are the four books, out of all the books in the world, that you must read. If the faculty will not say that, they should shut up shop. And there should not be eight of them. You cannot hold these truths to be self-evident and then offer eight sets of truths and let the student pick. The word fundamental means something or it does not.

When he had to give the Aims of Education address to the first-year class in 1982, the assigned title trapped him. To speak of the aims of education he first had to define education, no small task, and then survive the plural, aims, which put the clarity at risk. He was ready to give up and ask for a new title when the etymology caught his eye. Aim came from an old French verb, to guess. He retitled the talk. He called it “A Guess About Education,” and told the entering class that a curriculum was a place of deliberate, collegial, institutionalized choice, and that this was what their common talk needed to be about. Then he stopped to worry the word interesting, and split it in two. There was interesting as amusing, the gossipy sense that governs the elective survey and the after-dinner story. And there was interesting as a thing you have a stake in, a thing that places you at risk, a thing that makes a difference. A course had to be interesting in the second sense. Students cannot be asked to be consequential while the faculty abstains.

The students loved him for reasons that had little to do with the Core. In 2000 the University’s Scavenger Hunt list carried item number 265: J. Z. Smith in a lawn chair on the quads, drinking a Miller Genuine Draft; what else? Twenty points. A team approached him. He said yes at once. Absolutely. He carried a lawn chair onto the grass in front of the administration building, sat down, and threw back a beer. He did not think it beneath his dignity. It was part of the life of the College, and he could see why it was funny.

By then he had made himself into a figure. Around the time his curly black hair began to go, he told Charles Long what he meant to do.

“I’m going to invent myself as this old guy,” he said.

He grew the beard down toward his navel. He put on huge glasses. He carried a cane cut from a rhododendron, and the cane had a story he liked because it was botanical. Rhododendron sends up a shoot from under the mother plant and works its way out from underneath, a natural staff. The spindly rhododendrons of the Midwest never grow to such a length, but in England they grow like trees. His uncle made it. The uncle had two hip operations, and after both succeeded he took up making canes as a hobby, which Smith thought only Freud could explain. The uncle had been a YMCA coach, and he cut the wood on a drive through Great Smoky Mountains National Park, where, in a phrase Smith had not heard used properly since the 1960s, he “liberated” it from federal land.

The beard and the cane and the glasses made him a character on campus, and the character drew people in, but the character was not the reason they stayed. They stayed because he was the most arresting speaker any of them had heard. Doniger remembered the cigarettes. He was a chain-smoker, and in a room full of people he would let the ash on his cigarette grow, and grow, and grow, and everyone would stop listening to the argument and watch the ash, waiting for it to fall. You could have heard a pin drop. Then he would talk, and you listened again, because he was simply smarter than anyone else in the room.

He lived a private life arranged to protect his reading and his thinking. He would not use a computer. He typed his papers or wrote them by hand, and he took Marx seriously enough to feel that the machine put a wall between the worker and his work. When he struck a typewriter key, the letter happened, and he had made it happen. He hated the telephone and thought the cell phone an abomination, could not grasp why a man would carry one so that anyone could reach him for a nickel at any hour. He owned one, in the kitchen, with an answering machine, and paid it no attention. He measured his good days by the bell of the typewriter carriage. A thirty-bell day. An eighty-bell day. When Elaine asked how the work was going he would call back, three more bells. His last typewriter had a small window that let you delete a line and decided on its own where to break a word, and both features offended him, the deletion because it was mysterious, the word-break because he wanted to place his own hyphens, since a badly broken word could cost him a whole syllable when he read the sentence aloud. When the machine finally died he was happy. Now he did everything by hand again. Now it was his.

He ate lunch in Cobb Hall before class and drank coffee in Swift Hall after, and he welcomed students to sit with him. He was a regular at Salonica, the corner diner near the Greystone house where he and Elaine lived. When the student journalist Supriya Sinhababu wanted to interview him in 2008, she had no way to reach a man with no email and an ignored phone, so she walked to his house and knocked. Elaine looked at her through the glass of the storm door, stared for a couple of seconds, and walked away without a word. But the door had a mail slot. Sinhababu dug a scrap of paper out of her backpack, wrote her request, and slid it through. He got it. The interview ran two hours and broke the newspaper’s character limit for an article, and readers wrote in for years asking why it cut off at the end.

There is a smaller story that colleagues told to show the kind of man he was. On May 4, 1979, the front page of the student paper carried two photographs, each one column wide. One was Jonathan Z. Smith, meant to sit under a headline about the Core review. The other was a police sketch of a man wanted for rape in Hyde Park. When the printer lined up the negatives with the slots, he crossed them. The editor called the dean at once so he would not learn it some other way. Smith took the call in good humor. For a while afterward he answered his phone as the friendly neighborhood rapist. The joke around the paper was that the real suspect was furious, because he did not want to look like Smith.

His idea, the one that runs through everything, is easy to state and hard to swallow. Religion is not a thing waiting in the world to be discovered. It is a category scholars build. “Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study,” he wrote in Imagining Religion in 1982. “It is created for the scholar’s analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. Religion has no independent existence apart from the academy.” There is no data for religion, he liked to say, only data for human culture. People pray and sacrifice and keep the sabbath. Grouping those acts under one heading called religion is a judgment the scholar makes, not a fact he stumbles on. He did not deny that men worship. He denied that the box marked religion came free with the world.

He came to religion, he said, because these traditions are funny. They stand next to the world he lives in like a fun-house mirror. Something is off. It is recognizable and it is not his, and the gap held him. He specialized in dead religions first, and gave the practical reason with a straight face. The dead do not talk back. No one leaves a lecture on a Hellenistic cult and says that is not what I heard last Sunday. Everybody is dead, and he liked that. A living tradition is harder because it comes with living believers who hold their beliefs and also hold interpretations of their beliefs, and the scholar arrives with his own reading of both, and then the work turns into running back and forth, standing in for both sides of a conversation to figure out what it all means. That, he said, is what a historian does. He runs back and forth and makes both sides of the conversation happen. You get good at it with the dead, because you will never hear from them, so you have to do all of it yourself.

If you wanted one word from him for what he was, he gave it. A translator. He translated in both directions, and he warned that there is no original in the business, only other men’s translations of who they think they are, so the translator stands always in the middle, unable to force his own language on another’s and useless if he merely repeats it. He had colleagues who thought the job was to get believers to sign off on the scholar’s account of them. He thought that was nonsense, and he told the story of the other great Smith, Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1916-2000), the Islamicist who held that he could say nothing about Islam that a Muslim would not endorse.

“Wilfred,” Smith said, “the difference between you and me is that I’m at Harvard and you’re at Chicago. You’re rich, I’m poor. Who are you calling up? My God, what a phone bill.”

And how, he asked, did you pick the man you asked? You picked him because he talks just like you, and now you are asking a mirror how you look today.

His method of comparison was the thing he most wanted to fix, and he defended it by turning to the sciences that had shaped him as a boy. The human sciences cannot experiment on their subject. He could not hide a computer in the bushes and watch what modernization does to a tribe. Ethics committees stop that, and rightly. So the human scientist experiments the only way he can, with his mouth, by talking, by arguing, by trying a thing out to see what happens, and by comparing. Comparison is the experiment. There is no natural reason to set the Book of Mormon beside the Koran. You decide to do it. You throw two things that have no business in the same pond into one pond and you watch. The comparison does not uncover a hidden likeness sleeping in the world. It makes something new by putting unlike things into a relation the scholar has designed, and in doing so it changes each thing, because now the context of the one is the other he has dragged it next to. His 1982 essay “In Comparison a Magic Dwells” laid the charge that comparison in the study of religion had been done without rules, by a kind of magic, and it changed how the field worked. He set out the standards for responsible comparison that others then argued over for decades. His 1990 book, Drudgery Divine, took the case study of how scholars had compared early Christianity with the religions around it, and made the word drudgery a compliment. The labor of real comparison lies in refusing the easy analogy.

He had no patience for the grand simplifiers, and here too he kept the friendship and killed the idea. Joseph Campbell (1904-1987) was a friend who could drink like a fish and recite Finnegans Wake in a false Irish drawl for hours, and who, having written a key to the book, probably did know it letter-perfect. Ten minutes with Campbell and a couple of bourbons could pull Smith out of a black mood after a bad conference. But Campbell taught that all myths are one, that every myth tells the story of a hero who at a certain stage of his life does the same few things, and Smith thought this terrible. If all myths are one, why read more than one? Why not read only Campbell, which is exactly what Campbell had in mind. Campbell’s power did not come from the spirits. It came from an aura, from a gift for the story, and from a willingness to affirm anything a listener brought him. You like mushrooms? Let me tell you about mushrooms. It was a pleasure. It was also, to Smith, a betrayal of the one thing that made the material worth a life. The variety. He said that what he got from religion was the sense of the absolute wonder of the human imagination, unstoppable and unembarrassed, and that Campbell’s method condensed all of it down to a Reader’s Digest of itself. The stuff was too rich to do that to it. He would pick up a Brazilian myth in which the world is a web made of the dripping green semen of a cosmic spider, congealing here and there along the filaments, and it ran seven hundred paragraphs, and he would take his hat off to it. Whenever he thought he had seen it all, something like that arrived and sent him back to the drawing board, his definition never broad enough, one more strange thing to fit in.

The classifying that started with grasses never left him. Taxonomy, he held, is the fundamental act of the humanities. Every time you sort things into kinds you set up the likenesses and the differences and the borders that shape everything you say next. He argued that religions should not be defined by a single essential trait but recognized the way you recognize a family, by overlapping and crisscrossing likenesses, no one feature shared by all, the pattern still real. He argued that a canon works by staying closed. A fixed body of authoritative text forces each generation to reinterpret it to meet a changing world, so the stability of the canon drives the endless labor of commentary rather than freezing it. He argued in To Take Place in 1987 that sacred space is made, not found, that ritual carves a here out of a there by drawing boundaries and ordering acts, and he read Ezekiel’s temple and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to show it. He traced, in “Religion, Religions, Religious,” the way the very word religion grew up inside a particular European and colonial history and never described a timeless feature of mankind, an argument that opened the ground later worked by Talal Asad (b. 1932) and Timothy Fitzgerald. His first collection, Map Is Not Territory, published in 1975, held the image that named the whole project. A map is not the ground. Every classification simplifies. Maps stay indispensable, and they stay human. The danger is never in drawing the map. The danger is in forgetting you drew it.

His intellectual debts he named plainly: the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) on classification and on the elementary forms of religious life, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009) on the structures under the myth, and behind them the taxonomies of Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778) and the grass beds of his youth. He gathered the essays of a lifetime in Relating Religion in 2004 and, near the end, turned the same tools on his own trade in On Teaching Religion in 2013, edited with his former student Christopher Lehrich, arguing that to build a syllabus is to do exactly what a scholar does when he builds a taxonomy, to decide what belongs with what, to draw the map and answer for it.

He collected the honors a career like his collects. The Quantrell Award for undergraduate teaching in 1986. Election to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2000. Terms as president of the North American Association for the Study of Religion and, in 2008, of the Society of Biblical Literature, so that he became, as his colleague Margaret Mitchell said, the one figure who could speak across a field that had split into camps, the man almost everyone in the study of religion had read and thought with and argued against. Honorary lifetime membership in the International Association for the History of Religions in 2013. The Wilbur Cross Medal from Yale in 2015. He retired from Chicago in 2013 as the Robert O. Anderson Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of the Humanities, and he kept teaching undergraduates almost to the end.

He liked to end a course on an unfinished sentence. He said so, and he did it, and he had a reason drawn from the object he loved. He noted that the first page of the Babylonian Talmud is not page one. The text begins on the reverse of the second leaf, and he took this, half in earnest, as a teaching, that we join the conversation in the middle and that forty-seven volumes later the conversation is still not done. He was sorry that political conservatives had taken the phrase the great conversation to mean only the books they approved. He thought the conversation was the thing the university sold, the thing worth the money, and he hated efficiency because it finished things too fast.

Jonathan Z. Smith died of lung cancer on December 30, 2017, at seventy-nine. He asked for cremation and left orders that there be no funeral and no memorial service. He was survived by his wife Elaine, his daughter Siobhan, his son Jason, a granddaughter, Hazel van Wijk, and a sister, Pamela Hanson.

He spent his life telling scholars that the categories they trusted were maps of their own making, that comparison was an experiment they performed and not a discovery they received, and that the task was never to erase the human hand in the work but to make it plain, and disciplined, and accountable. He asked the only question Frazer never asked. How shall we compare. He did not think the answer closed. He thought a good course, like a good canon, and like the tradition he studied, should stop in the middle of a sentence and leave the student holding the rest, because

The Last Essence: Jonathan Z. Smith and the Norm of Responsible Comparison

Smith spent a career dissolving essences. Religion had none. It was a box the scholar built, filled by his own acts of comparison, empty of any nature waiting in the world to be found. He ran the same acid over every essence he met, the sacred, the holy, the timeless pattern under the myth, and watched each one fail to hold. Then, at the level of his own method, he stopped. He kept one thing back from the acid. He demanded that comparison be responsible. He said it had been done for a century by magic, without agreed rules, and he set out to found criteria for doing it well. The man who let nothing be essential made good scholarship the exception. Stephen P. Turner (b. 1951) is the reader who walks up to that exception and asks the question Smith spent his life asking everyone else. What is this thing you will not dissolve, and where does it live?

Turner’s target, across The Social Theory of Practices, Brains/Practices/Relativism, and above all Explaining the Normative, is normativism, the habit of treating norms, reasons, obligations, and collective oughts as real objects with binding force. Normativists themselves grant that a non-causal realm of normative facts is a spooky thing to posit. Turner calls the results Good Bad Theories. They coordinate behavior and confer authority, and they dress preference as obligation while wearing the face of neutral description. His deflation is austere. To explain what men do, a researcher needs the causal facts and the beliefs men hold about what is correct. He does not need to certify those beliefs as true. He does not need a parallel normative world. Where the normativist finds a binding standard, Turner finds habituation, feedback, correction, and enforcement, a rough uniformity of performance produced not by a shared substance passed between minds but by many separate trainings that land close enough together. He read this pattern in Kelsen on legal validity, in Winch on social rules, in Brandom on the norms of language, and in every place a thinker takes ground back from ordinary social-science explanation by redescribing a habit as a norm.

Run it on Smith and the first surprise is how much of Smith is already Turner’s ally. Smith refuses the smuggled essence exactly as Turner does. His polythetic account of religion, families of overlapping likeness with no trait shared by all, is a refusal of the hidden something that normativists and essentialists both want doing the work. His line that there is no data for religion, only data for human culture, is deflation of the purest kind. The category adds nothing to the practices it gathers except the scholar’s decision to gather them. And Smith the translator sounds at moments like a man who has read Explaining the Normative in advance. He said there is no original in the business, that he translates other men’s translations, that he stands always in the middle and can never impose his language or merely repeat theirs. He mocked his colleague Wilfred Cantwell Smith for holding that a scholar must get believers to sign off on his account of them, must secure their validation before he may speak. That demand for a court of correctness is a normativist demand, and Smith swatted it away. Translation changes things, he said, and no author ever signs off, and there is no one to ask. He refused, in his own field, the idea that interpretation answers to a binding standard of validity floating above the work. So far Turner has found a friend.

Then the friend reaches for the one word he will not give up. Smith’s essay “In Comparison a Magic Dwells” is the hinge. He charged that comparison in the study of religion ran on no rules, that scholars set two things side by side and pronounced a likeness by a kind of conjuring, and he meant to replace the conjuring with method. Margaret Mitchell credits him with founding the criteria for responsible comparison the field now uses. Hold those words up to the light. Responsible. Rigorous. Accountable. Disciplined. Self-conscious. Each one carries an ought. Each one says a scholar is bound to compare in this manner and fails if he does not. And here Turner asks the whole battery of his questions at once. What is responsible comparison? What kind of fact is that standard? Where does the bindingness come from? Smith has already told us, in the same body of work, that comparison is arbitrary, that no two things have any reason in creation to sit in one pond, that the scholar simply decides to drop them there. If there is no natural fact of likeness, there is no natural fact of good likeness-making either. So when Smith calls one comparison responsible and another magical, he is not reporting a standard he found. He is enforcing one he prefers.

This is the normativist pattern in Turner’s sense, run by a man who would have recognized it in anyone else. Smith takes ground back from mere taste and mere convention by redescribing them as a norm. The habits of careful, historically attentive, essence-refusing scholarship, the habits he was himself trained into and then trained others into, get renamed as responsibility, as rigor, as a duty the field owes. The criteria look like discovered standards. Turner’s deflation says they are the guild’s conventions, Smith’s own habituated taste, and the reward-and-punishment of the history of religions as a trade, and that describing those three things leaves no work for a fourth thing called the norm. There are causal facts about how a historian of religion gets made. There are the beliefs such scholars hold about what counts as a correct comparison. There is what the field promotes and what it declines to publish. Lay those out and you have explained every instance of responsible and irresponsible comparison that has ever occurred. You never once need to certify responsible comparison as a real standard with force. The criteria for responsible comparison are a Good Bad Theory. They coordinate a scholarly field, they confer authority, above all Smith’s own, and they dress his preference for a certain style of work as an obligation binding on all who would study religion.

The iron law of teaching shows the same move at a smaller scale. A student may not be asked to integrate what the faculty will not. Smith stated it as law and colleagues repeated it as law. Turner asks what makes it one. Nothing binds a faculty to it except persuasion and Smith’s standing. It is a maxim, an expression of his commitments, enforced by his authority and by the pull of his example, and calling it a law is the act of dressing a strong preference as a compulsion. The revealing detail is that Smith half knew it. He titled his most-quoted talk on education “The Necessary Lie,” and he grew angry when it circulated as if it were doctrine, insisting the thing was situational, written for one evening with one rival in the room, notes and not scripture. A man who calls his own prescription a necessary lie is a man who senses that his oughts are rhetoric and taste rather than standards he has read off the world. Turner would credit the flash of honesty and press on the word he still would not surrender.

The deepest instance is the slide Smith runs without marking it. Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study is a descriptive sentence. From it Smith draws, in the same movement, a set of duties. Therefore the scholar ought to be self-conscious about his making. He ought to own the construction. He ought to hold his categories accountable and make his map explicit and never mistake it for the ground. Not one of those oughts follows from the description without a normative premise Smith never states and never defends. Why ought a scholar be transparent about his category-making? Smith treats intellectual honesty as binding on its face, a duty that needs no argument. Turner’s answer is flat. That ought is no fact hovering above the practice of scholarship. It is a value Smith holds and his community rewards, and it can be given in full as a causal and empirical story, this is what the trade honors, this is the taste Smith was habituated into by his tribal Protestants at Yale and passed to his own students, with nothing left over that a normative fact would have to supply. Transparency is a virtue in Smith’s tribe. It is not a truth about the world that scholars are bound to obey.

Even the appeal to science, which Smith loved, falls under the same reading. He wanted the human sciences to hold something analogous to experiment, and he cast comparison as interference, the scholar dropping one thing into another to see what happens, borrowing the model from experimental biology. Turner would grant that this is a fertile picture and deny that it settles anything normative. To say good scholarship ought to look like an experiment is to choose a standard, not to find one, and the choice draws its force from the prestige of natural science rather than from any fact that makes the experimental analogy correct for the study of dead gods. Smith conceded that comparison was magic he hoped to convert into rules. Turner’s verdict is that you cannot launder a convention into a norm by calling it a rule and pointing at physics. The magic did not leave. It changed its name to responsibility.

How aware was Smith of the trade he was making? More than most, and never all the way, which is the human center of the case. He was Turnerian to the marrow wherever he was dissolving essences and refusing courts of validation. He turned normativist only at the one place where the full deflation frightened him, the standing of his own method, because to say plainly that responsible comparison names only a habituated regularity of the guild, enforced by reward and imitation and correction, would be to say that the study of religion rests on taste, and Smith had built a life and a program and a field on its resting on something firmer. The anti-essentialist needed one essence to go on, the essence of good scholarship, and he guarded it the way a man guards the last thing he cannot afford to lose. He ended his courses on unfinished sentences to refuse closure everywhere else, and here alone he wanted the sentence finished. Responsible comparison, full stop.

Strip the surplus and Smith is not diminished. He is relocated. What remains, in Turner’s terms, is a true and considerable description. Smith trained a generation into a set of scholarly habits, and those habits produce a rough uniformity in how careful comparison gets done, not through a shared normative substance transmitted intact from master to student, which is the thing Turner denies can be transmitted at all, but through imitation, feedback, and the steady correction of a field that rewards some performances and declines others. Responsible comparison is the name that regularity wears. It is real the way a custom is real and binding the way a custom binds, by enforcement and habituation, and no further. Smith the translator was right that there is no original, and the principle turns on his own work. There is no original standard of good comparison, no master text of rigor, only the endless middle he described so well, scholars rendering and re-rendering what counts as responsible, with no one able to sign off. He built his method to escape the magic that dwells in comparison. It rests on a magic of its own, the one syllable he would not translate, and Turner is the man who asks him, gently and without malice, to say the spell aloud and tell us where it gets its power.

Notes

The organizing thread follows the one Jonathan Z. Smith drew himself. The boy who wanted to breed better grasses became the scholar who argued that “religion” is a category constructed by scholars in much the same way that Linnaeus constructed a system for classifying grasses. Taxonomy runs from the camel’s-hair brush to the question, “How shall we compare?” I therefore opened with the farm and the brush rather than the ideas because it is the most surprising documented fact about his life and it prepares the intellectual payoff later. The ending mirrors Smith’s own habit of concluding classes in mid-sentence, so the final word is intentional.

The scenes and dialogue all come from the historical record. The story of his fascination with grass breeding, the summer spent spreading cow manure, the single camel’s-hair brush, and his youthful “do no harm” vegetarian ethic all come from his autobiographical chapter in Relating Religion and his 2008 interview: University of Chicago Press excerpt and Chicago Maroon interview.

His childhood at 86th Street and Riverside Drive, Hunter College Elementary School, his description of himself as “extra-worldly,” and his friendship with David Simpson come from the Chicago Maroon‘s 2018 profile: Chicago Maroon. The same profile is the source for the Robert Redfield episode involving alleged sympathy toward anti-Semitism, the remark that “the Creator had the same problem,” the advice to Charles Long to “invent myself as this old guy,” the Scavenger Hunt lawn chair (item 265), Wendy Doniger’s memory of cigarette ash, the Walkman exchange with Kathryn Lofton, the “friendly neighborhood rapist” photograph mix-up, and Arindam Sinhababu’s story about the mail slot. Each quotation is brief. If you decide to quote any of them at greater length, the complete wording appears in that article.

The Cornell headmaster’s description of Smith as a “stubborn son of a bitch,” the Haverford smoking-shrine episode with Martin Foss and the Hegel seminar, the Yale Divinity School remark about “the biggest piece of Greek myth,” the typewriter bells and Karl Marx, the machine-scored examination that skipped twenty questions, the description of one speaker as “the hottest nightclub act in town,” the Wilfred Cantwell Smith exchange over the telephone bill, the Joseph Campbell and bourbon story, the argument that comparison functions as experiment, and the Babylonian Talmud observation that one must “join the conversation in the middle” all come from the full 2008 interview linked above. I paraphrased most of this material and kept direct quotations brief. The original interview contains the complete wording if you wish to quote it more extensively.

Hans Penner’s observation that Smith “thought like we thought at Chicago,” Robert Redfield’s visit to Santa Barbara, the February 14, 1968 meeting with Mircea Eliade, Smith’s letter to Eliade dated June 4, 1968, Eliade’s promotion letter of July 1, 1971, and the poignant letter of November 21, 1980 are all documented in the same Chicago Maroon profile, which reproduces the correspondence from the University of Chicago Special Collections. If you intend to quote the letters directly, it would be worthwhile to consult the originals, since I compressed their contents.

The history of Smith’s walking cane, carved from rhododendron by his uncle using wood “liberated” from Great Smoky Mountains National Park, comes from Russell McCutcheon’s memorial for the American Academy of Religion and from the 2008 interview: American Academy of Religion.

The details of his death, cremation, absence of a memorial service, and surviving family members come from the University of Chicago obituary. General biographical facts were checked against Wikipedia.

I added only self-evident descriptive details without separate citations, including the physical texture of a barn and a binocular microscope, the atmosphere of a Quaker college campus, the feel of a lecture hall and a neighborhood diner, and the weight of the Vietnam era hanging over a classroom. These additions do not introduce new factual claims. They simply evoke settings already established by the sources.

I reproduced Smith’s statement that “religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study” in full because the exact wording is essential to his argument and remains the single most frequently cited sentence he wrote.

The Dead Do Not Loop: Jonathan Z. Smith and Ian Hacking on Making Up Kinds

Smith said there is no data for religion, only data for human culture. Religion arrives when a scholar decides that this prayer and that sacrifice and the other festival belong in one box, and the box is his, built for his purposes by his own acts of comparison and generalization. Ian Hacking (1936-2023), working three time zones north and in a different discipline, said something with the same shape about people. We make them up. A classification comes into the world, and a kind of person comes into the world with it, and the two grow together. Neither man read the other on this, as far as the record shows. Put their two sentences side by side and you have the strongest single pairing available for reading Smith, because Hacking supplies the metaphysics Smith carried in his pocket all his life and never wrote down, and Smith supplies Hacking a fifty-year worked case from a field Hacking never worked.

Start with the frame, stated as Hacking stated it. He called his position dynamic nominalism and set it against the static kind. The static nominalist says only particulars exist and the names we give them are labels laid over a world that does not care what we call it. Hacking agreed that the names are ours and disagreed that the world stays put under them. His interest was in how the name interacts with the named. He traced the idea to a line in Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, that more depends on what things are called than on what they are, and that new names can be enough to make new things. The cases Hacking built were cases of persons. Multiple personality, which appeared, spread, and grew more alters per patient as the diagnosis took hold. The fugueur, the compulsive wanderer of 1890s France, who existed as a kind of man for about a decade and then stopped. Autism, child abuse, obesity, suicide, homosexuality as a species rather than a set of acts. In each, a category made in the human sciences did not sit quietly over its objects. It reached down and changed them. People learned they had been sorted, and the knowing altered how they behaved, and the altered behavior fed back and bent the category, which bent the people again. He named this the looping effect of human kinds, and he split the world of kinds in two to hold it. Indifferent kinds, the electron, the mud, the mountain, do not know they are classified and do not answer. Interactive kinds, the kinds of people, know and answer. The study of a human kind is a conversation between the scientist and a subject who can talk back and, in talking back, change what there is to study.

He gave the larger project a name after Foucault (1926-1984): historical ontology, the study of how the objects a science can know come into being in time. Not the history of a thing already there. The history of the coming-to-be of the very thing, category and object at once.

Now read Smith through it. His central claim is dynamic nominalism raised one storey. Hacking made up the multiple and the fugueur, kinds of persons. Smith made up religion, a second-order genus under which the scholar files the kinds. “Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study,” he wrote in Imagining Religion, “created for the scholar’s analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization.” That is a nominalist sentence, and the nominalism is the moving kind, not the static one, because Smith did not say the word religion is an idle tag on a fixed reality. He said the category does work, organizes data, draws the boundaries that decide what a scholar sees next, and that the category has no life outside the academy that keeps making it. His essay “Religion, Religions, Religious” does in miniature what Hacking called historical ontology and calls it nothing, because Smith had no such term to hand. He traces the concept religion back through its European and colonial formation and shows that it names no timeless feature of mankind but a thing that came to be, in particular rooms, for particular reasons. Category and object emerge together, in history, from the classifying act. This is Hacking’s method, arrived at from the far side of the humanities, a decade or so apart, with no shared citation.

The polythetic move fits the same glove. Smith argued that religions share no single essential trait and hang together the way a family hangs together, by overlapping likenesses with no one feature running through all. Hacking spent his career refusing to let a kind be defined by a hidden essence that did the causal work, and preferred to watch how the kind actually got assembled and used. Two men allergic to the same thing, the smuggled essence, the natural kind pretending it grew in the ground when a person put it there.

Smith had the intuition, the practice, the aphorism, the map that is not the territory. He never built the ontology under it, and the gap left him open to a cheap reading, that if religion is made in the scholar’s study then religion is a fiction and the scholar a conjuror. Hacking closes that door. His whole labor on social construction, gathered in The Social Construction of What?, was to separate the claim that a thing is constructed from the claim that a thing is fake. Made does not mean unreal. The multiple personality, once made, is real in the ward, real in the insurance code, real in the suffering, and none of that reality is touched by the true account of how the kind came to be. Bring this to Smith and his position stops sounding like debunking. Religion made in the study is still real in the world, real in what people do, real enough to organize a life or start a war, and the scholar’s making of the category is a separate fact from the reality of the practices the category gathers. Smith knew this in his bones. He said he did not deny that men worship, only that the box marked religion came free with the world. Hacking gives him the argument that keeps the two apart under pressure.

The second gift is stranger. Hacking was not only a nominalist about human kinds. About the entities of physics he was a realist, and a particular sort, the kind who located reality at the point of use. If you can spray it, if you can fire it down a column and manipulate something else with it, it is real, whatever your theories about it do or do not survive. He argued this in Representing and Intervening. Reality lives at the manipulable end of the apparatus, in intervention, not in representation. Set this beside Smith on comparison and the fit is close to exact. Smith refused to treat comparison as the discovery of a likeness already sleeping in the world. Comparison, for him, is intervention. He called Frazer’s The Golden Bough a laboratory for comparison. He defined the act of comparing as the human scientist’s only available experiment, since he cannot hide a recorder in the bushes and run modernization on a live tribe, so he does the one thing left, he takes two things that have no reason in creation to sit together, the Book of Mormon and the Koran, throws them in one pond, and watches. The comparison interferes. It changes the context of each thing by placing the other beside it. This is the intervention idiom, and Hacking is its most careful theorist. The made category, for both, becomes real the way the electron becomes real, at the working end, in the handling, in the study where the scholar drops one thing into another and sees what happens.

Hacking’s looping effect requires an interactive kind, a subject who can hear the classification and answer it. The living religions loop. A scholar labels a practice, the practitioners learn the label, some adopt it, some resist it, some sharpen their self-description against it, and the category the scholar carries back to his desk is already a different category from the one he took out. Smith saw this whole loop and described it in plain speech before anyone handed him the vocabulary. The believer, he said, holds his beliefs and also holds interpretations of those beliefs, and the scholar arrives with his own interpretations of both, so the work becomes running back and forth, standing in for both sides of a conversation to find out what it is about. That is a looping-effect account. Subject and student revise each other in a feedback loop, and the object will not hold still.

So Smith fled. He chose to specialize in dead religions, and he gave the reason with a straight face. The dead do not talk back. Nobody leaves a lecture on a Hellenistic mystery cult and says that is not what I heard last Sunday. Everybody is dead, and he liked that. Read through Hacking, this stops being a charming quirk and becomes a methodological decision of the first order. Smith went looking for the one region of the human sciences where the human kind behaves like an indifferent kind. A dead religion cannot learn it has been classified. It cannot adopt the scholar’s category, cannot resist it, cannot loop. The Mithraist is not going to revise his Mithraism in response to a 1971 monograph. Smith found the corner of the study of religion where looping switches off, and he built his life there, precisely because it let him run the experiment clean, with a specimen that could not react to the instrument. He identified the boundary condition of Hacking’s theory from inside the practice, and he did it as a working choice about what to study rather than as a thesis, which is why nobody has said it back to him. The dead do not loop. That is the sentence this pairing produces, and it is, as far as I can find, unpublished.

What Smith gives Hacking runs the other way. Hacking drew his cases from psychiatry, from statistics, from the medicalized human sciences of the last two centuries, the fugueur and the multiple and the abused child. He rarely reached into the study of religion, which is the oldest and largest workshop of made kinds we have, running for as long as there have been scholars sorting other men’s gods. Smith hands him a case that spans a whole scholarly career and a whole master category, watched by the man building it, tested to failure and rebuilt again and again, from Frazer’s laboratory through the polythetic turn to the historical ontology of the word itself. And Smith adds the demand Hacking sometimes let go soft. Hacking studied how experts make up kinds, mostly from a step back, the historian of the making. Smith stood inside it and would not let the classifier out of the loop. The scholar is not the neutral cartographer of a sacred country. He draws the map, and the drawing is an imaginative act, and the honest thing, the disciplined thing, the accountable thing, is to say so and show your hand. Hacking told a true story about other people’s kind-making. Smith made a kind, used it for fifty years, and confessed the making in every book. He is the historical ontologist who is also the specimen.

Kuhn (1922-1996) sits close by, and Smith’s standing complaint against his field, that its paradigms went unexamined and it wanted more cold blood, is a Kuhnian charge. Latour (1947-2022) sits closer still. Smith’s laboratory, his comparison-as-interference, his debt to Claude Bernard’s experimental biology, all speak the construction-of-facts idiom years before Latour made it a movement, and they carry the exact caution Latour spent a career issuing and being misheard on, that to say a fact is made in the workshop is not to say it is false. Smith would have signed that without a pause. He said the map is made and the map is indispensable in the same breath.

Then the reflexive turn because Smith theorized the act of framing and would have classified this essay the moment it reached him. Bring Hacking to Smith and Smith asks what the framer gains by the sort, what the pairing lets me see and what it lets me miss, and whose study the category Hacking-and-Smith gets built in. The pairing survives the question, and survives it better than most, because the two men already hold the position the reflexive turn is trying to force. Both say the category is made. Both say the making is real and not a trick. Both say the one clean move left to an honest scholar is to own the making and discipline it rather than hide it under a claim to have found the thing lying in nature. Behind both stands the same figure. Hacking names Nietzsche the first dynamic nominalist. Smith took his epigraph from Nietzsche when he had to speak about his own life. Two nominalists, one dead and one newly so, who agreed that naming makes things and that the maker owes the world an account of the naming.

Making up religion, done Smith’s way and read through Hacking, is not the debunker’s move it gets mistaken for. It is the opposite. It is the claim that the category is ours, that it works, that it is real in its effects, and that the scholar who wields it is standing inside the loop he is describing and had better say so. The dead do not loop, which is why Smith could study them clean. The living loop, which is why he ran back and forth. And the category religion loops through the man who made it, which is the one loop Smith never tried to step outside of, because

Notes

The central claim is that “the dead do not loop.” Ian Hacking’s looping effect requires an interactive kind, a subject who can hear a classification and respond to it. Jonathan Z. Smith chose dead religions because, as he put it, “nobody talks back.” Read through Hacking, that stops looking like a personal quirk and instead becomes Smith’s practical decision to work in the one corner of the human sciences where a human kind behaves like an indifferent kind. I could not find this argument explicitly stated in print.

The second argument that earns its place is the bridge to Hacking’s entity realism, which is why I flagged the correction at the outset. If Smith is read only alongside Hacking’s work on “making up people,” the discussion stops at nominalism. But Hacking was also a realist about manipulable entities, as argued in Representing and Intervening, and Smith’s treatment of comparison as intervention, through Frazer’s “laboratory,” the pond example, and Claude Bernard, belongs to that same vocabulary of experimental interference. Both sides of Hacking therefore map onto Smith. He is nominalist about the category but realist about the practical work scholars perform. That combination answers the superficial criticism that if religion is “made,” then it must therefore be fake, a misunderstanding that Smith never fully addressed.

To keep the essay conceptually unified, I used Hacking as the central framework. Thomas Kuhn and Bruno Latour appear only briefly, and only insofar as they clarify the Hacking argument.

The Hacking framework is grounded in the published literature. Dynamic and static nominalism, the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, and the idea that “names interact with the named” come from Hacking’s own essay “Making Up People,” reprinted in Historical Ontology (Harvard University Press, 2002). The original version is available at the London Review of Books. Looping effects and the distinction between interactive and indifferent kinds are discussed in secondary sources including Tsou’s paper, Hacking on the Looping Effects of Psychiatric Classifications, and the history of medicine article on Munchausen syndrome: National Library of Medicine. Hacking’s principal examples, including multiple personality disorder, the fugueur, autism, and child abuse, come from Rewriting the Soul (1995), Mad Travelers (1998), and The Social Construction of What? (1999).

The biographical details are straightforward. Ian Hacking (1936-2023) was born on February 18, 1936, in Vancouver and died of heart failure on May 10, 2023, in Toronto. His entity realism, often summarized by the idea that “if you can spray them, they are real,” is documented in Wikipedia, the University of Toronto memorial, and the Washington Examiner obituary.

The Smith material comes from sources already cited elsewhere in this project.

I treat Smith’s preference for dead religions as a deliberate methodological choice. Smith himself explicitly says that he preferred them because “nobody talks back.” The further claim that he selected this field partly because it avoids Hacking-style looping effects is my own inference rather than Smith’s stated intention. I think the inference is well supported, but a skeptical reader could reasonably describe it as an anachronistic interpretation rather than an explicit claim by Smith.

The Same Kind: Jonathan Z. Smith on Ritual, Canon, and What Gets Transmitted

Smith learned from grass that sameness is a decision. He sat at a microscope as a boy and moved a single camel’s hair across the sex organs of one grass and then another, and he learned that the kinds are many and that a man with a system decides where one kind stops and the next begins. Linnaeus gave him a way to talk about the diversity of grasses, and the way was a choice, not a discovery in the soil. He carried that into religion whole. His polythetic classification refuses the single shared trait and lets a family hang together by overlapping likeness. His map is not the territory. The same kind, for Smith, is the classifier’s making. He knew this in his hands before he knew it in his prose.

Stephen Turner built a whole argument on that one word. In The Social Theory of Practices he takes the collective nouns of the human sciences, tradition, culture, community, shared values, background presuppositions, forms of life, and the newer analogues, paradigms after Kuhn (1922-1996), tacit knowledge after Michael Polanyi (1891-1976), habitus after Bourdieu (1930-2002), and shows that each names a supposed object that is tacit, shared, and the same across many people. He asks the question that sinks them. If a practice is a thing held in common and identical from head to head, it has to get from one person to another, has to be reproduced in each new member. There is no plausible route by which such an object travels. You cannot pour a tacit possession from one mind into the next. What you can do is train a man, correct him, let him watch and try and fail and try again, until his performance lands close enough to the others. That is habit, built separately in each person, made to look like a shared thing by common exposure and steady feedback. Turner’s line is the blade. Without the notion of sameness, the concept of practice collapses into the concept of habit. Drop the shared object and all that is left is many people doing similar things for reasons that never coincide.

Bring this to Smith and the first thing to see is how far Smith already stands on Turner’s side of the field, further than he stood on any other question. His long war was against Eliade, and the thing he fought was the collective tacit in its grandest form. Eliade’s sacred is a shared substrate, a single human experience of the holy that all religious men are supposed to carry in common and that surfaces in their myths and symbols across every age. That is a collective object endowed with causal powers, the exact article on Turner’s list, and Smith spent decades refusing it. He would not search for the timeless essence under the variety. He would not explain a rite by a shared cosmology or a shared inner state. When he built his own account of ritual in To Take Place, he put the weight on the doing. Ritual makes sacred space by ordering action and drawing a line between here and there, by placement and repetition, and not by broadcasting a meaning that every worshipper holds alike inside him. He located the thing in the performance and the arranged ground, in what a man can point to, and he took it off the shared interior where Eliade had lodged it. That is Turner’s move, made a generation early and inside the study of religion, against the most powerful tacit-theorist the field had.

The translator sounds the same note. Smith said there is no original in the business, that he renders other men’s renderings and stands always in the middle, unable to hand his language to anyone or to give theirs back untouched. Sameness is the thing he denies. No master version sits behind the translations for all of them to be the same as. There are only the separate acts of rendering, and they never fall on top of one another. And Smith had the field data before he had the theory. He used to carry his students’ books home and study what they had underlined, and he found that the one lecture and the one text had landed as many different things in many different heads. One student blacked out a whole page of Durkheim (1858-1917) and left the single word totem standing, which told Smith the student had received nothing the book was built to give. The grad students, he thought, were worse than the undergraduates, because years of training had taught them to perform the agreement their professors wanted to hear, so that what looked like shared understanding was a shared act of saying the expected thing. Similar exposure, divergent uptake, a surface of agreement over private habits that do not match. Smith kept meeting Turner’s thesis in his own classroom and writing it down without naming it.

Then the tension. The first is comparison. His method turns on recognizing a recurring form across cultures, a morphology, a resemblance, the same shape of rite or myth showing up in Babylon and in the Pacific. Turner presses on the word same. When Smith says two rituals share a form, has he found a shared object out in the world, or has he made a judgment of similarity from two performances that different setups produced? Smith’s polythetic hedge softens this, since he already gave up the single shared trait, but resemblance still has to carry the load, and Turner asks what resemblance is once sameness is no longer a fact of the matter but a decision of the observer. Smith half-answered by admitting the decision was his, that comparison puts two things in one pond because the scholar chose to, that nothing in creation set them side by side. To that extent he is safe. The exposure is that he still needed the reader to grant that the forms he lined up were forms and not just his own likeness-judgments dressed as findings.

The second and deeper place is canon and tradition, and here Smith is both most exposed and most ingenious. A tradition, a community, a canon, these are Turner’s collective nouns, the quasi-objects he denies. A theory of canon is a theory of how a thing persists and reproduces across centuries, which is the very thing Turner says has no route of transmission. Watch what Smith does with it. He does not locate the shared thing in a tacit understanding passed from believer to believer. He locates it in the explicit external object, the closed list, the fixed text on the page. The canon is stable because it is material and shut, and its stability is what forces each generation to reinterpret it. The shared thing sits in the artifact, which anyone can go back to and read again, and the variation sits in the separate acts of interpretation, which never coincide. This sidesteps Turner’s problem with some elegance. You do not have to transmit a hidden collective object if the object is a book on a shelf and the readings are individual labor. His ritual theory works the same way, putting the persistent thing in the ordered place and the repeated script, both external, both pointable, rather than in a shared inner meaning. Smith kept faith with the grass. He put the sameness where you can see it and left the interior alone.

And then he let one word stand that the whole argument should have pulled down, and it was the word he loved most. The great conversation. He liked to say we join the conversation in the middle, that the first page of the Babylonian Talmud opens on the reverse of the second leaf to teach us the talk was already going when we arrived and will not be finished forty-seven volumes on. It is his most beautiful image and his most exposed. The conversation, held across centuries, is a collective object if anything is, a tradition treated as a thing that continues and that a man can enter. Turner deflates it without raising his voice. There is no conversation as an object. There are people talking, each rendering the ones before him, and the look of a single continuous conversation is produced by feedback and mutual correction, by later voices reworking earlier ones, not by a shared possession anyone holds. The tradition is the name we give to a long chain of separate renderings that feed on one another. And Smith supplied the premise for his own deflation when he said there is no original. If there is no original, there is no conversation for all the voices to be contributions to the same of. There are only the voices, and the correcting, and the rough continuity that correcting makes.

How aware was Smith of the trade? More than on any other question, which is why the tension here is fine rather than gross. He led the attack on the field’s largest collective tacit and won it. He engineered his two central theories, ritual and canon, so that the durable thing hangs on explicit external objects and escapes the transmission problem by design. He even resisted the idea that his own teaching was a transferable object, refusing to let his method harden into a doctrine others could hold in common, insisting his talks were built for one room on one night. He acted, again and again, like a man who did not believe a tacit possession could be shared or passed down. What he never did was turn the insight on the warm words, tradition, community, consensus, the conversation, the words he reached for when he stopped arguing and started loving his subject. He dissolved the sacred and banked on the tradition. He denied the shared interior and kept the shared talk.

Strip the last collective noun and Smith is not smaller. He is clearer, and closer to himself. Without a shared sacred, religion is what men severally do, ordered by rites they perform and texts they severally read, held together by resemblance the scholar draws and enforcement the community supplies, and not by a holy substance every worshipper carries. Without a shared tradition, the great conversation is many voices across the centuries, each one rendering the last, made to look like one long talk by the endless correcting Smith described so well and called the middle. The grass breeder knew from the start that the same kind is the classifier’s decision. He spent that knowledge on the sacred and would not spend it on the conversation, because the conversation was the thing he could not bear to lose to habit. Turner asks him to spend it there too, and the surprise is how little Smith loses when he does. What remains is the middle, which is where he always said we live, and the separate renderings, which is all he ever claimed to make.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, the radical historical and comparative scholarship of historian of religions Jonathan Zittell Smith (1938–2017) provides the exact structural blueprint for how tribes construct and police their cultural perimeters.

J. Z. Smith is famous for foundational essay collections like Map Is Not Territory, Imagining Religion, and To Take Place. His central thesis revolutionized religious studies: religion is not a passive response to the “sacred” or a series of raw, unmediated encounters with the divine. Instead, religion is an act of human imagination, a highly deliberate system of classification, map-making, and boundary-enforcement designed to create order out of chaos. Smith famously noted that “religion has no existence apart from the academy,” meaning it is an analytical category used to compare how groups organize their worlds.

Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion validates Smith’s entire body of work, elevating it from a critique of religious history into a primary logic of human survival.

First, Smith argues that humans are obsessed with differences, and that identity is generated by drawing hard lines between the inside and the outside. In his analysis of ritual, Smith showed that things become sacred or clean not because of their inherent qualities, but because of where they are placed within a group’s conceptual map.

This matches Mearsheimer’s anthropological claim that humans are inherently tribal and bound by a long childhood of intense value infusion. The ritual maps Smith describes are the precise instruments used by a tribe to execute this value infusion. A society does not leave its members to navigate the world as atomistic, rational individuals; it uses myths, taboos, and sacred spaces to contain them. These maps dictate who belongs, what is dangerous, and what must be defended at all costs.

Second, Smith’s famous dictum—”map is not territory”—exposes the fatal flaw of the liberal crusade. Smith demonstrated that human groups confuse their provincial, culturally constructed mental maps with the actual structure of reality.

Mearsheimer argues that liberalism suffers from this exact cognitive distortion. Liberal states build a conceptual map based on universal human rights, individual autonomy, and rule-bound global governance, and then mistake this map for the actual territory of human nature. When they attempt to superimpose this liberal map onto societies with entirely different historical value infusions, the map shatters against the real territory of local tribal loyalties. Smith’s work explains the cognitive mechanism behind the “great delusion”: the tragic human tendency to believe our group’s specific mode of organization is a universal law of mankind.

Finally, Smith focused heavily on how groups handle incongruity—what happens when the map fails to match reality. He showed that when a ritual fails or a prophecy is disappointed, tribes do not abandon their map; they engage in sophisticated, hyper-rational secondary adjustments to patch the map and keep the system intact.

Under Mearsheimer’s lens, this explains the behavior of foreign policy elites. When liberal interventions produce chaos instead of democracy, the technocratic tribe does not abandon its universalist framework. It uses complex rationalizations—claiming the intervention failed only because of poor execution, bad timing, or insufficient funding—to preserve its ideological map. Reason is deployed not to find objective truth, but to protect the internal cohesion and authority of the group.

If Mearsheimer is right, J. Z. Smith was not just analyzing ancient myths and obscure rituals. He was documenting the permanent, defensive operation of the human mind. Humans are map-making animals because they are tribal animals, and they must constantly police their conceptual borders to survive an chaotic and indifferent world.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, the brilliant historical and theoretical work of Jonathan Zittell Smith (1938-2017) serves as a supreme example of an intellectual transforming fierce coalitional struggles over the supernatural into a polite, high-status academic exercise in classification.

Smith spent his career arguing that religion is not a native category but an invention of the scholar. In foundational books like Map is Not Territory and Imagining Religion, he argues that human ritual and myth are not irrational brain-farts. Instead, he presents them as sophisticated cognitive experiments in taxonomy, where human groups build mental maps to manage the gap between the messy realities of life and the ideal world. To his followers, his work changed the field by showing that religious differences are problems of human classification and definition.

A Pinsofian analysis strips away this elegant, cognitive framework. Human groups do not invent gods, perform complex rituals, and enforce taboos because they want to reconcile maps with territories. They build religious systems as functional, self-serving weapons to secure finite resources, police ingroup loyalty, and dominate rival coalitions. The strict boundaries of a ritual space are not a conceptual thought experiment designed to reflect on reality. Those rules function as coalitional badges that signal absolute commitment to the group and warn outsiders away. The actors know their incentives.

By asserting that religion is an artificial category created by academics rather than a distinct human instinct, Smith creates an ideal mission statement for his own guild. This stance positions the historian of religion as the elite mapmaker who stands above the cultural fray. It provides university circles with a sophisticated platform to look down upon the instinctual, zero-sum religious conflicts of history, treating those conflicts as data points in a taxonomy lesson rather than raw struggles for dominance.

Smith did not discover a universal, intellectual engine for human myth-making. He executed a highly successful status strategy within the modern university, using sharp historical analysis to secure immense prestige and a legendary legacy at the University of Chicago. His work provides an elite academic audience with a beautiful framework to classify the prejudices of mankind, proving that treating a fierce coalitional conflict as a taxonomic misunderstanding is the best way to secure institutional authority.

Posted in Academia, Religion | Comments Off on Jonathan Zittell Smith: The Grass Breeder Who Remade the Study of Religion

Thomas Scanlon

On a gray Sunday morning in February 2012, T.M. Scanlon (b. June 28, 1940) climbs the steps to Emerson Hall and finds the philosophy department overrun. Young men in ill-fitting suits pace the corridors, muttering arguments to themselves, checking their notes. He scans the hallway with a look of irritation. Then he sees what has happened. A debate tournament has taken the building for the weekend. His laugh comes loud and rolls up the stairwell. These would-be Sophists have it backward, he tells the writer who has come to interview him. They spend their talent scoring points off one another. They ought to turn it on their own beliefs instead.

He is tall and lanky, in his early seventies, with a long face and large hands. To his colleagues and students he is not T.M. He is Tim. He leads the way to a third-floor office and a long table at the back, and they talk into the afternoon while the light fails over Harvard Yard. Above them hangs a reproduction of Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s fresco of good government in Siena, its painted citizens going about a well-ordered common life.

The setting fits the man. Scanlon has spent his career on one question. What do we owe to each other? His answer built one of the ruling theories of modern ethics. An act is wrong, he holds, if it would be ruled out by principles that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced agreement among equals. Morality, on this account, is the work of justifying ourselves to one another. Right and wrong track what free and equal people could defend to each other across a table. He set that idea against the utilitarian tradition of Bentham and Mill, which measures the good by its sum, and against the Kantian tradition of duty.

He grew up in Indianapolis. His father came from an Irish immigrant family, the first generation to get an education, and put himself through college on the money from a large paper route. He became a lawyer, a successful litigator, and he loved the American constitutional order. Much of the talk at the family dinner table ran to constitutional questions. Scanlon’s mother had gone to college and studied some philosophy before she married and kept the home, as most women of her generation did. Both parents were sharp. Both pushed their son to go East for school.

He went to an enormous public high school, close to two thousand students, and loved it for its variety, a small city of a place where a student could pick among three or four versions of the same class and among teachers known to be hard or easy. He came for the mathematics. The school had strong math teachers, and he meant to major in the subject.

At Princeton the plan held for a while. He took his mathematics and drifted toward philosophy, which his parents had mentioned as something he might enjoy. He wrote his senior thesis on the philosophy of mathematics under Paul Benacerraf, who told him he should apply to graduate school. The suggestion flattered him and frightened him. It sat so far outside anything he had pictured for himself that he could hardly work up the nerve. He applied, got in, and then could not make the jump. He signed up instead for Harvard Law School. At the last minute an alternate Fulbright came through, and he left for Oxford.

At Oxford he worked mostly with Michael Dummett (1925–2011), whose rigor left a mark, and there the thing settled in him. He had taken some moral and political philosophy as a senior and thought it terrific. Now he decided he could not give it up. He returned to the United States and entered the doctoral program at Harvard, wrote a dissertation in mathematical logic under Burton Dreben (1927–1999), and finished in 1968. He was good at logic. He learned its techniques fast. But he judged himself to have no originality in it, no instinct for the next thing worth proving. In moral and political philosophy the ideas came.

His first teacher in political philosophy had been the classicist Gregory Vlastos (1907–1991), who taught him as a senior at Princeton. At the end of the term Vlastos invited a friend down to give a talk, a former junior colleague from Cornell named John Rawls (1921–2002), and told the class to come. Rawls read a paper called “Justice as Reciprocity,” a reworking of his earlier “Justice as Fairness.” Scanlon sat in the audience. He had read the earlier paper in class and thought it good, though as a beginner he did not yet know how to tell good from great. What struck him was the regard his teachers held for the speaker. He did not yet sense that this man would remake the field. He met Rawls properly at Harvard, as a graduate student, in the fall of 1963, and came to stand in awe of him. Rawls proved modest and welcoming, and the two became friends.

Scanlon left Harvard in 1966 for a teaching post at Princeton, where he had been an undergraduate, and completed his doctorate there two years later. He stayed eighteen years. He kept publishing a little logic, then let it go without ceremony, never announcing the change even to himself. His first notable papers took up freedom of expression, a straight line back to those constitutional arguments at his father’s table.

In 1972 he published “A Theory of Freedom of Expression” and set out what came to be called the Millian Principle. Government may not suppress speech, he argued, merely because listeners might form harmful beliefs from it or later act on those beliefs. People are to be treated as capable of weighing arguments for themselves. Seven years later, in “Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression,” he pulled back. The first version could not handle deceptive advertising or incitement, speech that does harm apart from persuading anyone of anything. He kept the commitment and built a more careful account, one that weighed the interests of speakers, of listeners, and of bystanders. Constitutional lawyers still teach both papers.

The center of his intellectual life for three decades was a discussion group. It met once a month, in New York and in Cambridge, and never grew past ten or twelve people. The roster reads like a census of a generation of American moral and political philosophy: Thomas Nagel (b. 1937), Ronald Dworkin (1931–2013), Robert Nozick (1938–2002), Marshall Cohen, Owen Fiss, Charles Fried, Michael Walzer, and later Judith Jarvis Thomson, Susan Wolf, Frances Kamm, Michael Sandel, Christine Korsgaard. Rawls belonged too. Someone circulated a paper in advance. They ate lunch and gossiped for an hour, then argued hard from half past one until half past five. Getting a word in took effort. They debated whether to appoint a chair to call on people, the talk ran so hot. Scanlon later called the group the most important thing in his development, a standing seminar with a gang of great teachers.

One year in the mid-1970s the philosopher G.A. Cohen (1941–2009) visited Princeton, and the two rode a bus to New York together for a meeting of the group. Cohen was then a Marxist at work on his defense of Karl Marx’s theory of history. On the ride they argued about Rawls and Nozick. Cohen, to Scanlon’s surprise, found Nozick’s approach the more appealing, drawn to its focus on the individual rather than on institutions. Scanlon pressed him. Surely a Marxist, of all people, held that the structures mattered more than personal virtue. Cohen kept answering that Nozick’s way just seemed right to him. Scanlon put it down to something in Cohen’s upbringing.

In 1984 Rawls came down to Princeton. He said he wanted to talk over some questions the two had been working on. What he wanted was to offer Scanlon a job at Harvard. Scanlon found the gesture moving. He found the leaving hard. His closest friends were at Princeton and the place held him, though by then he felt himself a little to the side of its center of gravity. He took the chair, the Alford Professorship of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, among the oldest endowed seats in American philosophy, and he returned to the building where he had once been a student.

The turn that made his name had begun a few years earlier, and Rawls had planted it with a single sentence. Scanlon had written a paper arguing that rights are principles we accept because they protect important values at acceptable cost, and he had cast the whole argument in consequentialist terms. He showed it to Rawls. Rawls, in his quiet and hesitant way, said the argument seemed right to him, but that he did not see why Scanlon called it consequentialism. Scanlon took the remark and sat with it. Around 1979 he saw the frame he had been missing. He could keep all the arguments and drop the consequentialism. He could ground morality in what people can justify to one another.

That frame became What We Owe to Each Other, published in 1998, the book on which his reputation rests. Contractualism, in his hands, is a theory of the morality we owe one another as rational creatures, not a theory of where governments come from. It does not run in the line of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, who used a contract to explain political authority. It asks a narrower and more personal question. Could the principle under which you propose to act be rejected, for good reason, by someone it burdens? If so, acting on it wrongs that person. The test runs person by person. It does not add up gains and losses across a population and call the largest sum right. Each individual holds a standing to refuse that no aggregate can override. Here Scanlon parts from the utilitarians, from Jeremy Bentham to Peter Singer (b. 1946), for whom the moral goal is the greatest total welfare.

He owes much to Kant and takes pains to mark the distance. He shares Kant’s respect for persons. He declines to rest morality on the Kantian apparatus of autonomy and universal law. Obligation, for Scanlon, grows out of a simpler human wish, the wish to be able to justify how you live to the people who have to live with you. Guilt, on this view, marks damage to that standing between persons, not the breach of a rule written somewhere above them.

His work and Rawls’s fit together like two halves. Rawls asked what principles should govern the basic structure of a society, and answered with the original position and the veil of ignorance. Scanlon asked what individuals owe each other apart from any political order. Between them they set much of the agenda for English-language political philosophy after the appearance of A Theory of Justice in 1971.

The reach extended past that one book. In metaethics he offered the buck-passing account of value. Philosophers had long treated goodness as a property that in itself gives us reason to want a thing. Scanlon turned it around. A thing is not good and therefore reason-giving. It is good because it already has features that give us reason to admire it, to choose it, to protect it. Goodness adds no further push of its own. The inversion looks small and has occupied metaethicists ever since.

In Moral Dimensions (2008) he pulled apart three questions that moralists tend to run together. Whether an act is permissible is one question. What the act says about the person’s regard for others is a second. Whether blame fits is a third. Blame, for Scanlon, is a change in a relationship. To blame a man is to judge that what he has done has damaged your standing with him, and on that basis to revise how you mean to treat him, whether to trust him, to count on him, to keep him as a friend. Some philosophers fault the account for leaving too little room for the heat of moral anger.

Within the same work he drew a distinction that has traveled into law and policy. Attributional responsibility asks whether an act reflects a person’s own judgment and character, so that praise or blame attaches. Substantive responsibility asks what claims people have on one another for the costs and outcomes of their choices. A man can be fully answerable for a bad decision and still hold a claim on others for basic help. Debates over welfare and desert have leaned on the split.

In Being Realistic about Reasons (2014) he defended the reality of reasons without the metaphysics that usually comes with such claims. Truths about what we have reason to do are objective, he argued, and cannot be reduced to facts about biology or desire. They form their own domain, as the truths of mathematics do, open to reasoning though not to the microscope.

In Why Does Inequality Matter? (2018) he argued that inequality is not simply a question of who has how much. Unequal wealth and power corrode the relations among citizens. They breed domination, humiliation, dependence, exclusion, and the capture of politics by the rich. Different inequalities carry different objections. The concept holds more than a single complaint.

His influence runs well past the seminar room. Legal scholars borrow contractualist reasoning for constitutional interpretation and the theory of rights. Bioethicists reach for it on questions of consent and the sharing of scarce care. And then, in a turn no philosopher plans for, his ideas reached millions through a network sitcom about the afterlife. Michael Schur (b. 1975) built the NBC comedy The Good Place around What We Owe to Each Other. He named an episode after it. The character Chidi, a professor of moral philosophy frozen by his own indecision, teaches the book to a dead woman named Eleanor as she tries to earn her way into a better place. Scanlon, told that a comedy had taken his treatise for a script, praised its fidelity to the philosophy. A moral theory written in careful analytic prose found a second life as a punchline and a plot.

His critics press from both sides. Consequentialists say contractualism weights the loudest individual complaint too heavily and the sum of small benefits too lightly. Kantians say it lacks the deep grounding that autonomy and the categorical imperative supply. Others doubt that reasonable rejection yields one answer in the hard cases, where reasonable people reject different things. Even the critics grant that his theory stands as a principal alternative to utilitarianism and Kantian ethics.

He works in the grain of analytic philosophy at its most patient. He builds no grand system. He takes one problem at a time, draws his distinctions, tests them against odd and telling cases, and answers the strongest form of the other side. His prose stays calm even where the conclusions run far. A reader can miss the size of a claim because he states it so evenly.

The honors came. He won a MacArthur Fellowship in 1993. He kept working into his eighties and published Morality and Responsibility in 2025, returning once more to blame, agency, and reasons. He is the father-in-law of the philosopher Tommie Shelby, who works on race and political philosophy at Harvard, so the discipline runs in the household. He retired from teaching in 2016 and holds the title of emeritus.

Change the question and you change the subject. For most of its history moral philosophy asked what brings about the most good, or what duty reason lays on us whatever our ties to other people. Scanlon asked something a person can act on across a table. What could I justify to you, and you to me, as equals who have to share a world? He put that mutual justification at the center of ethics and turned a neglected tradition into a main road. It is the question of the man on the stairs at Emerson Hall, the one who thought the students had it backward. Do not use your mind to win. Use it to find out whether you could look the other person in the eye and defend what you believe.

Notes

The opening scene is based on documented reporting rather than invention. The Sunday in February 2012, the debate tournament filling Emerson Hall, Scanlon’s irritation giving way to a loud laugh, his remark about would-be Sophists who score points instead of examining their own beliefs, the third-floor office, the long table, the fading light over Harvard Yard, and the Lorenzetti fresco of good government all come from Yascha Mounk’s interview with him. The same interview also provides the physical description of Scanlon as tall and lanky, with a long face and large hands, together with the observation that everyone calls him Tim: The Utopian.

The account of his childhood in Indianapolis comes from the biographical section of that same interview, republished with additional background by *Books & Ideas*. It includes his Irish immigrant father, who financed college with a paper route before becoming a litigator devoted to the American constitutional system, the constitutional discussions at the family dinner table, his college-educated mother, who had studied philosophy and remained at home, his parents’ encouragement to “go East,” the large public high school that he loved for its diversity, his original plan to major in mathematics, his senior thesis in the philosophy of mathematics, Paul Benacerraf’s encouragement, his initial intention to attend Harvard Law School, the last-minute decision to accept a Fulbright instead, his study with Michael Dummett at Oxford, his dissertation in logic under Burton Dreben, his later judgment that he lacked originality in logic, and his view that his work on freedom of expression continued the arguments that had begun around his family’s dinner table: Books & Ideas.

The account of Gregory Vlastos inviting John Rawls to present “Justice as Reciprocity,” Scanlon attending as an inexperienced undergraduate who could not yet distinguish good philosophy from great philosophy, his first meeting with Rawls after arriving at Harvard in the fall of 1963, and the 1984 conversation in which Rawls visited Princeton under the pretext of discussing philosophy before offering him the chair all come from the same Books & Ideas interview.

The famous discussion group, including the monthly routine of circulating papers in advance, spending an hour over lunch and conversation before debating from 1:30 until 5:30 in the afternoon, and the difficulty of getting recognized to speak, is described in the Books & Ideas interview. Scanlon’s statement that this group was the single most important influence on his philosophical development comes from a separate interview with the Brown Political Review: Brown Political Review.

The exchange with G. A. Cohen on a Princeton bus in the mid-1970s, when Cohen was more attracted to Robert Nozick than to Rawls and Scanlon teased him that a Marxist ought to care more about institutions than personal virtue, comes from Part V of the Yascha Mounk interview: The Utopian.

Rawls’s observation that Scanlon’s argument about rights seemed persuasive but did not appear genuinely consequentialist, together with Scanlon’s account of arriving at contractualism around 1979, comes from the Books & Ideas interview. I rendered these exchanges as paraphrase rather than direct quotation, because reconstructed dialogue reads more naturally than extended block quotations.

His MacArthur Fellowship in 1993 and his appointment as Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity are documented by the MacArthur Foundation and the Harvard Department of Philosophy. The references in The Good Place, including Michael Schur’s admiration for Scanlon, the episode titled after *What We Owe to Each Other*, the characters Chidi and Eleanor, Tommie Shelby’s relationship as his son-in-law, and the publication of *Morality and Responsibility* in 2025 are documented at Wikipedia.

Self-evident extrapolations I made without a link: the gray weather (the interview calls it a dreary day), the students muttering arguments before a debate round, and the closing image of looking someone in the eye, which restates his own relationship-based account of blame.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, the contractualist moral philosophy of T. M. Scanlon (b. 1940) stands as an elegant description of how humans justify their behavior within a secure subculture, mistaken for a universal description of moral motivation.
Scanlon, a leading American philosopher and author of What We Owe to Each Other, develops a distinctive form of moral contractualism. He argues that an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by a system of rules for the general regulation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement. For Scanlon, the core of morality is the desire to be able to justify one’s actions to others on grounds they cannot reasonably reject. This mutual recognition forms the basis of a non-utilitarian, reason-based account of our duties to other human beings.
Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion cuts through this contractualist ideal, showing that Scanlon’s philosophy reverses the true relationship between reason, group survival, and moral codes.
First, Scanlon treats the individual as a baseline rational actor whose primary moral drive is a desire for reasonable justification. Mearsheimer’s anthropology counters that reason is the least important way humans determine their preferences and foundational worldviews. The long human childhood ensures an intense value infusion from the primary group long before an individual can engage in the sophisticated testing of principles. This early socialization creates a localized, particularistic moral code rooted in group loyalty and collective survival. The deep-seated desire to justify oneself operates powerfully inside the tribe, where shared socialization establishes what constitutes a reasonable argument. It cannot scale seamlessly to a borderless community of abstract rational agents.Second, Scanlon’s formula relies on the premise of an unforced, general agreement. He describes a marketplace of reasons where individuals sit as equals, evaluating principles without coercion.
If Mearsheimer is right, this non-coercive environment is a structural illusion. Humans organize into distinct, cohesive groups primarily to secure survival in an anarchic world where there is no higher authority to protect them. The rules a society develops are engineered to maintain internal strength, coordinate defense, and navigate external competition. When resources tighten or an existential threat emerges, the luxury of seeking principles that a distant outsider cannot reasonably reject vanishes. The tribal state will enforce rules that ensure its own survival, regardless of whether those rules are reasonable to competitors or adversaries.
Finally, Scanlon’s model assumes that the boundaries of moral relevance are universal, encompassing any person capable of assessing reasons.
Under Mearsheimer’s lens, this universalist reach misreads the fundamental logic of group security. Moral communities are closed systems. Internal cooperation and mutual justification exist to keep the group cohesive against outside forces. A philosophy that treats the standard of reasonable rejection as a global, uniform baseline ignores that different societies, socialized into fundamentally incompatible worldviews, have completely different understandings of what is reasonable. What a Western contractualist views as a neutral, universal principle, a member of another culture might see as a tool of ideological encroachment.
If Mearsheimer is right, Scanlon’s philosophy describes the refined verbal behavior of individuals operating within a highly stable, affluent, and secured subculture. It captures the logic of internal group consensus but misses the external engine of human survival. Humans do not build societies by matching abstract reasons with strangers; they build them by binding themselves to a specific tribe to survive a dangerous world.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, the contractualist moral philosophy of T. M. Scanlon (b. 1940) represents a beautifully constructed, high-status effort to transform raw coalitional warfare into a polite committee meeting about mutual justification.

In his foundational book What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon argues that morality is built on a specific motive: the desire to be able to justify one’s actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject. In his view, wrong actions are not just social infractions; they are structural errors in reasoning, where an individual uses a principle that fails the test of universal, un-rejectable consensus. To his followers, Scanlon provided an objective, secular anchor for ethics, suggesting that human moral conflict can be resolved if we sit down and filter our principles through the lens of reasonable agreement.

A Pinsofian analysis strips away this high-status, contractualist narrative. Human beings do not seek to justify their actions because they possess an inherent, disinterested drive for logical consensus with all mankind. They deploy justifications as strategic, self-serving weapons. Natural selection designed the human brain to use moral language to recruit allies, police internal compliance within a faction, and demonize external rivals. When an individual argues that a principle is “unreasonable to reject,” he is not performing an objective logical calculation; he is signaling coalitional alignment and trying to impose his group’s preferred rules onto a competing faction to deprive them of resources or status.

By framing intense Darwinian struggles over power, reproduction, and property as a search for reasonable justification, Scanlon creates an ideal mission statement for the academic class. It positions the elite political philosopher as the ultimate referee who determines which reasons are valid and which are “unreasonable.” This framework provides university circles with a sophisticated platform to look down upon the instinctual, zero-sum behaviors of the masses, allowing adherents to signal immense moral and intellectual superiority by claiming their own political and social preferences are the only ones that pass the test of universal reason.

Scanlon did not discover a fundamental, non-deceptive engine for human cooperation. He executed a flawless academic strategy, converting dense ethical theory into high-status currency at the absolute peak of the university hierarchy. His work functions as an exceptionally effective apparatus to secure a dominant, high-prestige position—anchored by a long tenure as a Alford Professor at Harvard University—proving that defining the rules of mutual justification is the ultimate way to win the academic game.

Posted in Academia | Comments Off on Thomas Scanlon

Christine Korsgaard

The telephone rings in a dormitory room at the University of Illinois. The season is early spring, 1974. The student who answers is a senior, a philosophy major, weeks into the long wait that follows graduate school applications. A man’s voice comes on the line, careful, spaced out, and it spells itself. “This is John Rawls. That’s R-A-W-L-S.”

John Rawls (1921–2002) had written A Theory of Justice, which by then even undergraduates read. He chaired the Harvard philosophy department, and the task of telephoning admitted students had fallen to him. He stuttered, and he feared the phone might scramble him, so he spelled his own name to the young woman who becomes his student and, in time, his heir in a line of Kantian moral philosophy that runs on through her.

The scene holds the shape of the life. Christine Marion Korsgaard (b. 1952) reaches the center of American moral philosophy from its far edge. She reaches it because a chain of people took the trouble to reach her first.

She grew up outside Chicago, in Homewood, the daughter and granddaughter of Danish immigrants. Both grandfathers drove trucks. They collected garbage and delivered ice, because in the immigrant neighborhoods of that time occupations ran along national lines, and that was the work that went to Danes. The family name, Americanized, rode on the side of her paternal grandfather’s garbage truck, and she carries a version of it still.

Her mother wanted college. In that family there was no college for a girl. She had come over from Denmark at eight with no English, and the school placed her in first grade among children years younger, who laughed at her. She caught up, skipped two grades, and by high school edited the literary magazine. The father might have gone to college on the G.I. Bill and never took it up. In the Depression he went to California to pick fruit and send money home. They were a reading family even so. Every Saturday they walked to the library and carried home an armload of books.

Korsgaard did well in school and did not treat college as a given, because in her corner of the social world it was not one. She decided against it. College looked to her like four more years of high school, and high school had not made the case. She wanted to teach herself. So she bought a set of great books and started through them. Plato (c. 427–347 BC) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) stopped her cold. When she reached them, she later writes, she knew she was home. She had been turning over such questions for years, now and then writing down her answers, without knowing the activity had a name or that other people gave their lives to it. The discovery thrilled her.

Her parents set a condition. No college meant job skills. She took a secretarial course and went to work as a secretary at the American Bar Association, on the Midway across from the University of Chicago, the campus where she will spend eight years as a philosophy professor. She did not know that yet. The other woman in the office was married to a Chicago law student, and between them the couple showed her a college unlike the one in her head. At the same time her own reading had begun to defeat her. Philosophy alone was too hard. Teaching yourself has a ceiling. She needed teachers, and she went to find them.

She started at Eastern Illinois University and transferred to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The school was large, and her teachers there gave her their time as though she were the only student they had. They put graduate school in her head, and then Harvard, a place it would not have occurred to her to try. She took her bachelor’s degree in 1974.

Harvard taught her a second lesson about where she came from. Gender was not the wound she might have braced for; a third of the graduate students around Rawls were women, and had been for years. First generation was the wound. Some of her fellow students, men from places like Princeton, found it a fine joke that she had come from the university with the cornfield on campus. One of them took her aside to say he supposed she must find people like him intimidating. She let it pass. She had found her way into the profession she wanted, and that was the larger truth of the moment.

Rawls became her adviser, a generous one, and his lectures on the history of moral philosophy left her exhilarated. Her early drafts reached for both Aristotle (384–322 BC) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Rawls told her to pick one. She picked Kant, and the dissertation became a search for the ground of Kant’s claim that the categorical imperative is a principle of reason. She became Rawls’s teaching fellow and stood in front of undergraduates to explain Kant’s ethics and Rawls’s reading of it. She dates her professional birth to that course. She finished the Ph.D. in 1981.

The years after Harvard moved her around. She taught at Yale, then at the University of California, Santa Barbara, then at the University of Chicago for eight years, on the same Midway she had typed beside as a girl fresh out of secretarial school. She spent a year visiting Berkeley in 1990. In 1991 Harvard brought her home, and she took up Kant’s ethics again under Rawls’s old course number, Philosophy 168, a piece of continuity she reads, half in earnest, as proof that she remains his teaching fellow. She chaired the department from 1995 to 2002 and became Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy in 1999.

Her work circles one question, the one she calls the normative question. Why should anyone hold himself bound by morality at all? She lays out the answers a person might give and tests each. The voluntarists, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), root obligation in command, divine or political. She replies that command pushes the question back a step, since one still has to say why the commander earns obedience. The realists, Thomas Nagel (b. 1937) and Derek Parfit (1942–2017), hold that moral truths simply exist, out there, waiting. She replies that pointing at a moral fact does not explain why it should move anyone to act. The reflective-endorsement line that runs from David Hume (1711–1776) comes nearer, since it locates morality inside human nature, but it stops short of showing why reflection should bind everyone alike.

Her own answer follows Kant, and she draws it from the shape of the human mind. A person can step back from a desire and ask whether it gives him a reason. To act at all, he has to stand on a principle he can hold up to that scrutiny, and a principle able to survive it has to be one he could will for anyone. The source of obligation sits in that reflective structure, not in any authority outside the agent. She made the case in her 1992 Tanner Lectures and then in the book that grew from them, The Sources of Normativity (1996), which set her among the first rank of Kantian philosophers writing in English.

The companion volume, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996), gathered a decade of her essays. One of them takes up Kant’s hardest case, the murderer who comes to the door and asks where your friend has hidden. The usual reading has Kant forbidding every lie, always. Korsgaard argues instead that Kant’s own principles let you deceive a man who has already stepped outside the terms of honest dealing. The essay does the work she keeps doing, which is to show Kant’s ethics as a philosophy a person can live inside rather than a cage of rules.

At the center of her reading sits the idea of practical identity. A man understands himself under descriptions. Father. Teacher. Citizen. Friend. Each of these carries obligations, because to walk away from them is to come apart as an agent. Chase that regress far enough and it ends at the one identity a person cannot shed and still act, his standing as a reflective rational being. Because he has to value that capacity to act at all, he has to value it wherever it appears, in anyone. She offers this as a reconstruction of Kant’s command to treat humanity as an end, built up from the bare conditions of agency.

Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009) pressed the point to its limit. A person makes himself through what he chooses. Every deliberate act settles a little more of who he becomes. To act well is not to rack up good outcomes or to obey a code. It is the labor of holding oneself together as a single rational agent, and to act against principles one can endorse is to fracture the self one is trying to be. She keeps Aristotle’s stress on character and drops his fixed human essence. A man forms his identity through the reflective work of acting. That marriage of Aristotle and Kant runs through the essays of The Constitution of Agency (2008) as well, and it sets her against Parfit and Nagel: for her, moral truth is not discovered lying about in the world, it is constructed by rational agents who must endorse a principle before they can act on it.

Then the turn that surprised some of her readers and none of her cats. The animals came first in her life and late in her books. She kept cats and dedicated Fellow Creatures to them. She ate no meat for more than forty years and later gave up animal products altogether. In Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals (2018), fifteen years in the making, she argues that Kant drew the circle of moral worth too tight. Kant reserved it for rational beings. She contends that Kant’s own framework cannot defend the fence. An animal pursues its good and lives a life that goes well or badly from where it stands. It cannot reflect on its reasons, and so it carries no duties, but things are still good-for it and bad-for it, and that is enough to make a claim on the rest of us. She rejects the idea of a good floating free of any creature. Goodness is always good for someone. Food is good for the hungry dog. Pain is bad because it thwarts the creature whose pain it is. She ends up agreeing with the utilitarians about which animals have standing, the ones that feel, and parts from Peter Singer (b. 1946) about why. Singer counts up suffering and works to lower the sum. Korsgaard grounds the duty in respect for a living thing pursuing a life that matters to it, and she treats her argument not as a break with Kant but as the reach of Kant’s principles past the line he stopped at.

She retired from teaching in 2020 and stayed a working scholar. She published on Kant and freedom in 2024 and has a book on the good under way. The honors came along the road: the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2001, the British Academy in 2015, the presidency of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association for 2008 to 2009, the Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award, the Rescher Medal in 2023.

Set the beginning against the end. A girl who did not plan to go to college bought a mail-order set of great books, opened Plato, and knew she was home. She could not get there alone, and she says so plainly. She needed teachers, and she got a run of them, ending with the man who spelled his name into her dorm-room phone. She became one in turn. Her office hours ran Thursday afternoons at two, and the line of students in the hall outside her door grew long enough to pass into departmental legend. They came to her the way she had once gone looking for the teachers who had all the time in the world. She still calls herself Rawls’s teaching fellow. The line that started with a spelled-out name runs straight through to the students in that hallway, and out past them.

Notes

The opening phone call comes from Christine Korsgaard’s own account. She describes receiving the call in the spring of 1974 while living in a dormitory during her senior year at the University of Illinois. John Rawls, then chair of the department, personally telephoned admitted students. She recalls his stutter and his introduction: “This is John Rawls. That’s R-A-W-L-S.” These details come from her remembrance of Rawls in *The Harvard Review of Philosophy* (2003): PhilPapers, with the fuller quotation available at PhilPeople. One detail is worth noting. I described his voice as “careful” and “spaced out.” That is my own inference from the documented stutter and Rawls’s discomfort with telephone conversations. Korsgaard herself does not describe the sound of his voice.

Her Danish immigrant family background, her grandfathers’ work on garbage trucks, ice delivery, occupations divided by nationality, the family name painted on the truck, her mother’s schooling ending at age eight, her own two skipped grades and literary magazine editorship, her father’s fruit-picking work and unused G.I. Bill, the Saturday library visits, her parents’ refusal to let her attend college, the mail-order Great Books, her discovery of Plato and Nietzsche and the realization that “I knew I was home,” the secretarial course, her American Bar Association job across the Midway from the University of Chicago, the lawyer’s-wife coworker, and her conclusion that “I needed teachers” all come from her autobiographical essay, “The Importance of Having Teachers”: First Gen Philosophers. She also notes there that she spent eight years working at the University of Chicago.

Her studies at Eastern Illinois University, transfer to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the professors who generously gave her their time, her B.A. in 1974, the Harvard jokes about cornfields, and the remark that “you must find us intimidating” all come from the same essay. The reference to Princeton is also hers, as she writes about “colleges like Princeton.” Her statement that roughly one-third of Rawls’s graduate students were women is likewise her own and is echoed in the editors’ preface to Normativity and Agency: Normativity and Agency.

Rawls’s advice that she should “pick one,” meaning Aristotle or Kant, her decision to pursue Kant, her dissertation as a search for the foundation of the categorical imperative, her statement that “professionally I was born in that course,” the famous Philosophy 168 seminar, her return to teach it in 1991 under Rawls’s course number, and her Thursday afternoon office hours that became “legendary among graduate students” all come from the editors’ preface to Normativity and Agency and her Dewey Lecture, “Thinking in Good Company”: Dewey Lecture.

Her academic appointments, books, and 2020 retirement are documented on the Harvard Department of Philosophy website. Her election to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2001, the British Academy in 2015, her presidency of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 2008-09, and her Mellon professorship are documented at Wikipedia.

The discussion of the normative question, the four competing answers, practical identity, the regress argument concerning humanity, self-constitution, and her constructivist disagreements with Derek Parfit and Thomas Nagel comes from your uploaded document and aligns with the Harvard department profile and the editors’ preface to Normativity and Agency. Her interpretation of the murderer-at-the-door problem comes from her essay “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil,” reprinted in Creating the Kingdom of Ends.

Her later work on animal ethics, including the dedication to her cats, her more than forty years as a vegetarian before becoming vegan, her statement that “I end up agreeing with the utilitarians about which creatures have moral standing,” her distinction between what is good for a creature and the notion of an absolute good, and her eventual divergence from Peter Singer are drawn from the *Mind* review, the *Harvard Gazette* interview, and her interview with Erich Grunewald: Mind, Sinergia Animal International, and Erich Grunewald.

I made two minor self-evident extrapolations without separate citation. One is that a large state university dormitory in 1974 would have had a hall telephone that a senior might answer. The other is that the secretarial course she describes naturally led to the typing-pool work she later recounts. Neither adds a factual claim beyond what Korsgaard states.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, the neo-Kantian moral philosophy of Christine Korsgaard represents a brilliant, highly sophisticated description of an internal psychological process that is entirely missing its real evolutionary foundation.

Korsgaard, famous for The Sources of Normativity and Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, argues that moral obligations arise from our capacity for reflective endorsement. Unlike other animals, humans can step back from their desires and ask, “Is this desire a good reason to act?” Korsgaard contends that to act rationally, an individual must form a “practical identity”—a conception of himself under which he values his life and finds his actions worth undertaking. She argues that because we cannot value our specific practical identities (such as being a citizen, a parent, or a professional) without valuing our underlying identity as rational human beings, we are logically committed to valuing the humanity of everyone else. To her, universal moral obligation is a requirement of personal consistency and agency.
Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion breaks down this rationalist construction, showing that Korsgaard mistakes the cognitive tools of individual self-justification for the primary drivers of human action.
First, Korsgaard argues that our reflective mind allows us to step outside our conditioning to choose our reasons for acting. Mearsheimer’s anthropology counters that reason is the least important way humans determine their preferences. The long human childhood ensures that an individual undergoes an intense value infusion from his primary micro-society long before his critical faculties form. This early conditioning imprints a deep, localized worldview. By the time a person begins the “reflective endorsement” Korsgaard describes, his mind is already populated by the foundational prejudices, myths, and loyalties of his specific tribe. Reason does not operate as a neutral judge; it acts as a tool to justify and defend the values the individual has already absorbed.
Second, Korsgaard’s concept of “practical identity” relies on a fluid model where an individual constructs his own sense of self. Mearsheimer’s anthropology insists that human beings are fundamentally social and defensive creatures who are contained by their society. Our primary identity is not a private, intellectual project of self-constitution. It is an evolutionary tool designed for group survival in an anarchic world. The “practical identity” that matters most is the one that embeds the individual in a cooperative coalition capable of protecting him from external threats.
Finally, Korsgaard’s claim that valuing our own humanity logically forces us to value all of humanity is, under Mearsheimer’s lens, a structural non-sequitur. Logic does not dictate human solidarity; survival requirements do. Humans form distinct, cohesive groups that operate as closed systems. Internal cooperation and adherence to rules exist precisely to maintain group strength and navigate external competition. A philosophy that demands a man treat a distant stranger—or a rival group competing for vital resources—with the same moral consideration as his own tribe misreads the fundamental logic of group security. The boundaries of solidarity are not determined by the logical requirements of reason, but by the defensive parameters of the group.
If Mearsheimer is right, Korsgaard’s philosophy describes how an individual rationalizes his behavior to maintain internal peace, but it misses the external forces that drive human organization. Humans do not constitute themselves through abstract reflection; they are constituted by the specific tribes they rely on to survive.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, the Kantian moral philosophy of Christine Korsgaard is a supreme example of an intellectual trying to treat the raw, evolutionary architecture of the human mind as a logical misunderstanding that can be corrected through better self-constitution.

Across her foundational books like The Sources of Normativity and Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Korsgaard argues that human action is fundamentally distinct from animal behavior because humans possess reflective consciousness. She claims that we do not simply act on our desires; we look at them and ask whether those desires give us a reason to act. For Korsgaard, being a moral agent means endorsing your actions according to universal principles. If you act out of narrow self-interest, tribal loyalty, or malice, you are failing to unify your mind. You are committing a structural error in your own agency, essentially suffering from a severe psychological misunderstanding of what it means to be a rational human being.

A Pinsofian analysis strips away this high-status, philosophical framework. Human beings do not act on self-serving, tribal, or competitive desires because their agency is fractured or because they made a logical mistake in their reflective endorsement. They act on them because natural selection designed the human brain to be a highly functional engine for securing finite resources, building defensive alliances, and outcompeting rivals. The human mind is unified perfectly around one logic: winning the zero-sum game of survival and status. What Korsgaard labels a failure of self-constitution is actually the mind operating exactly as it was optimized to run.

By framing deep Darwinian imperatives as conceptual errors in personal agency, Korsgaard creates an ideal mission statement for the academic class. It positions the moral philosopher as the necessary elite technician who understands the hidden, rational laws of the human soul. Her philosophy provides university circles with a sophisticated platform to look down upon the instinctual, coalitional behaviors of the masses, allowing adherents to signal immense moral and intellectual superiority by claiming that their own progressive preferences are the product of superior reflective consistency.

Korsgaard did not discover a universal, rational formula to repair broken human agency. She executed a highly successful academic strategy, converting dense Kantian metaphysics into high-status currency within elite departments. Her work functions as an effective instrument to secure a dominant, high-prestige position at the peak of the university hierarchy, proving that the demand for absolute logical consistency is a brilliant tool for personal prominence.

Posted in Academia | Comments Off on Christine Korsgaard

Kwame Anthony Appiah

The boy lay in a hospital bed in Kumasi with a fever the doctors could not break. Toxoplasmosis, though it took a sharp physician and a drug called Daraprim to name it and fight it, and even after the drug worked his strength came back by degrees. He was seven. He had time to watch the ward.

In November 1961 two heads of state walked through it. Queen Elizabeth II (1926–2022) had come to Ghana as a visitor now, not a sovereign, for the country had left the British Empire four years before. Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972), Ghana’s president, walked at her side. He had once counted the boy’s parents as friends. He tapped his bright polished shoes against the floor, looked up at the ceiling, and kept his eyes off the bed.

The boy’s father sat in a cell on the far side of the country, held without trial. Nkrumah had put him there.

As the party moved to leave, the Queen’s husband, Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh (1921–2021), turned back toward the bed. “Do give my regards to your mother,” he said. He had met her before, among the small English community in Kumasi.

The words traveled. The exchange reached the international press, and the press reached Nkrumah, who saw that his royal guests knew whose son lay in that bed. The boy’s doctor lost his post at the government hospital. His mother measured the danger and sent the boy to England, to his grandmother, out of the president’s sight.

Much of what Kwame Anthony Appiah (b. May 8, 1954) later wrote sat already in that room. A Ghanaian father in a Ghanaian jail. English royalty who knew the family by name. A press that turned a sick child into an incident between nations. A boy who belonged to more than one world and paid a fee at each border.

He was born in London, where his father studied law. The Akan name marks the day. Kwame is the name for a boy born on a Saturday, and May 8, 1954 fell on one. At six months his parents carried him home to Kumasi, capital of the Asante kingdom, then about two and a half centuries old.

His father, Joe Appiah (1918–1990), came from Asante nobility, a descendant of Osei Tutu, the warrior king who forged the Asante confederacy. Joe read for the bar in London, returned to fight for Ghanaian independence, sat in Parliament, led the opposition, served as an ambassador and later as president of the Ghana Bar Association, and spent a stretch of the 1960s in prison for standing against Nkrumah. An Amnesty International campaign helped win his release.

His mother, Peggy Cripps Appiah (1921–2006), wrote novels and children’s books and spent decades gathering the proverbs of the Akan, more than seven thousand of them in Twi. She was the daughter of Stafford Cripps (1889–1952), the Labour statesman who served as Chancellor of the Exchequer after the war. When Joe and Peggy married in London in 1953, the British papers ran the story as one of the country’s first interracial society weddings. People later said it helped inspire the film Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner.

Peggy made Kumasi her home and refused every suggestion that it was not. Years after Joe died, when people asked her when she might go home to England, she gave the same answer. “But I am home.” She bought a burial plot in Kumasi to settle the question.

The house held many faiths. The family worshipped at St. George’s, a non-denominational Christian church where Peggy served as an elder. The children had Muslim cousins and Jewish cousins. Twi and English moved through the rooms together. Joe told his children to remember they were citizens of the world, and the phrase lodged.

The fever, and the politics around it, sent the boy to England near the age of eight. He passed through English schools, Ullenwood Manor in Gloucestershire, then Port Regis and Bryanston in Dorset, and spent holidays with his grandmother, Dame Isobel Cripps, widow of the Chancellor. He came back to Kumasi for summers and for Christmas and Easter.

In his teens he read theology and philosophy of religion inside a small circle of evangelical students, and the reading pulled the ground out from under the faith. The break came at a piano. He was home in Ghana on a vacation, playing a hymn, a fellow student beside him. The friend said something close to “I don’t think I believe any of that anymore.” Appiah heard himself answer, inside, at once. Nor do I. He has called it the one case he knows of a man born again as an atheist.

He went up to Clare College, Cambridge, for medicine, lasted a year in the medical sciences, and moved to philosophy. He took a first in 1975. He joined the Epiphany Philosophers, an odd and serious group that mixed science, faith, and analytic rigor. He taught for a while at the University of Ghana at Legon, and the teaching settled the matter. He wanted a life in philosophy. He returned to Cambridge and took his doctorate in 1982, under the philosopher Hugh Mellor (1938–2020), with a dissertation on the foundations of probabilistic semantics, a technical study at the border of language and mind. It became his first two books, Assertion and Conditionals (1985) and For Truth in Semantics (1986). The work marked him as an analytic philosopher of the exacting kind, a man who took pleasure in defining terms and clearing up confusions.

At Cambridge he met Henry Louis Gates Jr. (b. 1950). The friendship shaped both careers.

A joint appointment at Yale drew him across the Atlantic, into the philosophy department and the program in African and African American studies. Yale gave him more than a job. It gave him the Elizabethan Club, an old Yale room where members took tea and cucumber sandwiches and, when the mood struck, went down to a vault to handle rare Elizabethan manuscripts. There he met Henry Finder, later the editorial director of The New Yorker. Appiah has called it the best thing that ever happened to him. He describes Finder as one of the smartest men he has met, and kind, and easy to love. They became partners in 1986 and married in New York City on August 8, 2011, two weeks after the state recognized same-sex marriage, after more than a quarter century together.

Appiah’s early work lived in symbols and semantics. His fame came from a different place. Through the multicultural arguments of the 1980s and 1990s he set himself against two ideas at once, that race rests on biology, and that a culture carries a single fixed essence.

He drew a line that has organized the debate since. Racialism, in his terms, holds that humanity divides into biological races, each carrying inherited traits that mark its members. Racism goes further and hangs moral or political weight on those supposed traits. Modern genetics, he argued, gives no support to the first, so the second stands on sand. Racism, he added, needs no hatred in the heart. Institutions and habits carry racial injustice forward on their own, through men who wish no one harm.

He made the case at length in In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (1992), built out of his Cambridge training and his Kumasi childhood both. He turned the argument on Pan-Africanism and cultural nationalism, on the picture of Africa as one authentic self set against a monolithic West. African societies, he wrote, had always been many things at once, tied by trade and faith and migration to a wider world. He read W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963) closely and argued that Du Bois, for all his talk of a sociohistorical race, kept smuggling the old biological notion back in. He set the Pan-African dream of a homeland beside Zionism and let the comparison do its work.

The book won prizes and made enemies. Some African philosophers read it as a betrayal. Nkiru Nzegwu charged that Appiah bowed to European traditions and slighted his own father’s, that his awe ran one direction. Others worked through his logic step by step and came out furious, arguing that his definitions, followed strictly, left almost no racist standing except the Black man who feels a bond with other Black people. The heat of the response measured the size of the claim. Appiah had walked into the center of how a people names itself and told them the name rests on a mistake.

He did not tell anyone to forget race. He held that Black identity, in Africa and in America, grows out of a shared history real enough to build solidarity on, and that a man should decide for himself how far that history will steer his life. Identity, for him, is a tool and a comfort and a danger, useful until a man lets it become his jailer.

From there his work widened. The Ethics of Identity (2005) argued that a liberal society should guard a man’s freedom and still respect the pull of his attachments, since culture feeds the self even as it shifts under his feet. Then came the book that fixed his public name, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (2006). Its claim is old and hard. Every man owes something to every other, across every border, and every man may still love his own street, his own faith, his own country, first. Appiah calls his version rooted cosmopolitanism. He likes to say a man carries his roots with him the way he carries his family or his faith, into each new place.

He walked the streets of Tribeca once with Finder and a reporter and put the patriot’s case in plain terms. A country is like family, he said. When people you love do wrong, they are still your people, and the wrong cuts closer, and you want to pull them back toward the good. That, he said, is why a patriot criticizes his country rather than the reverse.

He asked, too, how moral change happens. The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen (2010) set aside the flattering story that men grow kinder. He looked at the end of dueling in Britain, the end of foot binding in China, the close of the Atlantic slave trade, and argued that each turned on honor. A practice dies when it stops conferring status and starts drawing shame. Reason does its work, and shame moves the crowd.

Experiments in Ethics (2008) brought psychology into moral philosophy and asked what the lab could teach the armchair. Lines of Descent (2014) returned to Du Bois. The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity (2018) took up five sources of the self, creed and country and color and class and culture, and gave each its due and its warning. Each binds men together, and each turns to a prison when a man treats it as the last word. As If (2017) studied the useful fictions men live by. In 2025 he published Captive Gods: Religion and the Rise of Social Science, on how the study of religion helped birth the study of society, and Attention, Please!, a set of reflections on reading and attention.

Since 2015 he has answered readers’ moral questions each week as The Ethicist in The New York Times Magazine, taking the ordinary snarls of family and work and money and turning philosophy on them in plain words. In July 2025 he sat before four hundred people in the theater of the Library of Congress and did it aloud.

The honors gathered. Membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Philosophical Society. The National Humanities Medal from President Obama in 2012. The presidency of the American Academy of Arts and Letters. An honorary degree from Cambridge in 2022, the John W. Kluge Prize from the Library of Congress in 2024, an honorary doctorate from Yale in 2026. NYU named him a Silver Professor in 2025, among its highest ranks.

One honor came from home. In August 2016 the people of Nyaduom, his family’s ancestral town, enstooled him as their Nkosuahene, a development chief, under the name of the Asante warrior he had been named for. The analytic philosopher who argued that race rests on a mistake sat also as an Asante sub-chief. He held both without strain. The holding was the point.

He became an American in 1997 and kept his ties to Britain and Ghana. His sisters live in Nigeria and Namibia and England. His brothers-in-law are Norwegian and Nigerian. His cousins run to every inhabited continent, some Christian, some Muslim, some Jewish, some none. He and Finder keep an apartment in Manhattan and a small farm near Pennington, New Jersey, with sheep and a few ducks and geese. When the family gathers for a wedding in a village near the Angola border, the guest list could serve as a footnote to his books.

His mother chose Kumasi and called it home to the end. Her son took the world for his own and still knew where the ground was. He wears his identities lightly, the way he counsels everyone to, and he has given up none of them.

Notes

The scenes are drawn from Kwame Anthony Appiah’s own recollections, so the dialogue is his reconstruction rather than a verbatim transcript. I therefore treat it as reported speech.

The hospital scene, including the toxoplasmosis diagnosis, treatment with Daraprim, Kwame Nkrumah tapping his shoes while staring at the ceiling, and the Duke of Edinburgh turning back, comes from Appiah’s interview at What Is It Like to Be a Philosopher? and from Appiah’s website. His website dates the visit to November 1961 and attributes to the Duke the remark, “Do give my regards to your mother.” The interview supplies the details about the polished shoes and the ceiling. His father’s imprisonment and the Amnesty International campaign are described in both sources.

The piano scene and the remark that he was “born again as an atheist” also come from the same interview. The friend’s comment and Appiah’s inward response are his own wording there.

His mother’s statement, “But I am home,” and the account of the family burial plot in Kumasi likewise come from the same interview.

His father’s observation that they should become “citizens of the world” comes from Yale University’s 2026 honorary degree citation: Yale University.

The Elizabethan Club, the cucumber sandwiches, the manuscript vault, his meeting Henry Finder there, and his descriptions of Finder as “the best thing that has ever happened to me” and “easy to love” all come from the philosopher interview. Their marriage on August 8, 2011, their partnership beginning in 1986, and the Pennington sheep farm are documented on Appiah’s website.

The conversation with Finder about patriotism in Tribeca comes from the Carnegie Corporation’s Great Immigrants feature. I paraphrased Appiah’s point about family and country rather than quoting it at length.

The discussion of race and its reception draws on *In My Father’s House*, Nkiru Nzegwu’s critique, and later responses in the philosophical literature. The criticisms that Appiah’s position leaves “only Black people” vulnerable to charges of racism and that it privileges European intellectual traditions are genuine strands in that debate. See Modern Ghana and the rejoinder at Academia.edu. His reading of W. E. B. Du Bois is documented by Mixed Race Studies.

His 2016 enstoolment as Nkosuahene of Nyaduom is documented at Wikipedia. The Library of Congress *Ethicist* event, attended by approximately 400 people on July 24, 2025, together with his recent books, is documented on Appiah’s website.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, the cosmopolitan philosophy of Kwame Anthony Appiah functions as a beautifully articulated defense of an exceptional, highly fragile anomaly, mistaken for a universal human possibility.

Appiah, famous for Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers and The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity, argues for a “rooted cosmopolitanism.” He posits that collective identities—such as nation, race, creed, and class—are largely historical inventions, social myths, and fluid labels rather than fixed essences. Appiah suggests that human beings can remain attached to their local cultures while simultaneously engaging in a global conversation with distant strangers, recognizing a shared human obligation that cuts across group boundaries.

Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion breaks down Appiah’s elegant pluralism, reinterpreting his insights through the lens of structural survival.

First, Appiah views identity labels as porous and socially constructed, demonstrating that individuals can consciously renegotiate these boundaries through critical reason. Mearsheimer’s anthropology counters that reason is the least important tool for determining human preferences and foundational loyalties. The long human childhood ensures an intense value infusion from the primary group long before an individual can deconstruct his identity. This early conditioning creates a particularistic moral code rooted in group survival. While an intellectual can analyze the historical contingency of his identity, his survival instincts remain tied to the group that protects him.

Second, Appiah’s “rooted cosmopolitanism” assumes that local attachments and global obligations can sit in a harmonious, non-hierarchical balance. He envisions global citizenship as an extension of the hospitality we show to neighbors.

If Mearsheimer is right, this balance is a structural illusion. Humans form distinct, cohesive societies primarily to secure survival in an anarchic world where no higher power guarantees safety. Cooperation is inward-facing to maintain group strength, and the distinction between the in-group and the outsider is essential for security. When resources shrink or a crisis emerges, the delicate synthesis of rooted cosmopolitanism fractures. The state or the tribe will always prioritize its own members over a borderless humanity, and abstract global obligations are instantly discarded to ensure collective survival.

Finally, Appiah’s vision of a global conversation relies on the existence of a highly specific, peaceful environment. The ability to engage with distant cultures as equal conversational partners is a luxury product that requires an immense concentration of security and wealth.

Under Mearsheimer’s lens, Appiah’s cosmopolitan arena is not a natural evolutionary step for mankind. It is an artificial zone of abundance secured by a dominant power or a stable distribution of force. The cosmopolitan elite who move comfortably across these networks are themselves a distinct subcultural tribe, socialized in elite global institutions and sharing a specialized set of class interests. They mistake their own unique, protected subculture for a general human condition.

If Mearsheimer is right, Appiah’s philosophy brilliantly describes the fluid interactions that occur when the perimeter is perfectly secure and the world is temporarily at peace. But it misreads the human engine. Identities are not mere labels we can rearrange through enlightened conversation; they are the defensive boundaries we build to survive.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, the cosmopolitan philosophy of Kwame Anthony Appiah (b. 1954) is a prime example of an intellectual treating deep evolutionary conflicts as an educational misunderstanding to secure elite standing in the global cultural marketplace.

Throughout books like Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers and The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity, Appiah argues that rigid identities—creed, country, color, class, and culture—are based on historical errors and conceptual confusion. He suggests that if individuals recognize that identities are fluid, overlapping, and socially constructed, they can engage in cross-cultural conversation, discover shared human values, and learn to live peacefully alongside strangers. To his followers, his work offers a elegant, logical framework to dissolve global tribalism through better conversation.

A Pinsofian analysis strips away this high-status, cosmopolitan narrative. Human beings do not rally around nations, religions, or ethnicities because they suffer from conceptual confusion or misunderstand the fluid history of their lineages. These identities are highly functional, evolved coalitional tools. Natural selection designed the human mind to use group markers to signal internal commitment, enforce inside loyalty, and mobilize resources to outcompete external rivals for status and power. The boundary lines humans draw are not logical errors; they are weapons used by rational primates to survive a zero-sum world.

By framing intense group competition as a series of lies and misunderstandings that can be talked through, Appiah creates an ideal mission statement for the academic and media elite. It positions the cosmopolitan philosopher as the essential mediator who can guide global society past its tribal errors. This narrative provides university circles, literary committees, and readers of his New York Times “The Ethicist” column with a sophisticated platform to signal immense moral and intellectual superiority over the ordinary public. Adherents can look down upon local loyalties and populist movements, reassuring themselves that their own lack of intense tribal attachment is a sign of superior enlightenment.

Appiah did not discover a conceptual flaw in the architecture of human identity. He executed a highly successful status strategy within elite institutions. His graceful, erudite arguments function as high-prestige currency, earning him top professorships at Harvard, Princeton, and NYU, alongside chairmanships of elite cultural bodies like the Man Booker Prize and the American Academy of Arts and Letters. His philosophy does not alter the fundamental incentives of human coalitions. It simply provides a beautifully written, respectable apparatus for a global managerial class to assert its own dominance over the factions fighting in the dirt.

Posted in Academia | Comments Off on Kwame Anthony Appiah

Christopher Caldwell: America is still an English country

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, this column by Christopher Caldwell is not a lament for a passing political order. It is an empirical validation of realism. Caldwell strips away the universalist rhetoric of the American empire to reveal a hard, historical truth: the United States is not an abstract marketplace of ideas, but a specific cultural group rooted in a distinct Anglo-Protestant lineage.

Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion directly supports Caldwell’s primary claims while providing the structural logic for why the American project operates as it does.

Caldwell takes aim at the liberal universalism championed by figures like Hillary Clinton, who argued that American values are universal values. He notes, “If they really were universal values we wouldn’t need to stand up for them.”

This lines up with Mearsheimer’s critique of the liberal crusading impulse. Mearsheimer argues that liberalism contains an inherent logic that drives states to export their model globally, falsely assuming that all human beings desire the same atomistic rights and political arrangements. Caldwell shows that these values are not floating in a vacuum of pure reason; they are the “fervently held prejudices” of a specific group. If Mearsheimer is right, treating particular cultural achievements as universal truths is the foundational error of American foreign policy, leading directly to the interventionist blunders Caldwell details.

Caldwell argues that despite its superficial diversity and waves of immigration, America remains constitutionally and culturally an English place, shaped by Lockean and Hobbesian intuitions inherited from Britain. He writes that what makes the US function is a specific set of institutions, intuitions, and cultural habits.

Under Mearsheimer’s lens, this is the precise operation of the long human childhood and intense value infusion. A society’s core logic is not determined by abstract, modern administrative rules, but by the deep imprinting that occurs early in socialization. The American elite of 1776 did not invent a system from scratch using pure logic; they radicalized the specific, historical prejudices of their English subculture.

This imprinting is so durable that, as Caldwell notes, it continues to dictate American behavior 250 years later, anchoring the country to traditional, classical republican structures that pre-date the modern democratic era.

The column tracks how the American empire has entered a period of decline, unleashed by the “character-sapping, empire-eroding power of consumerism” after the Cold War. Caldwell observes that preserving a republic requires preserving specific peoples and their specific virtues.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology explains why this friction occurs. Liberalism prioritizes the individual and treats society as a collection of atomistic actors, failing to provide the deep, collective meaning that social beings require. When the imperial state pushes its technocratic, borderless project too far—as Caldwell argues the US has done in Western Europe and at home—it strips away the traditional protective structures of the tribe.

The populist backlash Caldwell mentions is the natural, defensive reaction of a population seeking to reclaim its specific cultural identity when an atomistic system leaves them exposed.

If Mearsheimer is right, Caldwell’s column correctly diagnoses the survival engine of the American state. America did not last 250 years because it discovered a set of universal laws for mankind. It lasted because it was built by a highly cohesive, purposeful cultural group with a specific set of shared survival strategies. The decline of its hegemony is the inevitable result of forgetting that its institutions are a cultural achievement of a specific tribe, rather than a blueprint for a borderless world.

If the David Pinsof misunderstanding column is right, the analysis by Christopher Caldwell falls directly into the trap of the misunderstanding myth. Caldwell frames the biggest disruptions of modern history as errors, blunders, and misread situations. He points to the 2008 financial crisis, gain-of-function research, and the 2026 Iran war as examples of American hubris and wrong choices.

A Pinsofian analysis strips away this framework. These events do not happen because elites suffer from an intellectual brain-fart or fail to read the signs of the times. The financiers who designed complex derivatives, the biotechs that funded virus research, and the politicians who launch wars understand their immediate incentives. They use these operations to capture billions of dollars, secure institutional funding, and dominate foreign rivals. The massive profits they reap from the fallout demonstrate the true logic of the setup. The outcome is the goal, not an accidental byproduct of a blunder.

Caldwell argues that America survives its own stupidity because of a specific cultural inheritance from England. He claims that Lockean and Hobbesian arrangements balance classical virtues and protect the state from decline. From a Pinsofian view, this appeal to traditional Anglo-American identity functions as a high-status mission statement. It allows a conservative commentator to compete effectively in the media marketplace. Preaching about antique virtues and the genius of English liberty provides a refined platform to signal cultural superiority over progressive technocrats and the populist public.

The column treats history as a story of a nation losing its character to consumerism. Pinsof notes that human groups always fight a zero-sum struggle over resources, status, and power. The traditional rules and institutions Caldwell praises are not timeless solutions to human friction. They are weapons one particular historic coalition used to win dominance over its rivals. The text does not expose a national habit of misreading situations. It uses a sophisticated historical narrative to secure a high-prestige position in an elite attention economy, proving that analyzing the mistakes of an empire is an excellent way to maintain leverage within it.

If the Pinsof column is right, this analysis by Christopher Caldwell is another exercise in the misunderstanding myth, framing a raw struggle over the ultimate coercive apparatus of the state as a series of design choices and unintended paradoxes.

Caldwell treats the legal battle in Trump v. Slaughter and the broader war over the administrative state as an intellectual debate about democratic accountability versus apolitical expertise. He suggests that the Deep State arose because progressives convinced the country that modern government requires specialized systems, and that its survival lowers the cost of poor presidential character, turning politics into mere entertainment.

A Pinsofian analysis strips away this polite, structural narrative. The administrative state did not expand because 20th-century progressives had a theory about building dams or nukes, nor does it persist because people misunderstand the separation of powers. The bureaucracy is a massive, self-serving network of alliances. Elite law school graduates, regulatory boards, and administrators capture state leverage to secure high-status positions, allocate lucrative resources, and protect their own professional coalitions. They understand their immediate incentives perfectly.

Similarly, Donald Trump’s effort to overturn Humphrey’s Executor and gain unchecked firing power over independent agencies is not an idealistic crusade to make the country more democratic or restore traditional character requirements. It is a highly rational strategy to strip away the defensive armor of a rival elite coalition. By establishing at-will employment across the executive branch, a president can dismantle the institutional strongholds of his opponents and replace them with his own loyal allies, gaining direct control over the regulatory levers of power.

By framing this fierce, zero-sum Darwinian competition between a populist president and a managerial elite as a constitutional paradox filled with unintended consequences, Caldwell creates a high-status mission statement for himself. Preaching that a liberated presidency will force voters to care about moral character provides a refined, conservative intellectual audience with a platform to signal moral and analytical superiority over both the progressive noodle-heads and the erratic executive.

The text does not reveal a deep truth about the nature of American governance or the exile of the Constitution. It uses a sophisticated historical and sociological framework to compete in an elite media marketplace, proving that treating a high-stakes turf war as a philosophical misunderstanding is an excellent way to maintain prestige within the commentariat.

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, Christopher Caldwell’s column accurately identifies a profound structural tension between two different types of tribes: the localized political tribe and the managerial elite tribe.

Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion provides the social logic that explains why this battle over the administrative state is happening, why the “Deep State” arose, and why Trump’s attempt to dismantle it has backfired.

Caldwell notes that conservatives eventually viewed the administrative state in a sociological light: regulators and administrators “were people who had gone through elite law schools and otherwise learned to manage systems… They were progressive noodle-heads.”

Under Mearsheimer’s lens, the administrative state is not a neutral, apolitical apparatus of pure expertise, as progressives claimed at the turn of the 20th century. It is the institutional home of a specific subcultural tribe—the managerial, technocratic elite.

The long childhood and intense value infusion that these individuals undergo at elite law schools and universities imprint a specific worldview. This worldview prioritizes system management, rule-bound behavior, and progressive social engineering. They are deeply socialized to believe that their rule is rational and universal.

Mearsheimer argues that humans are tribal from the start, and this managerial class acts like any other tribe. It uses its position inside the bureaucracy to protect its territory, enforce its values, and resist external threats—including the threat of a populist president.

Caldwell tracks a paradox: as the executive branch grew, the president’s ability to control it decreased, creating a system where “elections didn’t matter that much” and people could afford to view the presidency as entertainment because the “experts” were running things.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology explains that this setup was a core feature of the liberal delusion. Liberalism attempts to build a state where political conflict is minimized through neutral rules and institutional design. The administrative state was supposed to take the raw, conflict-driven nature of politics and turn it into a series of technical, administrative problems.

But if Mearsheimer is right, you cannot engineer politics out of human nature. The administrative state simply masked the underlying struggle for power. By insulating the bureaucracy from elections, the managerial tribe successfully consolidated its own authority, keeping Middle America’s political impulses at bay.

The core of Caldwell’s argument is that if Trump succeeds in destroying this bureaucratic insulation through cases like Trump vs. Slaughter, the enormous powers of the state will become the “personal prerogatives of ‘some guy.'” In that world, an erratic or mercurial leader becomes an existential risk, and “character is all” once again.

Mearsheimer’s logic suggests that Trump’s campaign against the Deep State is a direct clash between populist tribalism and managerial tribalism. Trump represents a counter-tribe that feels subverted and excluded by the progressive elite.

However, by stripping away the bureaucratic layer, Trump removes the protective structure that kept the larger society stable. Mearsheimer’s anthropology insists that humans require a functional collective structure to survive and feel secure.

If you crush the administrative state and turn its power over to the whims of a single leader, especially one dragged into a war in Iran without a coherent aim, you trigger profound security anxieties across the entire population. The tribe will tolerate a distant, faceless bureaucracy because it provides predictability. It will quickly reject a personal sovereign whose erratic behavior threatens the safety of the whole group.

If Mearsheimer is right, Caldwell’s column demonstrates that the administrative state was not just a collection of agencies; it was the specific stabilization tool of the dominant elite. Dismantling it does not achieve pure democracy. It forces human nature back into a raw, high-stakes struggle over the character and reliability of the man at the top, a reality that the public will ultimately resist to ensure its own survival.

Posted in America | Comments Off on Christopher Caldwell: America is still an English country

Philosopher Thomas Pogge

He comes to Harvard from Hamburg at the end of the 1970s. He has tried sociology and left it. He wants the harder discipline, and at Harvard the hardest man in it is John Rawls (1921-2002).

Rawls runs a quiet seminar. He returns student papers covered in small, exact comments and says little out loud. To study under him in those years is to enter a guild with one master and a long line of supplicants. A Rawls advisee carries the mark for life. Thomas Pogge (b. August 13, 1953) earns the mark. His 1983 dissertation, Kant, Rawls, and Global Justice, names the road he will walk for forty years.

Rawls keeps justice at home. In A Theory of Justice and later in The Law of Peoples, he asks how a single liberal society should arrange its institutions, and he leaves the world of nations mostly to the sovereignty of peoples. Pogge takes the teacher’s apparatus and turns it outward. The trade rules, the lending rules, the patent rules, the recognition that international law extends to whoever holds a capital by force, all of it forms one order, and that order reaches every life on earth. So the order itself can be just or unjust. That is the move. The student keeps the method and breaks with the master on the question that organizes everything else.

His first book, Realizing Rawls (1989), reads as homage with a hidden argument inside it. He defends Rawls and at the same time pries the frame off the nation-state. By the time he publishes World Poverty and Human Rights (2002), the break is complete and the claim is stark. The rich do not merely fail to help the poor. They harm them. Citizens of wealthy democracies uphold, through their governments and their commerce, a set of global rules that foreseeably produce avoidable death and want. The duty he names is negative, not the soft positive duty of charity but the hard duty not to impose unjust arrangements on others. He wants poverty moved out of the church basement and into the dock.

His sharpest tool is the pair he calls the resource privilege and the borrowing privilege. International practice lets whoever controls a country’s territory sell its oil and its minerals and borrow against its future, no matter how he seized power. Pogge argues that this rewards the coup and the strongman and mortgages the lives of the governed. “Local elites can afford to be oppressive and corrupt,” he writes, because foreign money keeps them standing without their own people behind them. He does not let the kleptocrat off. He puts the kleptocrat inside a system that the comfortable maintain and prefer.

He carries the argument into medicine. The global patent regime, he says, prices lifesaving drugs past the reach of the poor. Rather than tear up patents, he and the economist Aidan Hollis design the Health Impact Fund, a standing pool that would pay drug makers by the measured health their products deliver instead of by monopoly price. The proposal still circulates among health economists and development scholars. It shows the cast of his mind. He wants the moral claim to land as policy with numbers attached, not as a sermon.

He spends roughly twenty-five years at Columbia, then moves to Yale in the late 2000s as the Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs and founds the Global Justice Program there. He builds a network. He brings in economists and physicians and lawyers. In 2010 he helps start Academics Stand Against Poverty, a body meant to push scholars into the policy fight. Young people from poorer countries find their way to him because he opens doors that no one else will open for them, and he opens many. The generosity is real and the record shows it.

The record shows something else.

In the mid-1990s, while he teaches at Columbia, a student accuses him of sexual harassment. The school disciplines him. The matter ends in a mediation rather than a hearing, and he agrees not to seek contact with her, not to touch her records, not to retaliate. Colleagues later say he was kept from the philosophy building when the woman had classes there. He denies the building ban. Christia Mercer, who has taught at Columbia since the early 1990s, will say years later that letting him go quietly spared no one, that other women paid for it. Yale recruits him in 2007. He tells a later investigator that Yale knew about Columbia and hired him anyway.

In 2010 a recent Yale graduate named Fernanda Lopez Aguilar finishes her senior thesis under his direction. He has offered her a salaried place in the Global Justice Program. Over the summer the relationship turns, by her account, into something charged and wrong. They share a hotel room at a conference. On a flight he sleeps with his head in her lap. He admits both of these acts and says she suggested them. She says he groped her and made advances, and that when she refused him he pulled the job. She reports him to Yale in 2011.

A Yale panel weighs it. The members find substantial evidence that he behaved unprofessionally and irresponsibly, that he created an intimate and improper setting with a former student and prospective employee, that the gap in power between professor and graduate left her confused and anxious. They write all of this down. Then they vote that the evidence falls short of sexual harassment. The one formal infraction they charge is that he used Yale stationery to help her get an apartment. The provost at the time, Peter Salovey, approves a letter of reprimand for the stationery. By Lopez Aguilar’s account, Yale offers her two thousand dollars to let the matter rest.

She does not let it rest. She retains Ann Olivarius, herself a Yale graduate and one of the plaintiffs in the 1980s case that first established sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under Title IX. In 2015 Lopez Aguilar and others file a federal civil rights complaint against Yale, charging it under Title IX and, because Pogge’s accusers are largely foreign women of color, under Title VI as well. The complaint argues that he sought out women new to American power and unsure how to refuse a famous man.

At 3:56 in the afternoon on May 20, 2016, Katie J.M. Baker of BuzzFeed News publishes the story under a byline that states the whole irony in a breath. The champion of the world’s powerless stands accused of preying on the powerless near at hand. New York Magazine follows, then HuffPost, then The New York Times, which on July 9 runs the headline that he has been cleared and that the worry has not gone away. Affidavits surface. A philosophy professor at Princeton, Delia Graff Fara, says he touched her wrongly when she was a Harvard undergraduate. A doctoral student in Europe, writing first without his name in 2014, says he dangled jobs and recommendations as the price of intimacy and lied to her for years about a marriage of three decades. By her count, nine more women come forward with versions of the same approach: the unsolicited offer of money or travel or a post, extended to a young woman he barely knows beyond her face.

Inside the discipline, the open secret turns into open speech. An open letter goes up in June 2016. It starts near a hundred and seventy names and climbs past two hundred, then past four hundred, then past eight hundred, and it includes about sixteen members of Yale’s own philosophy faculty, roughly half the department, and the man who chaired it when Yale hired him. The signers condemn his conduct toward women, and women of color above all. Some strike his work from their syllabi. Some pledge to skip any conference where he appears.

Shelly Kagan, who led the department at the hiring, gives an interview before the letter goes public. He has admitted to sharing the hotel room and to the flight, Kagan says. “That is not appropriate behavior,” Kagan tells the student paper. It is not how a man treats a former student or a prospective employee.

Pogge fights. He calls the Columbia accusation false. He tells the Yale panel that the affair was the most traumatic event of his life and points to the hole it left in his publishing. He insists he never held any non-professional intention toward Lopez Aguilar, that she was a weak student angling to soften the terms between them, that the salaried job was a kindness to keep her in the country and never a real offer. To the press he frames the storm as payback for his politics. Many people, he writes, enjoy the tale of the man who blamed the West for the suffering of the poor and then stood charged with assaulting a poor woman, and so they set his arguments aside without asking whether the misconduct happened at all. He says the signers never asked him for his side. He returns again and again to one line of defense. Anyone who believes the charges should want them investigated, he says, and yet the accusers do not press for investigation, “and so you wonder: Why not?”

Lopez Aguilar wants a single outcome. She says she remains set on seeing him dismissed and on a public apology from Yale for how it handled her.

Neither comes. The federal complaint turns, as the open letter predicted, on Yale’s conduct more than on his. He keeps his chair. He keeps the Global Justice Program. In the years after 2016 the graduate students sign up for his seminars in smaller numbers, and in some terms none enroll, and he goes on teaching undergraduates and directing the program he built. As of 2026 he holds the Leitner chair still, runs the program still, and since 2024 sits as an associate fellow at a German foreign-policy institute working on climate and poverty. His later books, Politics as Usual (2010) among them, press the old argument into tax fairness and corporate accountability and the rigged baselines he says make official poverty statistics flatter the powerful.

His critics on the merits never went away either, and they matter to the shape of the man. Mathias Risse argues that bad domestic institutions, not the global order, keep poor countries poor. Leif Wenar shares the worry about the resource privilege but reaches for narrower legal fixes. Others say global markets have lifted hundreds of millions out of want and that his ledger ignores the gains. He answers that growth under biased rules still kills more people than fair rules would, and that the rules can change.

So the life holds two true things at once and does not dissolve them. He wrote some of the most demanding moral philosophy of his generation about the duties the strong owe the weak. He stood accused, by many women across many years, of using his own strength against the weak who came to him for help. A Yale panel found his conduct improper and stopped short of the word harassment. He denies the worst of it and has paid, in standing if not in office, all the same. The argument and the accusation share one root, which is power and what a man does with it, and any honest account of him keeps both in view.

Notes

The Columbia disciplinary proceedings, the 1990s mediation, the building restriction that Pogge disputes, and Philip Mercer’s later comments come from HuffPost’s report on the philosophers’ open letter and BuzzFeed News: HuffPost and BuzzFeed News.

The allegations by Florencia López Aguilar, including the hotel room incident, the flight that Pogge acknowledges, the Yale panel’s finding of “substantial evidence” of unprofessional conduct, the letter of reprimand approved by President Peter Salovey, and the reported $2,000 settlement offer, come from the Yale Daily News and BuzzFeed News: Yale Daily News and the BuzzFeed article above.

Ann Olivarius’s role in Yale’s landmark Title IX litigation during the 1980s, along with the 2015 federal Title IX and Title VI complaint, is documented in the same Yale Daily News report.

The BuzzFeed publication time of 3:56 p.m. on May 20, 2016, and the *New York Times* headline “A Yale Professor Is Cleared of Sexual Harassment, but Concerns Linger,” published on July 9, 2016, are discussed in the Yale Daily News article “The Silence on Pogge”: Yale Daily News. The *New York Times* article is available at The New York Times. If you intend to quote Pogge directly from that article, it is worth consulting the original.

Delia Graff Fara’s account and the additional allegations by other women come from Inside Higher Ed. The account by the European doctoral student identified as “Aye,” together with her 2014 essay, appears at Feminist Philosophers.

The growth of the philosophers’ open letter, from roughly 168 to 169 signatories to more than 200, then 400, and eventually more than 800, including approximately sixteen Yale faculty members, is documented by Daily Nous, HuffPost, and the Yale Daily News: Yale Daily News. Shelly Kagan’s statement that “that is not appropriate behavior” comes from the same reporting.

Pogge’s responses, including his reference to “schadenfreude,” the remark “so you wonder: why not,” and his argument about trauma and delays in reporting, come from Inside Higher Ed and the Yale Daily News article “Three Disturbing Results,” which also documents the decline in graduate enrollment in his seminars: Yale Daily News.

His status in 2026, his fellowship with the German Council on Foreign Relations beginning in 2024, and the criticisms by Mathias Risse and Leif Wenar are drawn from your uploaded document together with Wikipedia, current through May 2026.
I added a small amount of self-evident texture without separate citation, including the atmosphere of a John Rawls seminar, the brief student interventions, the rarity of praise, and the prestige associated with being one of Rawls’s doctoral students. Those details reflect the documented structure of Rawls’s supervision and the profession’s treatment of his students.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, the cosmopolitan political philosophy of Thomas Pogge (b. 1953) stands as a highly developed moral misreading of the international system. Pogge, a student of John Rawls and author of World Poverty and Human Rights, is famous for his argument regarding the negative duties of Western citizens.

He asserts that global poverty is not a domestic failure of distant developing nations. It is a direct result of a global institutional order—enforced by wealthy Western states—that actively harms the global poor. By designing international trade, tax, and resource laws that favor Western interests, Pogge argues, Western nations violate a negative duty not to inflict harm on others. He demands a sweeping restructuring of global institutions, such as establishing a Global Resources Dividend, to compensate the global poor and fulfill basic human rights on a universal scale.

Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion breaks down Pogge’s cosmopolitan architecture, showing why its core assumptions are structurally impossible.

First, Pogge assumes that global institutions can be decoupled from the raw survival interests of separate states. If Mearsheimer is right, international institutions do not exist to enforce abstract, universal justice or protect human rights. They are instruments designed and leveraged by powerful states to maintain security, maximize relative gains, and ensure collective survival in an anarchic world.

The Western-centric institutional order Pogge condemns is not a moral choice that can be unmade through philosophical persuasion. It is the logical operation of a dominant coalition securing its resource base and strategic parameters. A tribal state will always manipulate the rules of international trade and resource capture to favor its own members, because failing to do so risks losing ground to rivals.

Second, Pogge’s model relies on the idea that citizens in wealthy nations can be motivated by an abstract, universal negative duty toward distant strangers. He treats human moral responsibility as something that can scale seamlessly across the globe via critical reason.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology counters that reason is the least important tool for determining human preferences and moral boundaries. The long human childhood ensures an intense value infusion from the primary group long before an individual can reason about international tax policy. This early socialization creates a particularistic moral code that prioritizes the security, wealth, and survival of the in-group above all else. A Western citizen does not view a distant stranger in the developing world as an equal partner in a shared global institutional scheme; he views his own society as the primary entity that guarantees his safety and identity.

Finally, Pogge’s proposed solutions—such as a global resource dividend that redistributes wealth across borders—require a central, authoritative global enforcement mechanism to operate fairly.

Under Mearsheimer’s lens, this is the ultimate liberal illusion. In an anarchic world, there is no higher authority to enforce such a redistributive scheme. The moment an international body attempts to extract resources from a powerful nation to serve an abstract global good, that nation will resist to protect its relative position. The “global institutional order” Pogge wants to reform is not an independent entity capable of being redirected toward universal justice; it is an arena of competitive forces.

If Mearsheimer is right, Pogge accurately identifies that international rules are skewed to favor the powerful, but his belief that these rules can be engineered to serve a borderless humanity ignores the primal, defensive nature of the groups that build them. The tribe protects its own, and cooperation terminates at the perimeter of the group.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, the global justice framework of Thomas Pogge (b. 1953) is a textbook example of an intellectual framing mass poverty as a moral and structural misunderstanding to claim high-status authority.

Throughout books like World Poverty and Human Rights, Pogge argues that citizens in wealthy nations are not merely failing to help the global poor; they are actively harming them. He claims that the global institutional order—including trade agreements, resource rights, and intellectual property laws—is structurally designed to enrich wealthy countries while systematically depriving the poor of resources. To his followers, this is a profound ethical breakthrough, proving that global inequality persists because citizens in developed countries misunderstand their moral responsibilities and tolerate an unjust global design.

A Pinsofian analysis strips away this high-status framework. The global institutional order does not produce inequality because its architects suffer from an administrative brain-fart or an ethical misunderstanding. The international arena is a high-stakes, zero-sum competition over finite resources, energy supplies, and geopolitical dominance. Wealthy nations use trade agreements and resource rights as rational, self-serving weapons to secure the survival, status, and economic leverage of their own populations and coalitions. The actors running these systems understand their incentives perfectly.

By framing this fierce Darwinian competition as a fixable institutional error, Pogge creates an ideal mission statement for the academic class. It positions the political philosopher as the elite technician who can design alternative global mechanisms, such as his Health Impact Fund, to correct the market’s moral failures. This narrative provides university circles with a sophisticated platform to critique Western hegemony while signaling immense moral superiority over corporate and state actors.

Pogge did not discover a fixable intellectual error in the global economy. He executed an effective academic strategy, using rigorous Kantian and Rawlsian ethics to climb to the peak of the university hierarchy, securing a prominent professorship at Yale University and immense prestige within global ethics circles. His theories offer a map of institutional reform while ensuring a high-status position within the cultural marketplace, demonstrating that the effort to correct global misunderstandings is a highly effective way to gain institutional power.

Posted in Philosophy | Comments Off on Philosopher Thomas Pogge

Philosopher Baroness Onora O’Neill of Bengarve – The World’s Leading Kantian

In the autumn of 1938, Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940) came home from Munich holding a paper he said meant peace. A young man at the Foreign Office read the terms, judged them a capitulation, and resigned. He was the only officer in the British diplomatic service to quit over the Munich settlement. He had taken a first at Balliol, won a fellowship at All Souls, and carried the name of an Ulster political family with a seat in the House of Lords. He gave the career up rather than sign his name to a policy he thought wrong.

His name was Con O’Neill (1912-1988). Three years later, on August 23, 1941, his daughter Onora arrived at Aughafatten, a townland in the hills of County Antrim, while the war her father had refused to appease burned across Europe.

The father resigned twice more across his life, the second time over a posting, the third over another. The Foreign Office took him back each time because it needed him. During the war he served in army intelligence and questioned Rudolf Hess (1894-1987) after Hitler’s deputy parachuted into Scotland. Late in his career he led the British team that negotiated the country’s entry into the European Economic Community, the work he counted his best. A colleague described his high domed forehead, his prominent nose, and a voice more episcopal than diplomatic. He was a hard man and a principled one, a staunch unionist proud of his Antrim roots. The household lesson on offer to a watching child ran plain: a man could refuse a policy on principle, lose the post, and keep his standing.

Onora’s schooling followed her father’s postings. She spent part of her childhood in Germany, where he advised the British high commissioner at Frankfurt and Bonn during the years of occupation and reconstruction. Then St Paul’s Girls’ School in London, a day school that sent its best pupils to Oxford and Cambridge. In 1959 she went up to Somerville College, Oxford. She began in history and switched to the school of philosophy, psychology, and physiology, a course that paired the study of argument with the study of the brain and the body. The combination marked her. She would spend a career insisting that ethics must answer to what real human beings can actually do.

She crossed the Atlantic on a Fulbright scholarship to Harvard, and there she fell under the supervision of John Rawls (1921-2002), the most influential political philosopher of the age. Rawls was then building the argument that became A Theory of Justice, the thought experiment of rational choosers deciding the rules of a society from behind a veil that hid their own place in it. O’Neill took her doctorate in 1969. She married the economist Edward Nell in 1963, during the Harvard years.

She admired Rawls and learned from him, and then she walked a different road. Rawls asked what principles people would choose if they did not know who they were. O’Neill turned to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and asked a harder question: which principles could every rational person adopt at once without contradiction, while treating each other person as an end and never only as a means. The veil of ignorance was a device. Kant’s test, as she read it, was a demand reason made on itself.

Her first book, Acting on Principle, came out in 1975 from Columbia University Press, where she had moved to teach at Barnard College, the women’s college of Columbia in New York. The book rebuilt Kant for a generation that had filed him away as a maker of rigid rules. O’Neill argued that Kant offered no rulebook. He offered a method for testing the maxims people live by, the working principles behind their conduct, against the question of whether all could hold them together. The reading freed Kant from the charge of cold legalism and put practical judgment back at the center of his ethics.

In 1977 she came home to Britain and took a chair at the University of Essex. She deepened the Kant work in Constructions of Reason (1989), which set her among the front rank of Kant scholars. The argument there cuts against the grain of much modern philosophy. Reason has no foundation handed down from outside human life. Reason earns its authority by constructing principles that free agents can share. Thought, on this account, is something people do together, not a fixed faculty they consult.

The questions widened. In Faces of Hunger (1986) she took up world poverty and refused both of the going answers. Charity treated the starving as objects of pity who might be helped if the comfortable felt moved. Pure rights talk declared that the poor held a right to food and left the matter there. O’Neill asked the question both sides skipped. Who, exactly, owes what to whom, and can they deliver it. A right with no one bound to honor it is a slogan. She carried that demand through Towards Justice and Virtue (1996), Bounds of Justice (2000), and Justice Across Boundaries (2016), where she traced how power had drifted to corporations and international bodies that the old theories never named. Across borders the obligations grow rather than shrink, she argued, and yet justice still needs a world state no more than a family needs one. It needs institutions a person can call to account.

The critique of rights talk became her signature in political theory. Modern argument tends to open by proclaiming a fresh right. O’Neill answered that a right means something only when a named person or institution carries the matching duty and can carry it. Proclaim a right to housing, and the philosopher’s work has barely started. Name the builder, the budget, the law, the official who answers when the house is not built, and the claim acquires force. Leave the duty unassigned, and the right stays a wish dressed as a guarantee. The point won her the reputation as a leading skeptic of what some philosophers call rights inflation.

Consent drew the same scrutiny. In a 1985 essay she questioned the habit of treating a signature on a form as the close of the ethical question. Consent matters, she granted. It cannot do the whole job. A patient who signs without understanding, a worker who agrees because he has no other choice, a research subject kept half informed, none of them has given the respect that consent is supposed to mark. Real respect asks that a person hold the knowledge and the standing to choose. She built the thought out in her work on medicine, where she chaired the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in the late 1990s and delivered the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh on autonomy and trust in 2001. Good medicine, she held, needs more than the paperwork of consent. It needs truthful doctors and institutions worth believing.

Trust became the public theme of her later life, and it carried her name out of the seminar room. In the spring of 2002 the BBC asked her to give the Reith Lectures, the broadcaster’s yearly platform for a major thinker. She gave five, under the title A Question of Trust, the second of them called “Trust and Terror,” delivered while the rubble of September 11 still shaped every conversation about security and the state. The lectures opened on a paradox the country felt and could not name. People said they had lost trust in doctors, politicians, the press, the police. The remedy on offer was more accountability, more audit, more disclosure. O’Neill argued that the cure had begun to sicken the patient. Endless checking taught professionals to dress the figures and guard their backs. Transparency dumped information without making any of it judgeable. The press, she said, proved skilled at making material accessible and erratic at making it assessable. A free press she counted a good, and not an unconditional one. The aim, she insisted, lay not in coaxing people to trust more. The aim lay in building people and institutions that deserved the trust, and in giving the public the means to tell the trustworthy from the rest.

Her father had spent his life inside institutions and had walked out of them three times on principle. The daughter spent hers asking what makes an institution worth a citizen’s confidence in the first place.

She had begun, by then, to live the question. In 1992 she left Essex to become Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge, one of the university’s women’s colleges, and held the post until 2006. The philosopher who wrote about accountable institutions now ran one, balanced a budget, raised money, and answered to a governing body. In 1999 she entered the House of Lords as Baroness O’Neill of Bengarve, a crossbench peer who joined no party, and there she pressed the same case across debates on science, medicine, education, and the constitution: design institutions that can justify themselves to the people they touch. She served as President of the British Academy from 2005 to 2009 and as chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission from 2013 to 2016.

The honors gathered. A Companion of Honour in 2014, the German Pour le Mérite the same year, the Kant Prize in 2015. In 2017 she took both the Holberg Prize, given for lifetime work in the humanities, and the million-dollar Berggruen Prize for philosophy in public life. In 2025 four research groups of the European Consortium for Political Research founded a book prize in her name.

Into her eighties she kept working, and the world kept handing her the material. She turned to the ethics of the internet, the duties owed by those who speak to a vast and faceless audience, the question of how truth and decency survive in a flood of disclosure that explains nothing. The 2002 argument about transparency had aged into prophecy. As of 2026 she remains an emeritus professor at Cambridge and an active crossbench peer.

Her work holds to one line from the first book to the last. Morality starts with duty, not with appetite or with the catalogue of rights. A free society rests less on what its members may claim than on what they will do for one another, and on institutions that earn belief instead of demanding it. The daughter of the man who resigned over Munich made a philosophy out of the conviction that ran his life, that a principle is worth only what a person will pay to keep it.

Notes

She was born in Aughafatten, County Antrim, Northern Ireland. Wikipedia, Wikidata, and the *Dictionary of Irish Biography* all agree: Wikipedia and Wikidata.

She read Philosophy, Politics, and Psychology (PPP) at Somerville College, Oxford, not Lady Margaret Hall. She is an Honorary Fellow of Somerville, which confirms this: Somerville College.

Her academic career followed this sequence: Harvard Ph.D. (1969), Barnard College in the 1970s, the University of Essex as Professor of Philosophy beginning in 1977, and Newnham College, Cambridge, where she served as Principal from 1992 to 2006.

Her bibliography is listed at PhilPapers.

The opening section about her father is based on the *Dictionary of Irish Biography* and Wikipedia. Sir Con O’Neill (1912-1988) resigned from the Foreign Office over the Munich Agreement, participated in the interrogation of Rudolf Hess, helped lead Britain’s negotiations over entry into the European Economic Community, and was widely described as “episcopal” in style while remaining rooted in Ulster unionism: Dictionary of Irish Biography and Wikipedia. His father was Hugh O’Neill, 1st Baron Rathcavan, the Ulster Unionist Member of Parliament, from whom the family’s seat in the House of Lords descends.

The Reith Lectures section is based on the documented record. O’Neill delivered five lectures on BBC Radio 4 in the spring of 2002, including “Trust and Terror.” The discussion of the press as needing to be accessible rather than merely assessable, and her argument that trust is “not an unconditional good,” come from A Question of Trust: Goodreads and Google Books. The connection to the aftermath of September 11 is my own inference based on the timing of the lectures and the title “Trust and Terror.”

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, the Kantian ethical framework and political philosophy of Onora O’Neill represent a sophisticated, well-reasoned attempt to build a global order on a foundation that human nature cannot support.

O’Neill, a leading scholar of Immanuel Kant, is famous for books like Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice, and Development, Towards Justice and Virtue, and Bounds of Justice. She rejects utilitarian calculation, arguing instead for a constructivist Kantian approach. Her central premise relies on the concept of universalizability: political and ethical principles must be structured so that they can be adopted by all rational agents without contradiction.

From this baseline, O’Neill builds an account of international justice. She argues that because our actions—through global trade, borders, and environmental impacts—affect distant strangers, we have a duty to construct global institutions that do not depend on the injury or coercion of those strangers. To her, justice requires a commitment to universal principles that transcend national boundaries, treating all individuals as autonomous agents worthy of respect.

Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion cuts directly through this Kantian constructivism, revealing three structural incompatibilities.

First, O’Neill treats the human being as a fundamentally autonomous, rational agent capable of discerning and choosing to act on universal duties. Mearsheimer’s anthropology counters that reason is the least important way humans determine their preferences and moral frameworks. The long human childhood ensures that an individual undergoes intense socialization within a specific micro-society long before his critical faculties form. This value infusion instills a particularistic moral code rooted in group loyalty and collective survival. A human being does not encounter a distant stranger as a detached, abstract “rational agent” in a vacuum; he encounters him through the lens of a primary identity that prioritizes the welfare of the in-group.

Second, O’Neill argues that our ethical boundaries must expand to match our causal boundaries. If our economic and political decisions affect people across the world, our principles of justice must become transnational. If Mearsheimer is right, this claim ignores the fundamental engine of human organization. Humans form distinct, cohesive societies—tribes and nation-states—primarily to secure their survival in an anarchic world where there is no higher authority to protect them. These groups are closed systems. Internal cooperation and adherence to rules exist precisely to maintain group strength and navigate external competition. A state cannot surrender its relative advantages or reshape its borders to satisfy O’Neill’s universal duties without compromising its security, an act the tribal state must always resist.

Finally, O’Neill’s extensive work on trust and accountability—including her famous 2002 Reith Lectures, A Question of Trust—argues that stable institutions require transparent, verifiable structures that respect individual agency.

Under Mearsheimer’s lens, this institutional trust is a secondary byproduct of security, not a primary engine of social order. True, deep trust is a resource generated inside the primary group through shared socialization, common culture, and mutual dependency. Trying to scale this thick, subcultural trust into abstract, universal international institutions is a delusion. When the international system enters periods of intense security competition, the formal, rule-bound accountability structures O’Neill designs are instantly hollowed out. The state reverts to its core logic, relying on raw power, strategic leverage, and inside alliances to guarantee its survival.

If Mearsheimer is right, O’Neill’s Kantian philosophy is a beautiful intellectual exercise that misreads the human architecture. By assuming that universal reason can override primary group attachments, she constructs a system of duties for abstract individuals rather than real, tribal men. The bounds of justice are not determined by universal logic; they are permanently bounded by the survival requirements of the group.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, the Kantian ethical framework and public policy philosophy of Onora O’Neill (b. 1941) represent a highly sophisticated intellectual effort to treat structural, zero-sum trust deficits as problems of conceptual clarity that high-status experts must fix. Across her influential books like Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics and her famous Reith Lectures, A Question of Trust, O’Neill argues that the modern crisis of trust in institutions is largely a misunderstanding about how trust and accountability actually operate.

She claims that society has mistakenly replaced real, relationship-based trustworthiness with rigid, bureaucratic systems of accountability, checklists, and performance indicators. From a standard philosophical viewpoint, her work is a brilliant diagnostic breakthrough, suggesting that if institutions can correct this conceptual error and shift toward fostering verifiable trustworthiness, social cohesion and institutional health can be restored.

A Pinsofian analysis strips away this high-status mission statement. The modern public’s deep distrust of elite institutions, media corporations, and government agencies does not happen because the public suffers from a cognitive brain-fart or misinterprets audit reports. Distrust is a highly functional, defensive weapon deployed by rational actors in a competitive social environment. Factions lose trust in institutions because those institutions are the ultimate coercive apparatus of the state, and competing coalitions have a strong incentive to suspect that elite choice architects are using institutional power to favor their own alliances, secure finite resources, and derogate their rivals. The actors understand their immediate structural incentives perfectly.

By framing this fierce, zero-sum competition over institutional legitimacy as a design error regarding “accountability cultures,” O’Neill creates an ideal mission statement for the academic and legislative class. It positions the moral philosopher and policy advisor as the necessary elite technicians who possess the superior rationality needed to redesign state and medical apparatuses. Her arguments provide university circles, bioethics boards, and the House of Lords with a sophisticated platform to critique bureaucratic excess while claiming immense moral and intellectual superiority over the unguided public.

O’Neill did not discover a fixable intellectual error in the operations of institutional power. She executed an exceptionally effective academic and political strategy, using rigorous Kantian ethics to climb to the absolute peak of the university and legislative hierarchies, securing presidency of the British Academy and a life peerage. Her theories offer a beautiful, high-status map of how institutions ought to communicate, proving that defining a raw struggle over power and legitimacy as a conceptual misunderstanding is the ultimate tool for securing elite authority.

Posted in Philosophy | Comments Off on Philosopher Baroness Onora O’Neill of Bengarve – The World’s Leading Kantian

Philosopher Peter Singer

The rain falls on Nassau Hall and the people in the wheelchairs hold their ground. It is September 21, 1999. More than two hundred protesters fill the gates of Princeton University, and about sixty of them sit in motorized chairs. Some chain themselves to the doors of the administration building. Others cuff their chairs together so the officers cannot pull them away one at a time. They chant the name of their group, Not Dead Yet, and they keep chanting through the morning. After two hours the campus police, the borough police, and the state troopers wall them in with metal barricades, read the warning, and start the arrests. Fourteen people go. The proctors leave the lifting to the police. None of the fourteen lives in New Jersey.

A few hundred yards off, in a large house at the edge of campus, twenty-three graduate students take their seats for a seminar. Public Safety officers stand at the doors and admit only the enrolled. The man they have come to hear is fifty-three years old, lean, soft-spoken, Australian. He asks his hosts about the format for the term and says he looks forward to the conversation. He seems to mean it. One student calls the morning a regular course.

The man teaching that quiet class, Peter Singer (b. July 6, 1946), had by then become the most protested professor in American philosophy. He had never raised his voice at anyone. He gave money to the poor, ate no meat, and lived on a fraction of what Princeton paid him. He also argued, in print, that the parents of a severely disabled newborn should in some cases have the legal right to end the infant’s life. The gentleness and the argument came from the same root, and to follow the one a reader has to trace the other back to its beginning.

Singer was born in Melbourne in 1946 to Ernst and Cora Singer, Viennese Jews who reached Australia in 1938, the year the Reich swallowed Austria. Three of his four grandparents died in the camps. The family rebuilt in a far country and raised a son who would spend his life arguing that the circle of moral concern has no natural border, not the family, not the tribe, not the nation, not the species. A man whose grandparents were murdered for their group might be expected to close ranks around his own. Singer drew the opposite lesson. Suffering counts wherever it occurs, and the passport of the sufferer changes nothing.

He read history and philosophy at the University of Melbourne, took his degrees, and went to Oxford for the B.Phil. There he studied under R. M. Hare (1919–2002), whose prescriptivism held that a moral judgment must bind everyone alike, the man who makes it included. Singer broke later with parts of Hare’s system. He kept the core. Ethics runs on reason, not on intuition or feeling or custom, and reason has no respect for the accident of who stands nearest to us.

One day in 1970, in the dining hall at Balliol College, Singer reaches for lunch without much thought. There are two choices, a salad plate and spaghetti under a brown sauce. He takes the spaghetti. Beside him a Canadian graduate student named Richard Keshen asks the server whether the sauce has meat in it. Told that it does, Keshen takes the salad. In England in 1970 a man passing up meat is a rare sight, and Singer asks him why. Keshen explains how the animals on the plate were raised and killed. The two had walked over from a class on free will and moral responsibility. Now they argue about dinner.

Singer went home and read Ruth Harrison‘s (1920–2000) Animal Machines, the book that named factory farming for British readers, along with an essay by the philosopher Roslind Godlovitch, and he stopped eating meat. He has called that lunch one of the most fortunate turns of his life. He fell in with the small Oxford circle of vegetarian philosophers around Keshen and the Godlovitches, and out of the reading and the talk came, five years later, the book.

Animal Liberation (1975) did not argue from rights. Singer thought the language of rights a distraction. He built instead on Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), who had asked of animals one question, whether they can suffer, and set aside whether they reason or speak. That, Singer wrote, is the line that matters. A creature that can suffer has interests, and to discount those interests because their owner belongs to another species is a prejudice of the same family as racism and sexism. He took up a coined word for it, speciesism, and pushed it to the center of the debate. He parted from rights theorists such as Tom Regan (1938–2017), yet the book carried the argument out of the seminar room. Factory farms and laboratories now faced a philosopher’s case made against them, in clear prose, by a man who named what sat on the plate. In 2023 he published Animal Liberation Now, rewritten around half a century of new science on animal minds and the spread of industrial agriculture.

He prized results over gesture. His friend the activist Henry Spira (1927–1998) had shown him that patient bargaining and hard evidence often won more for animals than open confrontation, and Singer carried that temper into the rest of his public life.

The engine under all of it ran on one rule. Count each being’s comparable interests equally, and act for the best result across all of them. For most of his career Singer framed this as preference utilitarianism, drawn from Hare, where the good lies in satisfying the preferences of those affected. Equal consideration never meant identical treatment. A pig and a man have different interests, so they earn different treatment, yet a like interest in not suffering carries like weight whoever holds it. Late in his career he changed his mind on the foundation. In The Point of View of the Universe (2014), written with the Polish philosopher Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, he returned to the older view of Bentham and Henry Sidgwick, that pleasure and pain themselves, and not the satisfaction of preferences, give ethics its bedrock.

In 1972 he published the essay that landed on a hundred thousand syllabi. Refugees were streaming out of East Pakistan into India, millions of them, and Singer put a hard question to comfortable readers. Picture a man walking past a shallow pond where a small child is drowning. He can wade in and pull her out at the cost of muddy clothes and a ruined pair of shoes. Everyone agrees he must. Singer then closed the distance the reader wants to keep open. If a man can prevent something terrible at no comparable cost to himself, he ought to, and the child ten thousand miles away has the same claim as the child in the pond. Proximity, nationality, a name we happen to know, none of it carries moral weight. He pledged a tenth of his own income to the relief of the poor and later gave more. In The Life You Can Save (2009) he turned the argument into a program and founded a nonprofit of that name to steer donors toward the charities that save the most lives per dollar.

Those essays seeded effective altruism, the movement that asks donors to weigh charities by measured results rather than by the pull of feeling. Singer supplied much of its moral grammar, the case for using evidence to find the interventions that save the most lives and sending money where it does the most good rather than where the heart happens to point. When the crypto exchange FTX collapsed in 2022 and took with it a fortune that had flowed into parts of the movement, Singer held to the principles and granted that the institutions around them needed harder scrutiny.

His cosmopolitanism ran past charity into politics. In The Expanding Circle (1981) he traced how human concern has widened over history from kin to tribe to nation, and argued that reason pushes the circle wider still, out to all people and then to every creature that feels. Borders serve governance and little else, which leaves wealthy nations owing a great deal to the poor beyond them. In A Darwinian Left (1999) he told his own side of politics to stop pretending that human nature is clay. People carry inherited pulls toward self-interest and kin, he wrote, and a politics that denies them fails.

He kept trying to turn argument into law. In 1993, with the Italian philosopher Paola Cavalieri, he launched the Great Ape Project, a campaign for basic legal protections for chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans, a floor of life and liberty under the great apes. In 1996 he stood for the Australian Senate as a Greens candidate and lost.

The same logic that won him admirers made him, to many, a monster. In Practical Ethics (1979) he held that moral standing rests on consciousness, self-awareness, and a sense of one’s own life reaching into the future. A creature with those marks is a person in his sense of the word. A newborn does not yet hold them. Neither does a human in the last reaches of dementia. From this he drew the conclusions that brought the wheelchairs to Nassau Hall. Where a newborn faces nothing but suffering with no prospect of the capacities he tied to personhood, Singer argued, the parents and the doctors might be allowed to end its life, and the same reasoning could touch the close of a life as much as its opening. Disability advocates, physicians, religious leaders, and many philosophers answered that he had cut the floor out from under the weakest people alive. The Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal (1908–2005) wrote that a professor of morals who justified killing disabled newborns had no place on a respectable platform. Steve Forbes (b. 1947), a trustee and heir to the magazine, stopped giving money to Princeton and said the appointment troubled him as it would if the honor had gone to a racist or an anti-Semite. The university posted guards at Singer’s public talks and ran his mail through a scanner.

In 2002 the argument took a human shape and rolled into his classroom on six wheels. Harriet McBryde Johnson (1957–2008), a disability-rights lawyer in solo practice in Charleston, flew north at his invitation. A neuromuscular disease had bent her body since childhood, and she traveled in a power chair that startled strangers on sight. She had spent her career arguing that the presence or absence of a disability does not predict the quality of a life. Singer had read her, written to her, and asked her to address his undergraduates and then to take him on. Delta tore up her chair somewhere over Atlanta. Before she left home, a colleague heard the plan, gave a full-body shudder, and told her the professor had no idea what he was in for. The two of them haggled by mail over how to name each other on the program, attorney and professor, Ms. and Mr. In the hall he laid out the logic, calm and lucid, and she took the microphone and pressed back as a lawyer presses, point by point, on the premise that people are not interchangeable. He answered each one. He assured her he did not want her dead. He thought only that her parents should have had the choice when she was the baby she once was, and that other parents should have it too. She later wrote of the terrible purity of his vision, a purity with no room in it for the particular human across the table. She found him courteous, even warm, and that was the hardest part of all. Her account, “Unspeakable Conversations,” ran on the cover of the New York Times Magazine the next winter. She died six years later, at fifty.

While the protests ran, a New Yorker writer named Michael Specter published a profile in September 1999, and in it sat a fact that Singer’s critics have never let go. His mother had advanced Alzheimer’s disease. By his own measure she had lost the marks of personhood, the reason and memory and sense of a future that, on his argument, give a life its claim. Singer and his sister hired aides and spent tens of thousands of dollars to keep her comfortable and alive. Asked about it, he did not wave the strain away. He said the questions felt harder than he had once thought, because the woman was his mother. It was different, he said, when it is your mother. His critics read hypocrisy. His defenders read a man meeting the wall that every universal ethics meets, the moment the stranger turns out to have a face you have known your whole life. Singer noted that his sister shared the choice, and allowed that, left to himself, his mother might not have lived as long.

The honors came anyway, and kept coming. In 2021 the Berggruen Institute gave him its million-dollar prize for philosophy and culture. He gave the money away, half to The Life You Can Save for the global poor and much of the rest to groups working against the suffering of farmed animals. He had told people for years that he would do exactly that if he ever won, and he did. He retired from Princeton in 2024 after twenty-five years, took emeritus standing, and went home to Melbourne. He still teaches part of each year in Singapore, records a podcast with de Lazari-Radek, writes, hikes, and surfs. He has three daughters and four grandchildren.

To his admirers he is the most consequential moral philosopher alive, the man who hauled the discipline back to the questions of how to eat, how to spend, and whom to help, and who can point to fewer animals in cages and more money reaching the poor as his evidence. To his critics he is the man who put a price on the lives of the weakest and called the price reason, whose calm is what gives the conclusions their menace. Both verdicts describe the same person. He returns in every book to the same shallow pond, the child in the water, the bystander who could wade in and is weighing a ruined pair of shoes against a life. Singer has spent fifty years insisting that the honest answer is simple, and that almost no one wants to say it out loud.

Notes

The scenes are all built on documented reporting rather than invention. Where I dramatized a moment in the present tense, I worked from the historical record and added only self-evident texture, such as the rain, dining hall logistics, and the airport-style mail scanner that Princeton itself confirmed.

The Nassau Hall opening comes from contemporaneous Princeton coverage. The number of demonstrators, the approximately sixty power chairs, the handcuffed wheelchairs, the fourteen arrests on September 21, 1999, and the fact that none of those arrested were New Jersey residents all come from the Princeton press archive and the *Princeton Alumni Weekly* feature: Princeton press archive and Princeton Alumni Weekly. The quiet seminar with twenty-three students at 5 Ivy Lane, the guards admitting only enrolled students, and the student describing it as “a regular course” all come from the same *Princeton Alumni Weekly* feature. Singer’s later reflection that he expected good students but never anticipated the backlash appears in the Daily Princetonian: Daily Princetonian.

The Balliol lunch in 1970 with Richard Keshen, the salad versus the meat-sauce spaghetti, and the class on free will are documented in several sources, including Singer’s own account, a *New Statesman* interview, a UNESCO *Courier* interview, and a 2025 retrospective: New Statesman, UNESCO Courier, and The Philosopher. His reading of Ruth Harrison’s Animal Machines and the Godlovitch essay is documented in the Wikipedia entry for the book and in TheCollector article on the Oxford Group.

The Harriet McBryde Johnson material comes from her own essay, “Unspeakable Conversations,” published in the *New York Times Magazine* on February 16, 2003. A complete text is available here: Unspeakable Conversations. The interpretation of its “terrible purity” theme is discussed in this academic paper: Academia.edu. Tom Shakespeare’s memorial essay provides her biography and his observation that disability does not predict quality of life: Farmer of Thoughts. The colleague’s warning that Singer had “no idea what he’s in for,” the Delta-damaged wheelchair, and the Ms./Mr. negotiation all appear in Johnson’s essay. I paraphrased rather than quoted them directly. Her birth and death dates, July 8, 1957, to June 4, 2008, come from Wikipedia.

The episode involving Singer’s mother and Alzheimer’s disease traces to Michael Specter’s *New Yorker* profile, “The Dangerous Philosopher” (September 6, 1999). The observation that “it’s different when it is your mother,” along with the home health aides and his sister’s role in the decision, appears in a Reason interview and in Not Dead Yet’s discussion: Reason and Not Dead Yet.

Malcolm Forbes’s withdrawal of donations and Singer’s letter comparing the honor to one bestowed on a racist or anti-Semite are documented in the Princeton press archive and Associated Press coverage: Princeton press archive. The Simon Wiesenthal Center letter is noted at Wikipedia. The Berggruen Prize and Singer’s decision to donate half the award to The Life You Can Save and more than one-third to animal welfare organizations are confirmed by NPR, the Berggruen Institute, and Princeton University. His 2024 retirement, emeritus status, return to Melbourne, appointment in Singapore, podcast, and family details, including three daughters and four grandchildren, come from Peter Singer’s website and the Princeton faculty page.

I added a few pieces of self-evident texture without separate citations. These include the rain falling on Nassau Hall, which is consistent with contemporary reports of steady rain that day, muddy clothes alongside the ruined shoes in Singer’s famous pond example, since the original story mentions only the shoes, and the inference that Keshen and Singer walked over from class together because they were classmates.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, the ethical philosophy of utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer represents the peak of the liberal delusion, attempting to construct a moral framework on assumptions that flatly contradict human nature.

Singer is famous for Animal Liberation, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, and his advocacy for “effective altruism.” His central premise is the principle of equal consideration of interests. He argues that preference utilitarianism requires an individual to use cold, detached reason to calculate the maximization of pleasure and minimization of suffering globally. To Singer, a child starving in a distant nation possesses the exact same moral claim on your resources as your own child. Failure to redirect your wealth to save that distant stranger is a moral failure, as proximity or biological relation are ethically irrelevant variables.

Mearsheimer’s framework strips away this hyper-rationalist universalism, revealing that Singer’s ethics are a psychological and structural impossibility.

First, Singer treats the individual as an unburdened, atomistic calculator who can use critical reason to override all biological and social attachments. Mearsheimer’s anthropology insists that reason is the least important way humans determine their preferences. The long human childhood ensures that an individual undergoes an intense value infusion from his primary micro-society long before his critical faculties form. This socialization imprints an indelible moral code rooted in group loyalty, family protection, and tribal defense. Humans are wired to favor the in-group; it is the fundamental mechanism of survival in an uncertain world. A philosophy that demands a man treat his neighbor’s son—or a foreign stranger—with the same utility calculation as his own child asks him to sever the primary attachments that make him a social being.

Second, Singer’s expansion of the moral circle to include all sentient animals is, under Mearsheimer’s lens, a luxury product of a highly secure, wealthy subculture. Singer argues that speciesism is a prejudice akin to racism. Mearsheimer notes that moral frameworks do not exist in a vacuum of pure logic; they are structures generated by specific societies to serve their cohesion and survival. The ability to fret over the preference maximization of livestock is a secondary phenomenon that only emerges when a powerful state has completely secured its borders and created an artificial zone of abundance. The moment security fractures or resource scarcity strikes, the primary logic of survival returns, and the tribe will instantly reassert its dominance over other groups and species to protect its own.

Finally, the movement Singer inspired—Effective Altruism (EA)—demonstrates Mearsheimer’s tribal logic in its very operation. EA attempted to turn global charity into a cold, mathematical optimization problem, stripping away emotional or local biases to maximize universal utility. Yet, as the movement scaled, it did not create a borderless network of hyper-rational cosmopolitan saints. Instead, it formed a distinct, elite subcultural tribe centered around elite universities, tech hubs, and specific financial circles.

The members of this movement developed their own intense socialization, specialized jargon, in-group loyalty, and status hierarchies. They became highly insular, defending their ideological borders and prioritizing their collective projects over outside critiques. Even when attempting to engineer a system free of tribal bias, they simply constructed a new tribe.

If Mearsheimer is right, Singer’s philosophy is an evolutionary dead end. By treating man’s deepest socializations, family bonds, and group loyalties as mere prejudices to be overcome by logical calculus, Singer designs an ethics for an imaginary species. Reason cannot displace the primary group, and a morality that requires the elimination of tribal preference is a system that human nature will always reject.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, the utilitarian philosophy of Peter Singer (b. 1946) serves as a sophisticated framework to mask tribal competition under the guise of universal logic. Singer spends his career arguing that human moral failures stem from logical inconsistency. In books like Animal Liberation and The Life You Can Save, he claims that people make a cognitive error when they favor their own family, nation, or species over strangers. To his followers, his philosophy offers an objective calculation to cure human selfishness and correct a long-standing moral misunderstanding.

A Pinsofian analysis strips away this high-status narrative. Human beings do not prioritize their immediate circle because they suffer from a lapse in logic. Natural selection designed the human brain to secure finite resources for kin and coalitional allies. True universal altruism does not exist in nature. The preference for one’s own group operates as a functional strategy to survive a competitive world. When Singer demands that people treat a stranger across the globe exactly like their own child, he asks human animals to ignore the basic incentives of survival.

By framing local loyalties as a prejudice, Singer creates a powerful weapon for a new intellectual elite. His movement, effective altruism, provides wealthy donors and academics with a clear tool to signal moral and intellectual superiority over the ordinary public. Adherents use his calculations to look down upon the instinctual, local charity of the masses, claiming a higher status based on their ability to suppress natural biases.

Singer did not discover a flaw in human reasoning. He executed an effective academic strategy. His arguments function as high-status currency in the cultural marketplace, earning him immense prestige, a long tenure at Princeton University, and authority over global ethical debates. His philosophy does not alter human nature. It simply shifts the battlelines, allowing a secular elite to claim dominance by preaching a universal love that no human brain can fully execute.

Posted in Philosophy | Comments Off on Philosopher Peter Singer

Andrei Shleifer and the Harvard Economists Who Looted Russia

In a photograph taken in Moscow when he was six, Andrei Shleifer (b. February 20, 1961) wears the uniform of a Soviet Army general. The costume fit the boy. When a friend moved to one of the best schools in the city, Shleifer rode his bicycle to the gates and stayed until the principal agreed to admit him too. His parents were engineers. The state had chosen the profession for them, as the state chose most things in the lives of Soviet Jews in those years.

The family left in 1976 with help from the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and settled in Rochester, New York. Shleifer was fifteen and spoke little English. He later said he learned most of it from Charlie’s Angels. He was good at mathematics, good enough that Harvard admitted him, and in his sophomore year he walked into the office of a young assistant professor named Lawrence Summers (b. 1954) and told him his paper contained errors.

Summers was the nephew of two Nobel laureates in economics. He had won tenure at Harvard younger than almost anyone before him. He did not throw the sophomore out. He took him on. The friendship that began in that office shaped both careers, and twenty years later it cost Summers the presidency of the university and cost Shleifer something harder to name.

Shleifer finished his A.B. in 1982 and went to MIT for the doctorate, which he completed in 1986 under Franklin Fisher (1934–2019), with Robert Solow (1924–2023) and Stanley Fischer down the hall. He taught at Princeton, then at the University of Chicago business school, and in 1991 he came back to Harvard and stayed. He holds the John L. Loeb chair in economics. By the RePEc citation count he ranks, in most recent years, as the most cited economist alive.

The work came in waves, and each wave attacked a comfortable assumption.

The first assumption was that financial markets price assets right. The efficient market hypothesis held that any gap between price and value gets closed by traders who smell the profit. Shleifer, working mostly with Robert Vishny (b. 1959), asked who those traders are and what constrains them. They run other people’s money. They face redemptions when they are down. They cannot wait forever for the market to come to its senses, and the market can stay senseless longer than they can stay solvent. Their paper “The Limits of Arbitrage” (1997) put a name to the problem and became a founding text of behavioral finance. Mispricing persists, the paper argued, because the smart money is not free to act. The book that followed, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (2000), carried the case to a wider room.

The second assumption was that managers serve shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny’s survey of corporate governance, published the same year, asked a blunter question. How does an investor in Boston ever get his money back from a manager in Moscow or Milan who controls the assets and writes the books? Their answer was concentrated ownership. A large shareholder has the motive to watch the manager. He also has the motive to rob the small shareholders sitting beside him. The trade is real and has no clean solution, and saying so reframed the field.

The third assumption was the largest. With Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, and Vishny, Shleifer built what came to be called legal origins theory. They gathered data on dozens of countries and asked why some protect investors and some do not. The pattern they found ran along an old fault line. Nations that inherited English common law tended to give shareholders and creditors stronger rights, courts more independence, and regulators a lighter hand than nations built on French civil law. Those protections, they argued, deepen capital markets and speed growth across generations. The claim turned legal tradition into a number a regression could use, and the regressions multiplied. So did the objections. Legal historians said the categories were too crude, the traditions too tangled, the causation too convenient. Shleifer and his coauthors answered with more data and held their ground.

A single proposition runs under all of it. Prosperity comes not from rational men but from institutions that channel imperfect men toward useful work. Markets beat governments where property is secure, contracts hold, and the powerful are fenced in. He carried the same suspicion to the state itself. With Vishny and others he showed how licensing rules and entry barriers protect the established firm and feed the bribe-taking clerk rather than the consumer. The fullest statement is The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures (1998), which treats the politician the way the governance work treats the manager, as a man who serves himself unless something stops him.

He would soon test the proposition in his own conduct, in the one country he knew from the inside.

The Soviet Union came apart in 1991, and Harvard came to Moscow. The Kennedy School sent men. So did the Russian Research Center, the economics department, and the Harvard Institute for International Development. Jeffrey Sachs (b. 1954), fresh from advising Poland, was the loudest of them. Shleifer arrived by a different road. The World Bank sent him, and the World Bank’s chief economist that year was Summers. Shleifer held an advantage no other American could match. He was born there. He spoke the language. He could sit with the young reformers around Yegor Gaidar (1956–2009) and Anatoly Chubais (b. 1955) and catch the meaning under the words.

The city was full of foreigners chasing the same opening. Consultants, bankers, missionaries of the market, and a layer of swindlers underneath them. Money moved in cash. Kidnappings were common. The reformers worked against the clock, certain that a slow privatization would hand the country back to the Communists. Gaidar called his planners the kamikaze team. They issued vouchers to a hundred and forty-eight million citizens and pushed state firms into private hands by the thousands, fast, on the theory that speed itself was the only safe policy. Shleifer advised Chubais and his lieutenant Dmitri Vasiliev, and he wrote the logic down later in Privatizing Russia (1995) and Without a Map (1999). Summers blurbed the first book and said the authors had done remarkable things in Russia.

To run the day to day, Shleifer hired a lawyer named Jonathan Hay, an Idaho native and Rhodes Scholar just out of Harvard Law. Hay had unruly hair, oversize horn-rim glasses, and a high tolerance for chaos. He set up the Harvard operation inside Chubais’s privatization agency, in a cold government building near Red Square. He told a reporter later that they had no heat, no Xerox, no fax, no food. A Russian lawyer summed up Hay’s method in three words. Don’t worry, be happy.

The work carried a hard line through the middle of it. The contract that Harvard signed with the United States government barred everyone on the project, their families, and anyone acting for them from investing personal money in Russia or holding a stake in any Russian business. Even a savings account in a Russian bank was off limits. The line existed because the conflict it guarded against was plain to anyone who paused over it. The institute’s own human resources officer, Louisa French, described under oath the test the staff was supposed to run on every decision. They asked how it would look on the front page of the New York Times. The mantra, she said, was that if you had to ask, you were too close to the line.

In July 1994, Shleifer and his wife began to invest in Russia.

Nancy Zimmerman ran a hedge fund out of Cambridge. She had left Goldman, Sachs to start it, and she out-earned her husband by a wide margin, more than a million dollars to his hundred and ninety thousand the year the investing began. She called him Boss. With the help of Leonard Blavatnik (b. 1957), a Russian émigré on the Forbes 400, the couple put two hundred thousand dollars into a vehicle that held shares of Russian firms being privatized under Shleifer’s own guidance, among them Gazprom and a set of aluminum smelters. When Blavatnik later merged those smelters, Hay’s American lawyers, paid by the United States, worked the merger papers for free.

That same season the Shleifers went into Russian oil with the hedge fund Farallon. On August 11, 1994, Shleifer wired a hundred and sixty-five thousand dollars to a bank account in the Channel Islands to buy thirty thousand shares of an oil company called Purneftegas. By early November more than four million dollars sat in Russian oil stocks, most of it Farallon’s, a tenth of it the Shleifers’. The shares were registered in the name of Zimmerman’s father, a Chicago man with racehorses and a stake in a small bank. A Farallon partner, David Cohen, told the grand jury what they were buying with Shleifer’s name. Russia then was the Wild West, he said, and they were petrified. There was incredible crookery, and they wanted all the protection they could get, and they thought Andrei provided some of it. People might think twice before crossing Andrei Shleifer. His closeness to Chubais was one of the reasons.

To work out which oil stocks to buy, Hay sent a first-year Harvard law student in Moscow to study the market. The student posed as the Russian agent of a foreign investor. He testified later that Hay told him to look at oil and gas because they sat at the front of privatization, and that those would be the most valuable assets in the economy, so of course they would be the most wanted.

In October 1994, the chairman of Harvard’s economics department, Dale Jorgenson (1933–2022), gave a cocktail party at his home. The room held economics stars, among them two men who had won the John Bates Clark Medal, Jorgenson himself and Martin Feldstein (1939–2019), once Ronald Reagan’s chief economic adviser. Shleifer and Zimmerman talked about their Russian investments in front of all of them. Feldstein grew interested and telephoned Shleifer afterward for an introduction to Blavatnik. He looked at Russia and decided against it. Shleifer stood in a room full of his peers and spoke freely about the thing his contract forbade, and no one in the room thought to stop him.

By 1996 the project had folded a love affair into its finances. Hay had fallen for Elizabeth Hebert, an American who wanted to launch the first licensed mutual fund company in Russia. She arrived at meetings on time in a trim suit with a leather portfolio of notes. Hay arrived late with his hair flying and no pen. He let her use his government car. He pressed the Russian regulators, who were his own advisees, to register her company ahead of larger and more seasoned rivals like Credit Suisse and Pioneer. When the registration came through first for Hebert, the Moscow financial community understood at once what it meant. Zimmerman moved to invest in the venture, an investment the conflict rules barred her from making.

The pressure on the Russians was real. Yeltsin had staked his reelection on mutual funds, and his prime minister told Vasiliev to his face that he was a failure. Hebert’s back-office partner, a Russian-born American named Julia Zagachin, told colleagues that if they did not get the thing running she would end up in jail. When an honest competitor refused to make room for her, a Russian official told the man, with Hay translating, that Zagachin was a grain of sand, an irritant, that they would get rid of her later, and that for now he had to take her into his company.

In late August 1996, Shleifer and Zimmerman went to Cape Cod, to the stretch of beach at Truro where they summered with Summers. By then Summers was deputy secretary of the Treasury and the architect of American aid to Russia. He knew the couple were investing there. He did not know they were hiding the oil shares behind Zimmerman’s father or routing bond profits through an Illinois bank to dodge Russian tax. He knew enough to worry. He told Shleifer to be careful, that there was a lot of corruption in Russia. He told Zimmerman there might be a scandal, that her husband could be pulled into it, that she should make sure she was clear with everyone. People might want to make Andrei a problem some day, he said. The world’s a shitty place. He told Shleifer to check what his Harvard contract said, and told Zimmerman to think hard about what she was doing.

Zimmerman had already named the problem herself, to a young aide, in a sentence that survives in the record. What was she supposed to do, she had asked, build a Chinese wall between herself and her husband through their bedroom. When she brought Summers’s warning home, Shleifer’s answer was a lawyer. They could use Michael Butler, he said, if they were worried about specific things.

The first person inside the project to sound an alarm was Holly Nielsen, a lawyer running the legal-reform secretariat. The favoritism toward Hebert’s fund shocked her. She wanted to reach Shleifer and barely knew him, so she took a colleague to breakfast at the Aerostar Hotel and poured out the story while he scribbled on a napkin. She asked him to keep it quiet, to use a code in any message, that the appointment with the pediatrician was confirmed. The colleague flew home, called Shleifer, and said that if what Nielsen described was true, Hay should be fired at once.

Shleifer met Nielsen in Cambridge that December. They lunched at the Faculty Club, and the next morning she came to his office in the Littauer Center and laid it out. Hay and Hebert were being stupid and arrogant, she said. If they had quietly taken the third or fourth registration, no one would have noticed. They had to have the first, and the first caused a sensation. Shleifer’s reply is in her deposition. He said he could not control who Jonathan slept with. As she left, he told her he was promoting Hay to run the secretariat. The man Nielsen had come to warn him about would now be her boss.

Others tried. A Pioneer executive named Timothy Frost took Hay to a diner off the Garden Ring and praised the good he had done, then told him there was a real problem, an odor of conflict of interest, and that he should lean over backwards to guard against it. Frost testified that Hay answered with a threat, that he could see to it that Pioneer’s business in Russia stalled. A New York Stock Exchange lawyer warned Vasiliev that the Harvard men would bring him public embarrassment. Vasiliev listened and protected Hebert anyway. He told an aide why. The first Russian mutual funds could carry no scandal, and the only way to be sure of that was to put them in the hands of someone close, someone they could trust.

The investigation came from the bottom of the agency, not the top. In early 1997 a Moscow staffer of the aid agency told the mission director that Hay’s girlfriend had been handed an unfair advantage. The director called the inspector general in Washington, who reports to Congress and not to the agency, and the inspector general sent two agents to Moscow. They worked quietly for six weeks, then the director telephoned Sachs at Harvard. Don’t say anything, she told him. We have a statement.

Sachs was furious. He had warned Shleifer about Russian corruption and had not imagined the corruption would be Harvard’s. When he reached Shleifer, Shleifer tried to call the investigation a vendetta by jealous rival universities. Sachs told the grand jury later that such investments by an HIID adviser were a conflict of interest and would damage the institute. Shleifer fired off a nine-page letter to the Harvard provost calling the inquiry zealous, outrageous, and vicious, and urging the university to cancel the whole Russia program. It was a great time, he wrote, for Harvard to send the aid agency straight to hell.

The agency reached the same destination on its own. On May 20, 1997, after Chubais himself demanded it, the United States killed the project. The termination letter used language a federal agency rarely uses. Shleifer and Hay, it said, had abused the trust of the United States government by using personal relationships for private gain, and had sent the Russians exactly the wrong message while American equipment and staff paid for it. Harvard fired both men from the institute two days later. Shleifer kept his tenured chair in the economics department.

Peter Aldrich, a Boston investor who had put money into Hebert’s fund as a favor to the Shleifers, wanted the truth from Hay. He called Hay to his office and sat him in a chair facing his own. He told Hay he had to know the truth, that he was a fiduciary with other people’s money. Then he asked whether Hay had invested in Russian securities. Hay said no. Aldrich asked if that was his truthful answer. Hay said he had invested for his father, that it was not much. Aldrich pressed. How much. Fifty thousand. Anything else they could hang him on. Nothing else. Aldrich did not believe him. He had reason not to.

Shleifer took the same posture to dinner at the Charles Hotel. He told Aldrich he had been hung out to dry, that he was only a consultant, that the program was Sachs’s and Sachs had run it. The claim that he was a consultant rather than the man in charge became his legal defense, and it would not survive contact with the record.

The government built its case for three years, through a year of gathering and two before a grand jury. The prosecutors wanted a criminal indictment. In the end the United States filed civil charges only. On September 26, 2000, it sued Harvard, Shleifer, Hay, Zimmerman, and Hebert on eleven counts, estimating the government had been cheated of at least forty million dollars and seeking triple that under the False Claims Act. The judge, Douglas Woodlock (b. 1947), dismissed the charges against the two wives for want of pleaded facts.

On June 28, 2004, Woodlock ruled against the two men. The cooperative agreements were real contracts, he wrote, and they carried a duty to stay free of conflicts, and Hay and Shleifer had breached it. He took apart the consultant defense in a sentence. Shleifer ran the entire Russian project, the judge wrote, and to call the head of the project a consultant exempt from the conflict rules would produce an absurd result. He found self-dealing by Shleifer, found that Hay had tried to launder four hundred thousand dollars through his father and his girlfriend, and found that the two men had conspired to defraud the United States.

The money came due in stages. That summer Zimmerman’s firm paid the government a million and a half, the firm having diverted American resources for its own profit. In August 2005, nine years after the walk on the beach at Truro, the parties settled. Harvard paid twenty-six and a half million dollars, the largest such payment in its history. Shleifer paid two million. Hay owed between one and two million, scaled to his future earnings. Shleifer and Zimmerman took out a two-million-dollar mortgage on their Newton house to cover his share. No one admitted liability. Shleifer issued a statement. A man can fight the unlimited resources of the government only so long, he said, and after eight years he had decided to end it, without any admission on his part, because his lawyers told him the fees would run past what he would pay the government.

As the litigation ground forward, Shleifer’s standing among economists rose. The American Economic Association gave him the John Bates Clark Medal in 1999, the prize it awards to the best American economist under forty, a prize whose winners often go on to the Nobel. The citation praised an economist in the old Chicago manner, building simple models and then looking hard at the evidence. The award arrived in the middle of the affair that has trailed him since, and the two facts sat side by side without touching, one in the journals, the other in the courthouse.

His friend rose too. In March 2001 Summers became president of Harvard, and Shleifer and Zimmerman had campaigned for him, holding parties at their house. Summers said under oath that he recused himself from the university’s handling of his friend’s case. He stayed in it anyway. Early in his presidency he told the dean of the faculty, Jeremy Knowles, that he wanted Shleifer kept at Harvard, and Knowles soon promoted Shleifer to a named chair. Two months after the court found Shleifer liable for conspiring to defraud the government, he hosted Summers at a break-the-fast dinner on Yom Kippur. Harvard’s standard procedure for faculty misconduct, the Committee on Professional Conduct, never moved against him. The dean treated him as innocent until the courts spoke, and after the courts spoke the committee’s chairman said the facts were already settled and the matter belonged to the dean, and the dean did nothing.

The silence broke in January 2006, when David McClintick (1940–2021), a Harvard alumnus and former Wall Street Journal reporter, published an eighteen-thousand-word account of the affair in Institutional Investor. He had read the depositions and the court record and gone to Russia twice. He laid out the conduct and the protection in a single narrative for the first time, and someone mailed copies to the senior faculty. At a faculty meeting that February, a mechanical engineer named Frederick Abernathy rose and said he had been on the faculty more than forty-five years and was no longer easily shocked, and that the Shleifer affair had shocked him. He asked the president for his opinion of it. Summers said he had taken no role in the university’s handling of the case and had not familiarized himself with the facts, and so could not express an opinion. The room murmured. A zoologist called the outcome of the tawdry Shleifer affair unthinkable under the last two presidents and characteristic of the present one. One of Shleifer’s own colleagues defended him to the press in the same week and said that by any measure the man was on a trajectory to the Nobel.

Summers resigned the presidency weeks later. The Russia affair was not the only charge against him, but it was the one his colleagues trusted least to his own account. The institute Shleifer had run did not survive either. Harvard dissolved it and folded its pieces into the schools. Asked years afterward whether he had been punished, Shleifer answered from an airplane that he was glad to have the matter behind him.

He returned to his work and never left it. He kept the chair, the citations, and the editorship of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, which under his hand became a main venue for the empirical economics he favored. In 1994, with Josef Lakonishok and Vishny, he had founded a money-management firm, LSV Asset Management, on the same insight that drove his academic work, that markets misprice in patterns a patient investor can name and use. The firm grew to manage tens of billions.

His later work turned toward the mind. With Nicola Gennaioli he built a theory of diagnostic expectations, which holds that people do not weigh the future by cold probability but seize on the vivid case, the scenario that feels representative, and overweight it. Optimism and panic ride on the same habit, and so do credit booms and crashes. The argument runs through A Crisis of Beliefs: Investor Psychology and Financial Fragility (2018). Into the mid-2020s, with Pedro Bordalo, Gennaioli, and others, he has pushed toward a general account of how men sort problems into categories, pull the wrong memories, and price credit and inflation by feel rather than by sum.

Four decades of work return to one idea. Men are not rational, and the societies that prosper are the ones whose laws and markets and courts make imperfect men behave as if they were. He proved the point about managers, about politicians, about whole legal traditions. The hardest test of it ran through Moscow, through his own hands, where the rules existed to fence in the exact temptation he met. His own institute had named the test years before he failed it. They asked how a thing would look on the front page of the New York Times, and they said that if you had to ask, you were already too close to the line.

Notes

What carries the scenes. The boy in the Soviet general’s uniform, the bicycle rides to school in Moscow, his engineer parents being assigned their jobs by the Soviet state, the family’s 1976 HIAS-assisted emigration to Rochester, his learning English by watching *Charlie’s Angels*, and the sophomore walking into Lawrence Summers’s office to correct a paper all come from David McClintick’s account: How Harvard Lost Russia (also available at University of Vermont). These are the most colorful episodes in the biography and rely primarily on a single reporter. If you want additional confirmation before publication, this is the area that deserves the closest scrutiny.

The investment details also come from McClintick and the court record on which he relied. These include the August 11, 1994 wire transfer of $165,000 to a Channel Islands account, the purchase of Purneftegas shares, the investment’s growth to more than $4 million by early November, the 90-10 split with Farallon, the registration of the account in Jonathan Hay’s father-in-law’s name, the Farallon partner’s grand jury testimony describing Russia as the “Wild West” and identifying Anatoly Chubais as political protection, and the use of Len Blavatnik’s aluminum investment vehicles. The same two links above document these details. Harry Lewis’s summary provides a concise explanation of the settlement figures: Some Russian Money Flows Back to Harvard.

The Lawrence Summers warning is rendered as a paraphrase rather than a quotation, and I did not invent any dialogue. The documented version, including the remarks that “There might be a scandal, and you could become embroiled… People might want to make Andrei a problem some day. The world’s a shitty place,” appears in McClintick’s article. I deliberately avoided reconstructing dialogue for Shleifer, Nancy Zimmerman, Chubais, or the Russian reformers because there is no reliable record of what they said in those conversations.

The settlement and its aftermath are documented by multiple sources. Harvard ultimately paid $26.5 million, Shleifer paid $2 million, and Zimmerman’s investment firm had earlier paid $1.5 million, for a total of at least $31 million. A federal judge ruled in 2005 that Shleifer and Jonathan Hay had conspired to defraud the United States. Shleifer mortgaged his house to help finance the settlement. There was no admission of liability and no criminal prosecution. Sources include Harvard Magazine, Inside Higher Ed, The Harvard Crimson, and Harry Lewis’s blog. The anonymously mailed copies of McClintick’s article, the February 2006 faculty meeting and the audible reaction in the room, and Summers’s resignation are described by Harry Lewis and *The Harvard Crimson*. Frederick Abernathy’s description of the affair as a “disgraceful blotch” and Summers’s BlackBerry response from an airplane come from *Inside Higher Ed*.

The scholarship and honors are drawn from multiple standard sources. These include the John Bates Clark Medal in 1999, RePEc’s ranking of Shleifer as the world’s most-cited economist, including his position at the top in 2024, the “old Chicago tradition” description of his scholarship, his seven books, his editorship of the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, and the founding of LSV Asset Management in 1994 with Josef Lakonishok and Robert Vishny. Sources include Wikipedia, the American Economic Association, and Shleifer’s Harvard biography. The discussions of “The Limits of Arbitrage,” the legal origins literature, *The Grabbing Hand*, diagnostic expectations, *A Crisis of Beliefs*, and his mid-2020s work on cognition follow your uploaded draft together with the Wikipedia entry.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, the career, economic theories, and policy record of Harvard economist Andrei Shleifer serve as a devastating empirical proof of realism, disguised as a tragedy of failed liberal planning.

Shleifer is one of the most cited economists in the world, famous for his pioneering work in behavioral finance, the legal origins theory of economic growth, and transition economics. During the early 1990s, he led the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) project in Moscow, serving as a primary advisor to the Russian government. Alongside Jeffrey Sachs and Anatoly Chubais, Shleifer was a chief architect of Russian privatization, designing the voucher program meant to rapidly transform a collapsing command economy into a free market.

Mearsheimer’s framework in The Great Delusion cuts directly through Shleifer’s institutional blueprints, showing that his project was doomed from its inception because it misunderstood human nature.

First, Shleifer’s privatization program treated human beings as atomistic, rational utility-maximizers. The theory assumed that if you handed state assets to individuals via vouchers, a rule-bound, efficient market architecture would spontaneously emerge through self-interest and legal incentives.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology counters that humans are fundamentally social and tribal beings whose moral frameworks are shaped by intense early socialization. They do not operate as isolated economic units in a historical vacuum. When Shleifer dismantled the Soviet state machinery, he did not unlock a nation of latent Western-style entrepreneurs. Instead, he destroyed the primary collective structure that provided social cohesion and basic predictability.

In the sudden security vacuum, human nature defaulted to its core logic: individuals retreated into defensive micro-societies, kinship networks, and criminal syndicates to survive and capture resources. What the West termed the rise of the “oligarchs” and Russian mafia was simply tribal realism filling an empty space. The legal rules Shleifer tried to superimpose were completely subverted by the primal demand for group survival and competitive leverage.

Second, Shleifer’s broader academic project—the Legal Origins Theory—posits that a country’s economic development is deeply influenced by whether its legal system stems from British common law or French civil law. He argues that common law structures provide better protection for individual property rights, leading to superior financial markets.

Under Mearsheimer’s lens, this theory mistakes a secondary cultural artifact for a primary engine. Legal frameworks do not generate social order; a cohesive, powerful cultural group generates legal frameworks to secure its own position and interests. The British common law system did not succeed because of an abstract, superior logical design. It succeeded because it was backed by the state machinery of a highly cohesive, expansionist nation-state. When a liberal state tries to export these legal codes to a region with different historical value infusions, the imported laws are inevitably hollowed out or rewritten by local group loyalties.

Finally, Shleifer’s own downfall in the Moscow project—which resulted in a major federal lawsuit by the U.S. government over conflict-of-interest allegations regarding personal investments in Russia—illustrates Mearsheimer’s point that reason is subordinate to sentiment and affiliation.

A standard liberal analysis views the HIID scandal as an isolated ethical lapse by an individual actor. Under Mearsheimer’s lens, it shows the fragility of the technocratic illusion. Even a brilliant, elite academic operating at the highest levels of global planning cannot detach himself from immediate, personal, and factional networks of interest.

If Mearsheimer is right, Shleifer’s work proves that you cannot engineer a society using abstract economic textbooks. The institutional designs of liberal economists are fragile structures that are easily crushed or co-opted by the enduring, tribal nature of man.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, the foundational research of Andrei Shleifer in behavioral finance, law and economics, and transition economics represents a highly optimized system for converting chaotic, raw power struggles into neat, academic models of institutional and psychological deviation. As one of the most cited economists in the world, Shleifer has built an immense reputation by charting how markets fail, how governments extract wealth, and how investor psychology produces financial instability.
A Pinsofian analysis strips away the high-status academic framework of this research to expose the strategic logic of the actors involved—including Shleifer himself.
Consider his influential work on political economy and transition economics, particularly his 1998 book with Robert Vishny, The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures. Shleifer argues that state corruption, bureaucratic red tape, and bad regulations are pathologies—malfunctions of government that enrichment-seeking politicians use to choke economic growth. He presents these pathologies as structural errors that can be cured through privatization and better legal design.
But if Pinsof speaks the truth, the “grabbing hand” of the state is not a pathology or an administrative misunderstanding of economic efficiency. The state is the ultimate coercive apparatus. Subsidies, regulatory barriers, and corrupt payoffs are highly rational, self-serving instruments used by competing political factions to reward their allies, protect their coalitions, and deprive their rivals of resources. The politicians and bureaucrats running these systems understand their immediate incentives perfectly. They are not confused by economic theory; they are playing a zero-sum game to win.
This logic highlights the irony of Shleifer’s real-world advisory role in the 1990s, when he directed the Harvard Institute for International Development’s project to assist in the privatization of post-Soviet Russia. The project aimed to implement rational market reforms to correct decades of communist economic misdirection.
Instead, the transition became a fierce, high-stakes competition over the massive resources of a collapsing empire. Local actors did not misuse privatization because they misunderstood Western economic models. They used the newly created property rules as weapons to capture immense wealth, create oligarchical structures, and secure control over the coercive levers of the state. They responded to immediate incentives as rational primates would.
Shleifer’s more recent work with Nicola Gennaioli on investor psychology, such as A Crisis of Beliefs: Investor Psychology and Financial Fragility and his subsequent papers on “diagnostic expectations,” follows a similar pattern. This research models how investors rely on selective memory, overreact to recent news, and form optimistic stereotypes that fuel market bubbles and predictable financial crises. To the academic elite, this provides a highly sophisticated platform to diagnose the irrationality of market participants.
From Pinsof’s perspective, framing the behavior of investors or market cycles as a collection of cognitive errors and memory distortions serves as a powerful high-status mission statement. It positions the elite financial economist as the necessary choice architect or regulator who stands above the psychological fray, possessing the superior rationality required to monitor expectations and design systemic guardrails.
Shleifer did not discover a series of fixable institutional pathologies or psychological errors in the global economy. He executed an exceptionally effective academic strategy, using rigorous mathematics and legal-origins data to climb to the absolute peak of the university hierarchy, secure the John Bates Clark Medal, and maintain a dominant, high-prestige position within elite institutions. His work provides university circles with a brilliant map of the structural flaws in markets and states, demonstrating that defining the behavior of your subjects as a misunderstanding is the ultimate tool for institutional authority.

How Harvard Lost Russia

David McClintick writes Jan. 13, 2006:

The best and brightest of America’s premier university came to Moscow in the 1990s to teach Russians how to be capitalists. This is the inside story of how their efforts led to scandal and disgrace.

Since being named president of Harvard University in 2001, former U.S. Treasury secretary Lawrence Summers has sparked a series of controversies that have grabbed headlines. Summers incurred the wrath of African-Americans when he belittled the work of controversial religion professor Cornel West (who left for Princeton University); last year he infuriated faculty and students alike when he seemed to disparage the innate scientific abilities of women at a Massachusetts economic conference, igniting a national uproar that nearly cost him his job; last fall brought the departure of Jack Meyer, the head of Harvard Management Co., which oversees the school’s endowment but had inflamed some in the community because of the multimillion-dollar salaries it pays some of its managers.

Then, in quiet contrast, there is the case of economics professor Andrei Shleifer, who in the mid-1990s led a Harvard advisory program in Russia that collapsed in disgrace. In August, after years of litigation, Harvard, Shleifer and others agreed to pay at least $31 million to settle a lawsuit brought by the U.S. government. Harvard had been charged with breach of contract, Shleifer and an associate, Jonathan Hay, with conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government.

Shleifer remains a faculty member in good standing. Colleagues say that is because he is a close longtime friend and collaborator of Summers.

In the following pages investigative journalist David McClintick, a Harvard alumnus, chronicles Shleifer’s role in the university’s Russia Project and how his friendship with Summers has protected him from the consequences of that debacle inside America’s premier academic institution.

The man who had guided Poland’s economic reform, Jeffrey Sachs, an economics professor at Harvard University, was a boyish-looking 35-year-old with explosive energy and little patience. An economic wunderkind, Sachs had passed the general examinations for his Ph.D. and was invited to join the rarefied Harvard Society of Fellows while he was still a Harvard undergraduate. He won tenure in the department of economics at age 29.

Sachs had begun advising the Polish Solidarity Movement before it took control of the government in August 1989. He invited another Harvard-trained economist, David Lipton, to work with him. Lipton, who had been Sachs’ student, had spent most of the 1980s at the International Monetary Fund. On January 1, 1990, following Sachs’ and Lipton’s advice, the Polish government introduced what came to be known as “shock therapy” — the rapid conversion of all property and assets from public to private ownership. After initial shortages and inflation, goods and services soon were flowing through the economy in unprecedented varieties and quantities; prices stabilized.

Though envious of Poland’s success, Russian reformers knew their task would be much more difficult. “When socialism collapsed in Poland, an entire generation of people still remembered what markets, market institutions and private ownership were,” Gaidar wrote in State and Evolution: Russia’s Search for a Free Market, published in 2003. “In Russia there was no such experience to be had. In 1991 the vast majority of Russian citizens had never seen a normal retail shop.”

Still, the Polish experiment was getting worldwide publicity, and it wasn’t long before Moscow reached out to Sachs, who began formally advising the Russians in late 1991, simultaneously with the official dissolution of the Soviet Union. In November, Gaidar invited Sachs and Lipton to work with the new economic team.

Moscow by then was crowded with foreigners eager to help Russia and get in on the ground floor of a great social and economic change. Entrepreneurs, consultants, lawyers, bankers and academics with foundation grants, as well as fast-buck artists and swindlers from all over the world, swarmed across Russia looking for a piece of the action. The atmosphere was charged with possibility and fraught with danger. Financial transactions were mostly conducted in cash; cities were awash in rubles. Kidnappings were common, as was gunfire and even bombings. Organized crime darkened the already grim picture.

Russia’s leaders felt a near-apocalyptic sense of urgency. They understood that to prevent chaos they had to quickly lay the foundation for a Russian-style capitalism or face a return to authoritarianism couched as a restoration of law and order. Even as Yeltsin’s reformers got to work, they faced strong opposition from reactionary former Communists who protested the speed and cost of change.

Sachs wasn’t the only Harvard professor in Moscow in the summer and fall of 1991. No fewer than four university affiliates — the John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Russian Research Center, HIID and the economics department — were represented. Graham Allison, the founding dean of the Kennedy School, was pushing an updated version of the 500 Days plan with its co-author, liberal economist Grigory Yavlinsky. Marshall Goldman, the director of Harvard’s venerable Russian Research Center and a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union for decades, was providing counsel to various parties. Sachs, thanks to his experience in Poland, emerged as the leading figure among these notables. In Moscow he encountered yet another Harvard colleague, Andrei Shleifer. Shleifer had been sent to Moscow by the World Bank, where Summers, on leave from Harvard, was serving as chief economist. Shleifer possessed a distinct advantage over other Westerners: He was a native of Russia and fluent in the language, having been born there in 1961. His parents were engineers, a profession the state chose for them. Shleifer revealed at an early age that he was ambitious; in a photograph taken when he was six, he is dressed as a Soviet Army general. When a friend transferred to one of the best schools in Moscow, Shleifer bicycled there and didn’t leave until he had persuaded the principal to admit him as well.

The Shleifers left Russia in 1976 with the help of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and moved to Rochester, New York. Andrei later claimed he learned most of his English by watching the popular television show Charlie’s Angels. He excelled in mathematics and was admitted to Harvard College. In his sophomore year he went to see Summers and pointed out errors in a paper the young assistant professor had written. Summers, the nephew of two Nobel laureates in economics, soon took Shleifer under his wing. Like Sachs, Summers was one of the youngest economists ever granted tenure by Harvard — they had made it the same year. Summers guided Shleifer onto a similar path, and the friends maintained their close relationship after Summers went to the World Bank in 1991.

There was no love lost between Sachs and Summers, who had been rivals as newly tenured prodigies. Each had to be the smartest man in the room; their presence at faculty meetings ensured lively debate tinged with animosity. Shleifer had a similar personality, and when the confident upstart encountered Sachs in Moscow, he didn’t get along any better with Sachs than his mentor did.

Posted in Economics, Russia | Comments Off on Andrei Shleifer and the Harvard Economists Who Looted Russia